Mothering the Fatherland

Nationalism and Gender in Eastern Europe

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Abstract

Although the study of nationalism has expanded over the last decade as nationalist movements have increasingly resulted in violent conflict, constructions of gender have not been widely recognised as integral elements of these nationalist projects. Through an examination of nationalist movements in two case studies, this thesis found that gender constructions are vital to the legitimation of nationalist movements.

The need to integrate gender (meaning the constructions of both men and women) into studies of nationalist movements stems from the fact that nationalism is a social phenomenon reliant on certain social norms and guidelines for its legitimacy. Nationalism and gender were examined through two thematic lenses, the politics of tradition and the politics of reproduction. The politics of tradition incorporates symbolic aspects of gender, in which the manipulation of tradition and history play a major part. The politics of reproduction are comprised of gender constructions based on the "natural" roles for men and women, such as father and mother. This section examines manifestations of gender constructions such as pronatalism and rape. These lenses were then used to examine two countries in which there were leadership legitimation crises, Romania and the former Yugoslavia. As socialist legitimacy was eroded in the 1980s, potential leaders in both countries sought to legitimate themselves through nationalist ideology. These nationalist movements, which occurred during both the late socialist and post-socialist periods, were highly gendered in their rhetoric and discourse.

Gender constructions were found to be vital in the demarcation of difference between national groups, and in the mobilisation of communities to achieve national projects. The symbolic and emotive elements of these gender constructions were used to create the perception of internal and external threats. Additionally, gender constructions were found to have long-term effects on ethnic relations, and, in the case of the former Yugoslavia, on the nature of violent conflict and prospects for peace.

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Chapter One
Introduction

Gender is a useful tool for political analysis.[1] Many modern political phenomena, such as nationalist movements, are heavily reliant upon and imbued with gender constructions, particularly as part of attempts to legitimate leadership. Seeing gender as problematic, not axiomatic, allows a deeper understanding of such social structures and of political power. [2] This thesis demonstrates the need for incorporating gender into the study of nationalism, and illuminates the utility of gender as an analytical device.

This thesis examines how certain nationalist movements legitimate themselves in part through this gendered nationalist discourse. By looking at a problematic definition of gender in nationalist movements, we can see how identities that are often perceived as natural and immutable are actually constructed, and how they are utilised to create and maintain power structures.

Eastern Europe is useful for illuminating the intersection of gender and nationalism. The roles of women and men within these societies, the nationalist movements that have developed in the area, and the conflicts that have arisen since the breakdown of the Soviet Union all provide compelling examples of why this is an important area to research. The late 1980s and early 1990s were a time of upheaval for many communities in Eastern Europe.[3] The end of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe in 1989 exacerbated and resulted in crises of legitimacy for communist leadership in the Eastern European countries. The subsequent "revolutions" were

[1] Scott, 1988, p 28
[2] Ibid, p 49
[3] By Eastern Europe I am referring to Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Bulgaria, the regions of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Hercegovina. While these official boundaries have shifted recently, the general areas remain the same.

varied in both form and content: some erupted into violence, some have not changed their power infrastructure in any significant way, and others are perceived to be well on the road to capitalist democracy. One characteristic many of these states have had in common has been the use of nationalist concepts and ideology to legitimate political power. These nationalist discourses were (and are) highly gendered in both rhetoric and policy.

Many of the borders of Eastern Europe were imposed after WWI, and are partially along "ethnic" lines and partially in accordance with the politics of the Allies. The various groupings of people, and how they identified themselves, were generally either quashed or manipulated by the Soviet-influenced leadership. With the collapse of the USSR's influence in the region in the late 1980s, these ethnic, religious, and historical identifications became rallying points for nationalist conflicts. The gender aspect of these identifications is complex, and is interwoven with the professedly traditional and historically "pure" roles of the various nationalist groupings. With these issues in mind, this thesis will be looking at Romania and the former Yugoslavia. In both countries, nationalist sentiment was manipulated by various groups throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, incorporating both socialist and post-socialist time periods. These case studies clarify the utility of studying gender in relation to the legitimation and maintenance of power by demonstrating how, in crisis, nationalist movements overtly draw on gendered conceptions to assume legitimacy.

Socialist nations had their own dynamics of legitimation and maintenance of power, one of the main methods being the inculcation of certain societal norms.[4] In some countries, this was combined with the exploitation of ethnic nationalist sentiments for political ends. Rather than adhering to the traditional interpretation of Marxist theory, which maintained that communism would transcend national boundaries and eliminate the need for nationalist goals,[5] nationalist sentiments were often manipulated to maintain the power of the leadership. As the political and military support structures around them disintegrated and economic (and social) crisis

[4] Verdery, 1991b, p 418-19
[5] Ramet, 1992, p 42

loomed, the contenders for power increasingly turned to ethnic nationalist ideology for legitimation.

Legitimation in such instances was sought through the claim to authenticity for the nation, specifically through the "naturalness" of the nation. This involves drawing on what are purportedly natural roles and identities, such as family structures, when justifying a patriarchal leadership, to form the basis for wider societal organisation. This legitimacy was gained in part through the co-option of gender roles and relationships. Romania and Yugoslavia, the countries analysed in this thesis, demonstrate the power to be gained not just by the manipulation of these roles, but in the inculcation of the norms that they prescribe. These norms not only define who does and does not meet the criteria for membership in the nation, and who is defined as the enemy, but they also imbue a sense of validity for the national project. These norms are based on what are professed to be absolutes that have innate validity because they are eternal and natural: just as the nation is.

This thesis examines two countries in which there were leadership legitimation crises. In the 1980s, under socialist leadership, it was through the aegis of socialist ideology that the regimes were legitimated. However, as this legitimacy was eroded, potential leaders in both countries sought to legitimate themselves via a nationalist discourse. After the collapse of socialism, as former social certainties were thrown into confusion, the nationalist rhetoric intensified as various leaders sought to gain leadership legitimacy through nationalist concepts. By looking at these legitimation crises, we can see how the utilisation of gender as an identifier and as a symbol in nationalist movements becomes overt. The use of nationalist dialogue to legitimise a particular group or ideology opens a window on the gendered nature of power structures. The movements discussed in this thesis rely on gendered constructs to demonstrate their right to govern. The claim they make for in leadership is dependent upon gender constructions and, in conflict, gendered warfare.

The case studies are examined through two thematic lenses: the politics of tradition and the politics of reproduction. The politics of tradition incorporates the more symbolic aspects of gender, in which the manipulation of tradition and history play a major part. In this section, the instances of retraditionalisation in the case study

countries is investigated, which involves policies aimed at moving women out of the work force and into the home. To justify this, nationalist leaders called on the mythology of the nation to strengthen their power bases and demonise the "other": those who represented either an external or internal threat to the nation. The politics of reproduction deals with gender constructions that are based on "natural" roles for men and women, such as father and mother. This section examines how nationalist movements attempt to control these constructions, and deals with themes such as rape as a nationalist tool of war, and pronatalism.

Studies of nationalism have generally taken one of two approaches when confronted with the role of gender. One approach has ignored gender as irrelevant, as it is often perceived to be synonymous with women, and therefore pertains only to the private sphere of society. Because nationalist movements and the key figures in them are in the public arena, there is no need to incorporate a gender dimension. Scott's summation of this reasoning, that an understanding of an issue "is not changed by knowing that women participated in it", is made regarding history, but is true of much social science literature.[6] On an international level, studies have tended to focus on the strictly official, public realm (which usually involves heads of state and negotiators) and neglects aspects of gender. The second approach to gender analysis also equates gender with the study of women. These studies focus solely on activities at the local level, rather than in the wider context of the larger community. This approach examines the private realm of women, rather than examining the larger implications of gender for the whole community.

The need to incorporate gender (meaning the constructions of both men and women) into studies of nationalist movements stems from the fact that nationalism is a social phenomenon which relies on certain social norms and guidelines for its effectiveness. Gender is "one of the most basic organising principles in human societies, past and present".[7] To understand the power of nationalist movements as motivating forces, then, we require an understanding of how these social organisations interact on symbolic, community, and individual levels. As is evident in the literature review in chapter two, gender is noticeably absent in the discussions on nationalist

[6] Scott, 1988, p 30-1
[7] Verdery & Borocz, 1994, p 223

movements and constructions. While some theorists do address social issues such as class[8], it is only recently that there has been an incorporation on any level of the role gender plays.

The study of gender in nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon and has only been incorporated into this literature for little over a decade. As discussed above, gender is a basic unit of social construction.[9] Gender as a basic building block of society is important in the study of nationalism. In the last decade, there has been a growing acceptance that gender plays an integral role in how people perceive themselves and are perceived within a group.

Nationalism's place as an "important" field of study is evident not just in the massive body of literature that is already present on the subject, but also in the number of current struggles, both violent and peaceful, between groups that identify themselves as nationalistic. The study of this type of group identification is important for the analysis of how people situate themselves within a community. Both gender and nation are significant ways people identify themselves within a community. Within most nationalist movements, gender roles are defined in fairly specific ways. As will be demonstrated through the examples of crisis, and particularly in conflict, gender constructions are not only transformed and entrenched by conflict, but also help to determine certain characteristics of the conflict itself.

It is important to note that there are limitations on a project of this nature. The primary qualification is the difference in emphasis on various aspects of the case studies. Both Romania and Yugoslavia provide ample evidence of the incorporation into and manipulation of gender in the nationalist project. However, the particular manifestations of these constructions vary, and it is important to recognise that these idiosyncratic experiences result in a variation of emphasis in the case study section.

There are also certain factors, such as language and distance, that limit the amount of primary information available from the case studies. In areas of conflict, such as the former Yugoslavia, there is often information available that is skewed towards one "side" or the other. Because this thesis is in English (the native language

[8] Hobsbawm, 1983a, for example.
[9] Verdery & Borocz, 1994, p 223

of the author) there is a danger that English language information has a particular bias. Therefore, this primary material has principally been examined in the context of exploring propaganda and rhetoric.

The issue of language and geographical distance also presents the problem of access to primary information. While this has been alleviated by access to information over the internet, I have been reliant on many secondary sources for information. This has influenced the nature of the case studies, as much of the information and analysis is based on other investigations and studies.

The nature of the topic of this thesis and the geographical difficulties in primary research require that this thesis be theory-based, and that it draw on secondary sources for the case studies. Because this is a theoretical, qualitative approach rather than a quantitative approach, the analysis will consist of a large amount of "theory knitting". This will include a synthesis of theories and discussions from a wide range of disciplines including political science, history, anthropology and sociology. These writings and theories include relevant works on nationalism, particularly "seminal" writings on nationalism, those that address gender issues, feminist writings, and conflict theory, among others.

This thesis first explores the role of gender in nationalism, and then examines how nationalist movements incorporate and utilise conceptions of gender. This demonstrates how gender is imbedded in our understanding of politics in a way that often seems so natural that it is deemed irrelevant. This thesis looks at gender in nationalist legitimation crises. The relationship between nationalism and gender is then illustrated and explored in Romania and Yugoslavia.

The second chapter reviews the theoretical issue this thesis addresses, namely nationalism. This includes a general discussion of the major themes in the discipline. This section begins with an overview of the various arguments in the literature, attempting to identify the general theories of how nationalism becomes important in a community and how it is legitimised. The chapter discusses the modernist paradigm and its main critiques. Additionally, there is a brief examination of theories of nationalism in Eastern Europe, particularly how they are unique, or different from nationalisms in the West.

The third chapter discusses gender constructions in nationalist movements, and examines the exclusion of this area from nationalist literature. This chapter includes an overview of the models of both gender and nationalism and women and nationalism that have been proposed by various authors. This chapter also covers how gender is located as important in nationalist theory, how gender roles are conceptualised in these movements, and includes an analysis of why this is so important to nationalist movements. Not all nationalist groups perceive gender in the same way or as playing the same role in nationalist movements. Rather, this chapter shows that there are trends and similarities that are useful in this examination.

The fourth chapter provides the framework for the analysis of the case studies, by presenting the "lenses" through which these countries are examined: the politics of tradition and the politics of reproduction. This chapter includes a detailed examination of how gender constructions are manifested in the national project, including the rhetoric and policies of nationalist leaders, and in the policies and actions of nationalist movements.

The fifth and sixth chapters are the case studies of Romania and the former Yugoslavia. The structure of this thesis seeks to utilise these Eastern Europe examples as a means of explaining, illustrating and clarifying the various theories discussed. These sections examine the gendered nature of nationalist rhetoric and discourse in the media, history, and popular culture. These chapters discuss various nationalist strategies such as pronatalism, and will canvass particular nationalist aspects of rape.

By examining the particular way that gender is incorporated into the nationalist discourse, this thesis reveals the gendered symbolic representations and manifestations of nationalist rhetoric. These in turn show the reliance of nationalist movements on male and female ideals. These ideals are used to construct national identities that are different from those of other nations. These identities are used in the presentation of threat to the safety and integrity of the nation, and can be manipulated to achieve nationalist goals such as population growth. They can be used as a tool of war, such as rape. The utility of understanding the problematic nature of gender in these identities is that it helps in understanding what is driving nationalist movements, and how they engender such powerful responses in today's world.

Chapter Two
Nationalism

Chapter two reviews the major themes of nationalism, with a particular focus on nationalism and legitimation. The emphasis is on the modern manifestations of nationalist movements, how they command such deep allegiance, and the source of their legitimacy. The first two sections, modernism and the critiques of modernism, do not present a definition of nationalism; rather, they provide an overview of the general debates on the topic as they relate to this thesis. The third section discusses theories on what are purported to be Eastern European types of nationalism.

Seymour, Couture and Nielsen trace a split in nationalist theories along the division between Ernest Renan and Johann Gottfried Herder, two of the earliest and more influential theorists on nationalism.[10] The contention is that the differentiation between Renan's civic and Herder's ethnic nationalisms led to the current groupings of modernist and pre-modern typologies. The assertion of Renan, that the "nation is a voluntary association of individuals", contrasts sharply with that of Herder, who theorised the nation as "a collective body which transcends each individual", and in which ancestry counts more than an individual's choice or desire to belong.[11]

While it is acknowledged that this is a simplified version of complex arguments, the division nonetheless becomes the basis for the subsequent separation between modern and premodern theorists. The rationale for this is that despite attempts to reconceptualise nationalism, it is the dichotomy between civic and ethnic that reappears in one form or another.[12] In a stance that is repeated by Smith (discussed below), the ultimate reason for maintaining this particular opposition is the

[10] Seymour, Couture and Nielsen, 1998
[11] Ibid., p 2-3
[12] Ibid., p 6

general acceptance of civic nationalism by academics and theorists, while ethnic nationalism is held up by nationalist movements as the rationale and legitimation for their struggles.[13] Both the modernist and premodernist approaches follow on from the civic/ethnic debate, and are therefore concerned primarily with the *origin* of the nation.[14] Seymour, Couture and Nielsen's critique of their own work is that by operating within this paradigm, these definitions and explanations are self-limiting and therefore leave "no conceptual space for normative arguments or normative issues."[15] Premodern theory is not utilised as a theoretical tool to the extent that modernist theory is. Because there is not the same degree of rigorous critical analysis of premodern theory, the door is closed on other critiques of modern nationalist theory, which makes Seymour, Couture and Nielsen's framework inappropriate for the purposes of this thesis. By utilising this categorisation, which the authors themselves refer to as limiting, other critiques have been excluded from consideration.

Another way of categorising nationalist theory is to make the division along functionalist lines, arguing that since modernist theorists offer the prevailing paradigm, they are the important ones to study.[16] For example, Smith draws on the major critiques of the prevailing paradigm, rather than limiting himself to the ethnic/civic debate.[17] This approach outlines the major themes in modernist writings on nationalism, and then offers critiques of these models and conceptions. Although relegating critiques to the end of his work, Smith still presents a useful model for the grouping of theories.

Smith summarises the basic tenets of modernism in five main points. First, modernism asserts the modernity of nations, in their location in time, in their institutions, and in their concepts. Second, nations could only arise through "modern conditions and modernising policies".[18] Third, because nations only arose through certain conditions, once those conditions no longer existed, neither would nations. Fourth, this held for nationalism as well, in that nationalism would disappear with the disappearance of these conditions. Finally, nationalisms were socially constructed

[13] Ibid., p 9
[14] Smith, 1998, p 10
[15] Seymour, Couture and Nielsen, 1998, p 10
[16] Smith, 1998
[17] Ibid.,
[18] Ibid., p 22

identities, "designed for an age of revolutions and mass mobilisation, and central to the attempts to control these processes of rapid social change."[19] Smith's characterisation of what is part of the modernist paradigm may be somewhat simplistic, especially in regards to the degree of agreement over numbers three and four above, as he makes assumptions regarding the maintenance of the nation that can be disputed. His argument on these points assumes that what is made can be unmade, rather than recognising how difficult it is to redefine nationalist identities once they have been formed. Nevertheless, he presents a useful framework for the authors included here.

Smith's categorisation permits an examination of how the dominant paradigm addresses the relevant issues, while allowing for critique and input from other theorists. This modernist section below will first examine Gellner, Hobsbawm, Breuilly, and Anderson as examples of various theorists in the modernist paradigm. The two main critiques are represented by Hutchinson and Smith.

Modernism

One of the mainstays of the modernist argument is Gellner's hypothesis that nations are modern constructs reliant on a certain type of societal organisation.[20]

> Nationalism – the principle of homogenous cultural units as the foundations of political life, and of the obligatory cultural unity of rulers and ruled – is indeed inscribed neither in the nature of things, nor in the hearts of men, nor in the pre-conditions of social life in general, and the contention that it is so inscribed is a falsehood which nationalist doctrine has succeeded in presenting as self-evident. But nationalism as a phenomenon, not as a doctrine presented by nationalists, is inherent in a certain set of social conditions."[21]

It is the current organisation of society that encourages the pairing of central culture and central state. The transformation from agrarian to industrial societies propelled high cultures – those that are comprised of a literate, homogeneously

[19] Ibid., p 22
[20] Gellner, 1983
[21] Ibid., p 125

educated population – to the fore. This transformation required the development of a "shared culture, and a literate sophisticated high culture at that."[22]

This high culture is imposed through education, communication, the media and other means on low cultures. In other words, what were formerly small local folk groups are now bonded together in a large, uniform culture. Nationalism is usually evoked by representing a culture as under threat from a foreign, high culture that seeks to eradicate it or subsume it. Gellner has presented this as a progression that often leads to conflict: a movement looking for "national liberation". [23]

Nations and nationalism transform/create/obliterate pre-existing cultures. Nationalism uses history to create something which looks natural, but which has often transformed history quite radically, and not accidentally. Indeed, "the cultures it claims to defend and revive are often its own invention, or are modified out of all recognition."[24] This, says Gellner, is the paradox of nationalism. It professes to be something natural and inevitable. We are then unable to conceive of a world where nations are not the natural structure of global systems, and a state without a nation (and vice versa) is a "tragedy" and is "incomplete".[25] Gellner has emphasised that nationalism is a phenomenon of the modern age in which certain preconditions have been met.[26]

Hobsbawm has also discussed the paradox between the invented nature of a nation's history and the claim that this history is "rooted in the remotest antiquity, and the opposite of constructed, namely human communities so 'natural' as to require no definition other than self assertion."[27] He developed the concept of the "invented tradition", defined as "a set of practices...of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seeks to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past."[28] He described a process wherein such traditions are

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[22] Ibid., p 141
[23] Ibid., p 57-8
[24] Ibid., p 55-6
[25] Ibid., p 6
[26] Gellner (1983) puts forth arguments that are useful in conceptualising several pertinent issues. One is the relationship of nation and the desire for a state. Another is the example that Gellner gives of the "Ruritanians". This coincides with the example of Romania, in which "traditional" songs were sung and peasant dress worn by people of high social standing in times of nationalist fervour.
[27] Hobsbawm, Eric, 1983a, p 13-14
[28] Ibid., p 1

made to appear to have basis and therefore legitimacy in a connection with the past.[29] The three motivations Hobsbawm described are to create unity in a group, the "legitimisation... of authority", and the "inculcation of... value systems."[30] These all lead to the defining of group membership and identification with a particular group. Co-option, manipulation and invention of cultural signifiers are particularly relevant when examined in the context of gender, which Hobsbawm and the other theorists discussed in this chapter have not done.

As a means of illustrating the mechanisms of these invented traditions, Hobsbawm draws on the examples of the Third Republic in France, and the Second German Empire. He distils three common devices. The first is what he calls the "secular equivalent of the church", or the institutionalisation of concepts and ideas of the nation through such means as education.[31] The second is that of public ceremonies: in the French case, for example, Bastille Day. These memorialise the formation of the nation and give citizens cause to celebrate. Finally, the third device is the creation of public monuments on a wide scale. These include not just the large, imposing statues, but the mass production of smaller scale figures.[32]

Hobsbawm described the blurring of the line between civil and state society as the state standardises cultural and traditional symbols.[33] This dynamic has particular relevance to the situation in Eastern Europe, where this "blurring" took place under state socialism as well. Finally, and perhaps of greatest consequence, Hobsbawm has made explicit the use and manufacture of actual traditions in relation to defining and legitimising the nation, pointing to this as an integral way in which the nation creates itself. This has obvious implications for the role of gender in the later stages of this chapter, both in the symbols that are utilised, and the creation of tradition for nationalist ends.

Smith has claimed that "Hobsbawm provides no clue as to why nationalism has been so successful."[34] While this is overstating the case, there is a lack of a solid

[29] Ibid., p 4-9
[30] Ibid., p 9
[31] Hobsbawm, 1983b, p 271
[32] Ibid., p 271-2
[33] Smith, 1998, p 77
[34] Ibid., p 129

link between drawing on the past for legitimacy and the emotive nature of the bond between individual and nation. This is addressed in Breuilly's examination of how nationalist ideology arose.[35] He has contended that,

> Nationalist ideology has its roots in intellectual responses to the modern problem of the relationship between state and society....it was turned into an ideology by means of notions such as authenticity... [and was] combined in a powerful but illogical way with purely democratic and political values. The net result was to transform certain important ways of understanding human affairs into political ideology which was beyond critical examination.[36]

It is apparent that Breuilly believed firmly in the modernity of nationalism, in that it is a political manifestation that relies on modern institutions and dynamics. Breuilly traced the development of nationalist ideology from the desire to reconcile these social and state spheres.

Breuilly examined the problematic nature of the relationship between state and society, not least of which is the artificial separation of the two.[37] In a discussion of how attempts have been made to overcome this separation, he described how historicism can be a useful theoretical framework when attempting to understand nationalist ideology.[38] Breuilly argued that "it should be impossible for historicism to give rise to political value judgements", but that, with certain assumptions about nature and uniqueness, these judgements are made and provide the basis for particular nationalist ideologies.[39] He demonstrated this progression through a discussion of the theories of Herder and Palacky.

Herder's first factor in nationalist ideology is that of authenticity, which is derived from what are referred to as nature and the natural state. This authenticity is in turn derived from the natural societal organisation of families. Herder maintained that society started with families, and when these families joined into larger groups, there was a need for leadership.[40] From this he concluded that the natural and therefore the legitimate state of human society is along ethnic lines, because it is an

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[35] Breuilly, 1993
[36] Ibid.,, p 70
[37] Ibid., p 55
[38] Ibid., p 56
[39] Ibid., p 59
[40] Ibid., p 59

extended family. Herder's conclusion is that the national identity is natural and positive, while any incursion by foreigners is unnatural and negative.[41]

The next phase of the discussion deals with the assertion of validity of every community on its own merit. This contention reinforces the notion that each nation, being distinct and original, has a way of demarcating and identifying itself. Here Breuilly questioned how historicism reconciles this with all the unnatural societies that exist, and with the fact that the people writing about these natural states often a) could not themselves be anything but products of "unnatural" societies, and b) their portrayal of the societies are often arbitrary in what they record and report as natural: "These arbitrary judgements, justified by the contrast of natural with unnatural, are an essential ingredient of nationalist ideology."[42]

The final element of nationalist ideology is the reconciling of the historic community with political needs. This follows on from the above point, as the "logical" political end to the uniqueness of the community is the desire for self-autonomy. Breuilly contended that not only is this relationship in fact irreconcilable, but that it is the appearance of the settling of this issue that gives nationalism its appeal.[43] Nationalist sentiment only seems to eradicate differences between culture and politics, namely the public and private spheres. While this may seem a simplistic connection, it is not necessarily an invalid one. This results in the attractive combination of human affairs, history, and symbols. All of these are self-referential, giving legitimacy to seeking self-determination, and justifying the society's uniqueness.[44]

In his conclusion, Breuilly stated that the nationalist solution to the relationship between state and society is simple. Since nations are unique, and foreign rule can only harm the nation, each nation should have its own government and state. Following from this, "history can be understood only in the terms of the achievements and frustrations of the nation."[45]

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[41] Ibid., p 61
[42] Ibid., p 61
[43] Ibid., p 62
[44] Ibid., p 69
[45] Ibid., p 69

Anderson's theory of "imagined communities" redefined the way many theorists conceptualised the nation and its formation.[46] Anderson's main contention is that nations are, in fact, not "natural" groupings that have existed since humans first started to congregate. Rather, this particular type of community emerged through a combination of certain historical factors. Anderson stated that his purpose is to demonstrate that "nationality and nation-ness are cultural artefacts", thus contending that nationalism is a constructed phenomenon.[47] Anderson argued that by the 18th century, the collapse of three previously axiomatic concepts laid the foundations for the beginning of modern nationalism. These were:

1. a particular language offers access to truth. The language and the truth were the same, so to have access to the language was to know this truth.
2. society is organised around high centres and individuals who were different from others (divine right). This created/enforced the hierarchical nature of society's organisation and "loyalties".
3. the conception of time in which "cosmology" (concept of religion and the divine) and history are "indistinguishable", as are the "origins of the world and of men".[48]

The collapse of these concepts brought a void in identity that sought a new relationship between "fraternity, power and time".[49] The collapse of these certainties meant people needed to seek identity through a different means. National identification provided a sense of belonging and an overarching authority. The nation was also an entity that located people in history, reaching back in time and existing into the future.

The question then is how these communities identified themselves and their members. Anderson answers this by defining nationalism as an "imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign".[50] This community is imagined as the "image of ...communion".[51] Nationalism then is created through language and a sense of belonging in that community, reinforced by the narrative of that community's history. Anderson's model is one that portrays the powerful sense of belonging/identity, and the equally important notion that this is not a natural or inevitable state for society.

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[46] Anderson, 1991
[47] Ibid., p 4
[48] Ibid., p 36
[49] Ibid., p 36

A key element that Anderson identifies is the appeal that nationalism has on an emotive level. The concept of belonging to a nation can be seen as tantamount to a spiritual belief, or a belief in something that not only transcends the individual, but the lifetime of an individual. Other conceptions of society, such as Marxism or liberalism, did not present that kind of connectedness, or "man in the cosmos" that people sought.[52] This kind of inclusion and alliance to an overarching community partially explains the loyalty that people show to nationalist identities over other identities (i.e. class, gender, etc.) It also goes far in explaining the power that nationalism wields in uniting and mobilising large numbers of people.

Mythology, as referred to by Gellner and Hobsbawm among many others, plays an integral role not only in the in the maintenance of the nation, but in the supposition that the nation is something natural and therefore legitimate. Kertzer (1988) discussed how symbols, rituals and myths also teach the "valued norms of conduct and what are the criteria of success."[53] These norms and values relay to the members of the nation what their role in the nation is. Kertzer has discussed the specific needs that symbolism and mythology address. Symbolism, he argued, allows people to make sense of the information that assaults them in their everyday lives by imposing order upon the maelstrom: it is the "primary means by which we give meaning to the world around us.".[54] Using Geertz's definition of a symbol, that it is "any object, act, event, quality, or relation which serves as a vehicle for a conception",[55] Kertzer described how Anderson's imagined community is actually conceived through symbols: that "far from being window dressing on the reality that is the nation, symbolism is the stuff of which nations are made."[56]

The modernist paradigm presents a framework of constructed identity in nationalist movements. It is the relationship between the constructed nature of this identity and the perception of the identity being natural that is explored above. When we then look into a particular nationalist movement's rhetoric, the dialogue around the

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[50] Ibid., p 6
[51] Ibid., p 6
[52] Ibid., p 9-12
[53] Kertzer, 1988, p 13
[54] Ibid., p 4
[55] Geertz, 1966, p 5 as cited in Kertzer, 1988, p 185
[56] Kertzer, 1988, p 6

manipulation of history and the invention of tradition becomes clear. The efforts to anchor the nation in antiquity are part of legitimation-seeking. The "natural", family-centric, hierarchical foundations of such a national movement created a security of identity that struck a chord which was, as we shall see, particularly resonant in Eastern Europe.

Critiques of Modernism

The theorists above describe nationalism as a modern occurrence. While the modernist paradigm allows (to different degrees) that there may have been ethnic and historical ties between groups of people in the distant past, the argument is that these ties cannot be construed as nationalism. Rather, nationalism is a constructed political phenomenon; it is based on invented traditions, and is an imagined community reliant on cultural artefacts. These modernist arguments, while representative of the dominant theories, are challenged on some structural levels by theorists such as Hutchinson and Smith.

Hutchinson has disagreed with the notion that nationalism is a political construct.[57] Hutchinson's primary argument is that there is a distinction between political and cultural nationalism, and that the political is not the relevant construct. Political nationalism is the mobilisation of like-minded people who seek to create a community of "educated citizens united by common laws and mores like the *polis* of classical antiquity."[58] Sometimes using "ethnic-historical identities" to engender mass support, the goal of political nationalism is to obtain a state for this nationalist community. [59]

On the other hand, cultural nationalism is not a constructed entity but is "accidental" and is unique.[60] Hutchinson maintained that cultural nationalism relies on new concepts for vitality, unlike political nationalism's reliance on retraditionalisation for legitimacy. [61] Countering one modernist argument that cultural nationalism is a

[57] Hutchinson, 1987
[58] Ibid., p 12
[59] Ibid., p 13
[60] Ibid., p 13
[61] Ibid., p 13

"regressive force", he claimed that "cultural nationalists act as moral innovators" and are in fact forward thinking. [62] The politicisation of cultural nationalism is reconciled through the cultural nationalist's efforts to ensure the nation's non-assimilation by other cultures: a state is sought to preserve the uniqueness of the nation. This nation is a "progressive culture in active contact with other societies." [63]

Nationalist historians are described as tellers of the "national destiny"; with Hutchinson reframing the modernist idea of a constructed mythology as that of the historian's combination of scientific research with "romantic" ideals to help the members of the nation "rediscover their authentic purpose."[64] Indeed, these scholars constantly encourage individuals not to imitate the heroes of whom they write, but rather to see them as embodiments of an ideal. They are to be inspirations, so that "every true member of the nation, then, is an artist-creator". [65]

My critique draws attention to who decides the criteria for a "true member". This can be a very political decision. Although Hutchinson referred to the political necessity of the nation seeking its own state (which can also be questioned), the dynamics he described among cultural nationalists point to a very subjective and arbitrary conception of the nation. In the reality of human and social interaction, Hutchinson's portrayal of cultural nationalism seems to lead to an affirmation of the modernist paradigm.

Smith has written of his own journey from being a modernist student of Gellner's to believing that the modernist emphasis on elites was inadequate in several ways: it did not explain the passion that nationalism evokes, it did not include the popular involvement in nationalism, and it did not fully explain the relationship between historical cultures and the form nationalism takes today.[66] Hence, Smith arrived at the conception of *ethnies*, "named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory, and a sense of solidarity" as the basis of the nation.[67]

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[62] Ibid., p 34
[63] Ibid., p 35-6
[64] Ibid., p 14
[65] Ibid., p 15
[66] Smith,1998, p 190
[67] Ibid., p 191

Smith located the beginning of the concept of "national*ism*" in the 18th century, but feels it is insufficient to explain the connection with "national structures, sentiments and symbolism". For this, scholars of nationalism must go much farther back in history, necessitating an examination of how roots and connections of modern nationalism can be traced back in time: farther than modernists are willing to admit.[68] Careful to distinguish between his theories and those of primordialist ideology, Smith referred to the mechanisms of "community, shared memory and collective destiny, i.e. by lines of cultural affinity embodied in myths, memories, symbols and values retained by a given cultural unit of population."[69] These all point to a community that is rooted in the past, based on a "*myth* of descent", not the actual tracing of a lineage.

We are then presented with three ways that the modern nation forms out of these historical groupings and identifications. Firstly, "bureaucratic incorporation" stems from the competition of monarchs for resources and wealth. This resulted in the middle classes being incorporated into "an increasingly accented, territorialised and politicised 'national' culture'". [70] Smith associated this with "civic" nationalism, in that it gradually became not just the middle class, but the general populace. The second, "vernacular mobilisation", involves the "quest for authenticity" in the past, and is often referred to regarding nationalist mobilisation. This results from a movement of intellectuals looking to the past to create an identity that seems genuine. Unsurprisingly, the nationalism this forms is "founded on 'ethnic' conceptions".[71] Finally, in a very brief section on nationalisms formed out of immigrant cultures, such as the USA and Canada, Smith discussed "providentialist frontier nationalism", which is based on the nation's plurality of cultures.[72] It is not clear whether the historical ties here are those that the migrant cultures bring with them, or if such nations merely have short histories.

The modern nation, which stems from antiquity, means that "the nation... as concept and ideal formation, is historically firmly embedded".[73] Here, Smith does not differentiate between uses of history in theoretical conceptions of the nation and

[68] Ibid., p 190
[69] Ibid., p 192
[70] Ibid., p 193
[71] Ibid., p 194
[72] Ibid., p 194
[73] Ibid., p 195

nationalist rhetoric. Smith's theories on the historical roots of the nation include an aspect of legitimate historical connection that the others have not, but I am not convinced that it is a complete examination of nation formation and analysis. I contend that he takes the connection too far, as is demonstrated in his abrupt analysis of "providentialist frontier nationalisms". While his concept of *ethnie* may be convincing in some areas, its failure to explain the dynamics in other situations means it is unsatisfactory as a general theory of nationalism.

Eastern European Nationalism

This section examines the argument that there is a particular kind of nationalism unique to Eastern Europe. Explicit in many of these theories is the contention that this unique type of nationalism makes the region more susceptible to entrenched conflicts. *Implicit* is the contention that Western nationalisms are rational and logical, and therefore somehow more legitimate than Eastern nationalisms. The theorists discussed below posit various theories on why nationalism in Eastern Europe has developed the way it has. Sardamov, for example, has presented several perspectives on Yugoslavian nationalisms and why they disintegrated into armed conflict with each other.[74] Kohn's contention was that Eastern nationalism developed through resentment of the West, whereas Sugar has engaged in a somewhat contradictory effort to describe Eastern European nationalisms in Western terms.[75] While contending that Eastern European nationalisms are distinct from those in the West, Sugar attempted to utilise models based on the Western paradigm.

Sardamov initially categorised the theories of nationalism that have been applied to Yugoslavia: constructivist, instrumentalist, structuralist, culturalist, and essentialist or primordialist.[76] The constructivist approach sees nationalism as a modern phenomenon, based on models such as Anderson's conception of imagined communities. This view holds that nations, far from being strictly and permanently defined, are a "fluid, highly malleable and pragmatic affiliation".[77] The instrumentalist view draws from this, but maintains that nationalist movements are

[74] Sardamov, 1997
[75] Kohn, 1945; Sugar, 1994
[76] Sardamov, 1997, p 461-2

elite-created and manipulated for political purposes. These are Western models that derive from the Western conceptions of the rational individual. Sardamov next referred to structuralist and culturalist theories of nationalism, specifically in regard to Eastern Europe. Structuralism lays the blame for ethnic conflict in Eastern Europe at the door of institutional collapse, which leaves society in disarray; whereas the culturalist explanation examines cultural and religious differences in these societies. [78] The final grouping, essentialist (or primordialist), states that "each people in the region represents an organic community of common ethnic descent".[79] This is usually reiterated and reinforced by a sharing of "glorious and painful historical experiences".[80]

Sardamov settled on the essentialist approach to describe events in the former Yugoslavia. In this model, the Croat and Serb forms of nationalism are based on a long history of victimisation and perceived wrongs done by the other. He concludes that this constant demonisation of the other has resulted in the two groups being unable to view each other as anything other than inherently an enemy. His conclusion is that it is this construction of the other that has resulted in the intractability of the conflict: neither is capable of seeing the other as anything other than a threat, and that this conflict would have occurred regardless of the attempts at manipulation by the nationalist leaders.[81] What he does not explain, however, is how after many years of peaceful coexistence there was a Yugoslav identity, to the extent that radical means had to be taken to differentiate between ethnic groups.[82] Sardamov's analysis of Yugoslav nationalist identities is very useful, but his conclusions ignore the way that identity is manipulated.

In another approach, and working from the view that "nationalism is a state of mind", Kohn has contended that a state is one of the requirements of a nationalist movement.[83] This requirement was drawn from the theory that the state is the highest demonstration of legitimacy and is a kind of "consummation". Although Kohn traced

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[77] Ibid., p 461
[78] Ibid., p 462
[79] Ibid., p 462
[80] Ibid.,, p 462-3
[81] Ibid.,
[82] See Meznaric (1994) for a discussion of how rape was used to make this differentiation in Kosovo (p 82). This is also discussed at length in the chapter four of this thesis.

a similar search for legitimacy and sovereignty back to the Greeks, he maintained that not until the French Revolution was a true form of nationalism born (this places Kohn in the modernist paradigm with Gellner and Anderson).[84] The transformation of the populace from being "no longer in the nation, but of the nation" meant that a reframing of the masses' perceptions of themselves and their affiliation took place.[85]

Kohn then traced the differences between Western and Eastern nationalisms to the political cultures in which they arose. In the Western world, according to Kohn, not only was nationalism a "predominantly political occurrence", it also took place (with the exception of the USA, where it was simultaneous) after the "formation of the future nation state." The difference in the Eastern world was that nationalist struggles clashed with existing boundaries and political systems. Kohn then went on to describe the relationship between East and West, in which the West, as a leader and teacher in nationalist movements, "wounded the pride" of the Eastern elites' nationalisms.[86]

Kohn contended that Eastern nationalisms grew in a tradition of trying to find their own style of nationalism, always defining themselves in opposition to the West. Eastern nationalists reached back to mythologised pasts that were based on dreams of a homeland that was destined to be reclaimed. Here we have the crux of Kohn's argument: that in attempting to find its "own" nationalism, the East defined its identity along historic and ancient relationships which contrasted completely with the Western conceptions of liberalism, individualism and rationality. Kohn also asserted that this growth in opposition to the West resulted in an "inferiority complex" , in which nations were likely to "over-assert" themselves.[87] Kohn plotted the widening divergence between East and West as crucially affected by the different nationalist movements. As the West became rational and looked forward while casting off the vestiges of medievalism, the East reached back in time to concepts of the past, and relegated itself to a secondary role yet again.[88]

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[83] Kohn 1945
[84] Ibid., p 18
[85] Ibid., p 20
[86] Ibid., p 330
[87] Ibid., p 330
[88] Ibid., p 331

Kohn's interpretation of an Eastern "inferiority complex" can also be interpreted as one of the reactions of nationalist movements to perceived threats from external forces: defining the unique Eastern nations against the Western nations could be seen as creating a threatening "other" that would create support for Eastern movements. What is useful about Kohn's analysis is his outline of some of the sources of Eastern nationalist legitimacy, and the reliance on a glorified past as a method of rationalising a particular nationalist future. However, Kohn's argument, that Eastern nationalisms are based on inferiority complexes, does not seem to satisfactorily account for the emotional attraction of the movements. Rather than Kohn's reflexive perception of Eastern nationalisms, a more convincing perspective may be rooted in the seeking of a distinctive national past. In other words, it is more a case of each movement asserting its own uniqueness against all others, rather than only the West.

Another perspective on Eastern European nationalism is that of Peter Sugar, who maintained that there are four kinds of nationalism in Eastern Europe, which loosely correlate to Western types.[89] These were bourgeois nationalism, (most like the West) such as the Czechs; aristocratic nationalism, such as Poland and Hungary; popular nationalism, such as Serbia and Bulgaria; and bureaucratic nationalism, which Sugar identified with Turkey, Greece and Romania.[90] Sugar then presented the rationale for these categorisations, country by country, looking at their original nationalist movements.

Sugar contended that Czech nationalism developed in a mostly Western manner - through the bourgeoisie – because this class strata had developed enough to take a leadership role. This was due to the Czech nobility being foreign, which not only created a gap between commoners and nobility that the bourgeoisie could fill, but also meant that there had been foreign influence on the intellectual movements of the Czechs, bringing Czech nationalism closer to the Western variant.[91] However, Sugar contended, the lack of a Czech state forced Czech nationalists to increasingly include traditionally Eastern European styles of nationalist components; what Sugar

[89] Sugar, 1994
[90] Ibid., p 46
[91] Ibid., p 47-48

calls "less realistic and more historical-traditional than the bourgeois nationalism of western Europe."[92]

Sugar's explanation for the same phenomenon not occurring in Poland and Hungary, despite similar contact with the West, relies on the lack of any cohesive middle class. His contention is that this middle class was more closely aligned with the nobility in Czech society. Sugar sees the adoption of nationalist principles by the Hungarian and Polish nobles as what Sardamov would call instrumentalist: the nobility utilised anything that ensured their hold on power.[93]

The examples of popular nationalism, Serbia and Bulgaria, are so categorised because the development of their nationalist movements is found in the "lower clergy" and peasants. Sugar's contention is that because the landowners in these regions were foreign (Turkish), nationalist movements developed among the peasantry, and were "basically democratic and directed mainly against landlordism".[94] The bureaucratic nationalism that arose in Romania, by contrast, was caused by the inability of a liberal nationalist movement to garner enough support. With the other divisive movements that were tearing up the country, the only concept that bonded the country was an irredentist one. Sugar maintained that the bureaucracy utilised this irredentism to "justif[y] its slogans and omissions and its condemnation of all opposition as unpatriotic."[95]

Sugar's discussion of how Eastern European nationalism appears is somewhat one-dimensional. His argument is undermined by two important flaws. One, as referred to earlier, is the inappropriateness of the Western models he applies to the countries involved. Despite his own contention that the two areas are different, Sugar fails to expand his hypothesis to include this. The second flaw is the method used to prove that these categories are valid. Rather than presenting case studies that seek to demonstrate a well developed theory, Sugar presents a primarily historical progression with little analysis to prove his contentions.

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[92] Ibid., p 47
[93] Ibid., p 48-50
[94] Ibid., p 52
[95] Ibid., p 51

The theorists above present various arguments in an attempt to isolate the uniqueness of Eastern European nationalisms. Ironically, this is what most Eastern European nationalist movements base themselves on: uniqueness. Sardamov's contention that nationalism in Yugoslavia is based in essential aspects of Serb and Croat identities. While the logic of this assertion may not withstand scrutiny, the perception of Serb or Croatian national difference is part of the entrenched conflict between the two groups. Kohn's representation of the inferiority complex of Eastern Europe is also indicative of this uniqueness. The legitimacy of these national projects lies in their ability to indicate their difference from other groups. The background these analyses present is also useful as this thesis moves towards an examination of gender in the region; namely that the nationalisms in the region are contested and often co-opted by the power elites, despite claims of representing the popular will.

Conclusion

There are several key elements of the discussions above. First, the nation is a modern construct, imagined through language, a shared culture, and a common identity rooted in history. Anderson's conception of membership in a community being reinforced by the community's history is particularly salient, for it conveys the importance of history to the existence and reinforcing of the national identity. This history is often manipulated to achieve modern goals, such as presenting the nation as a natural and self-evident entity.

One of the main methods of legitimation for nationalist movements is the presentation of identity constructs as "natural". This naturalness, as Breuilly argues, comes from a perception of the nation as an extended family, which as the next chapter will demonstrate, helps to determine gender roles. The utilisation of a family hierarchy to delineate national identities is drawn on heavily in nationalist rhetoric. The combination of a "natural" national identity and the importance of a shared history is then made more potent if the history is presented as one of victimisation, as Sardamov detailed in his discussion of Serb and Croat nationalisms.

Throughout these theories are variations on a theme: the imagining of the nation through invented traditions and manipulated histories. The question becomes

how these social structures are imagined and manipulated. Although some of the theorists above deal with social issues, such as class, the modernist paradigm and the critiques above generally neglect the part played by a certain social construct: specifically, gender. Gender is one of the most potent ways to manipulate nationalist sentiment, as gender constructions can be highly emotive. The conceptions above operate on a construction of the nation and the state as structured entities that have within them groups such as elites and masses. While discussing the foundation of ethnic nationalism in the family, the impact of this construction has upon nationalism and the national identity is not explored. As many of the theorists in the next chapter argue, the familial structure has many ramifications for the nation, both symbolically and physically.

Chapter Three
Gender and Nationalism

This chapter covers the main relevant critique of the modernist theorists and the paradigm within which they are writing: the neglect of gender in nationalist literature. This is demonstrated through an examination of the major lines of theory regarding gender and nationalism. The rationale for including gender in the study of nationalism is based on the need to include a comprehensive examination of gender in this discipline. The discussion of models of gender in nationalist movements begins with theoretical models of how women participate in the development and perpetuation national projects, including feminist interpretations of gender. This is followed by models of gender in these movements, and discussions of various thoughts on how to reconceptualise gender in nationalism.

Definition of Gender

Before continuing with a discussion of gender, it is necessary to clarify exactly what is meant by the term. In much of the literature there is a tendency towards, as Nagel phrased it, the "conflation of the terms 'gender' and 'women'."[96] Scott contended that one reason the terms are used almost interchangeably was the "political acceptability in the field", in that "gender" was a less controversial and more academically acceptable term of analysis in the 1980s.[97] Nagel argued that the efforts to incorporate gender into the study of nationalism focus on women, rather than the examination of gender, i.e. feminine *and* masculine roles. Because much of

[96] Nagel, 1998, P 243
[97] Scott, 1988, p 31-2

the literature on gender and nationalism is written to redress the lack of information on women in nationalist projects, Nagel maintained that this means the literature is still bereft of a real examination of "what is uniquely masculine in a structural, cultural or social sense, about such clearly gendered activities as... nationalism."[98]

Current literature surrounding gender and nationalism focuses on women, especially (and understandably) feminist literature. However, as this thesis attempts to analyse the relationship of gender with nationalism, it is key to identify the relationships of men and women with this dynamic. Because of the lack of information available in the literature on the relationship between masculinity and nationalism, by necessity there will be more primary information on women. Consequently much of the analysis of men's roles will be extrapolated from the roles identified for women.

Jones, in an approach that has caused a degree of controversy, argued that although they have produced important analyses of women in nationalism and conflict, feminist analyses of gender are restricted by their own mandate: to analyse women, rather than men and women.[99] He therefore "argues for a more balanced and inclusive understanding of the role gender plays in conditioning the actions and experiences of men and women alike, in the Balkans war and other conflicts."[100] Jones has argued that wartime gender crimes are not perpetrated solely against women, and that men are also targeted for specific actions because of their gender. Therefore, "a more nuanced and inclusive approach to the gender variable is warranted."[101]

As discussed previously, one of the main contentions of this thesis is that gender is one of the fundamental elements of societal structure.[102] This argument has maintained that although the use of devices like gender symbolism are prevalent and obvious in nationalist movements, gender has been all but ignored in nationalist theory and analysis. Adding to this definition is Scott's discussion of gender as both "a constitutive element of social relationships" and a "primary way of signifying

[98] Nagel, 1998, p 243-4
[99] Jones, 1994
[100] Ibid., p 115
[101] Ibid., p 115-16
[102] Verdery and Borocz, 1994

relationships of power."[103] This includes the transmission of symbols and culture, as well as the maintenance and legitimation of power.[104]

Absence of Gender in Nationalism Literature

Yuval-Davis has maintained that nationalism literature in general has neglected the importance that gender (and women) plays in both the formation and maintenance of the state and nation.[105] The majority of nationalism theory has separated public and private spheres, with women in the private, which in turn renders them irrelevant. Yuval-Davis and others (Pateman, 1988) have contended that this is an invalid separation, as "the public realm cannot be fully understood in the absence of the private sphere... [i.e.] without both, mutually dependent halves of the sphere."[106] Grant asserted that this stems from the omission of women from such foundational theories as those of Hobbes and Rousseau, who understood men's essentially aggressive nature to be at the root of the transition to society.[107] Yuval-Davis advocated the inclusion of more anthropological theory, which recognises the "links between gender relations and social cohesion".[108]

Peterson contended that "sameness within is purchased at the price of institutionalising difference."[109] In its efforts to demarcate and identify the boundaries of a nation, the state must set cultural and social boundaries in policy. This is an important aspect to keep in mind as this thesis looks at gender roles: these are roles that are often determined out of a desire to maintain the legitimacy and stability of the nation. Peterson has argued that by ensuring that certain gender roles are perceived as natural, they are removed from the public sphere, and therefore remove women from political power.[110] In other words, "naturalising" women's roles de-politicises them, and thus dis-empowers them.

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[103] Scott, 1988, p 42
[104] Ibid., p 43-44
[105] Yuval-Davis, 1993
[106] Pateman, 1988, p 4
[107] Grant, 1991
[108] Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 623
[109] Peterson, 1994, p 77
[110] Ibid., p 77-8

Rationale

In a general sense in the social sciences, gender informs our understanding of social and power structures. As Scott maintained, "gender is a primary field within which or by means of which power is articulated" while remembering that "concepts of power, though they may build on gender, are not always literally about gender itself."[111] In other words, there is not always a sign reading, "this power structure is gendered". It is often in the absence of women in official power, or in the organisation of a society through male and female spheres, that we see this gendered structure. The taking for granted of certain gender identities leads to a neglect of gender as an analytic aid. By treating issues of gender as problematic, not axiomatic, we can examine "what is at stake in proclamations or debates that invoke gender to explain or justify their positions."[112]

It is useful at this point to look at the rise both of nations and conceptions of gender respectability. Mosse has shown how the two became intertwined by contending that sexuality and the physical body, which had been integrated into society, became "privatised" in the 1800s.[113] In other words, in the West, the human body became something to hide if one was to be considered respectable. The morality of the Victorian Age dictated strict codes of conduct reliant on one's gender. This is not to say that there had not been such codes in the past; merely that such things as bodily functions and the male and (especially) the female bodies were now subject to rigorous norms in order to maintain respectability.[114]

One of the most interesting aspects of Mosse's work is the way he connected gender with nationalism. The rise of the nation and nationalist movements came at approximately the same time as a general shift towards sexual "decency".[115] This raises the conjunction of acceptability and respectability, upon which the nation and sexual decency are reliant. Nationalism as a movement includes only those who are acceptable; who meet certain norms. Acceptable sexuality and gender roles rely on the

[111] Scott, 1988, p 45
[112] Ibid., p 49
[113] Mosse, 1985
[114] Ibid., p 9-11
[115] Ibid., p 10, 18

same: adherence to a set of norms. Within a nation the norms that are required for acceptance are based on gender norms of acceptability.[116] Continuing membership in the nation is dependent upon continuing adherence to one's appropriate gender role.

According to Peterson, gender "illuminates the processes of identity formation".[117] When inequality is "natural" and "presumed", it becomes a very difficult concept to battle. On a larger, more inclusive scale, gender inequality sets the stage for other institutionalised inequalities. The gendered nature of nationalism results in a "naturalisation of domination ("us" at the expense of "them") [that] depends upon the prior presumption of men/masculinity over women/femininity."[118] Peterson warns that outdated dichotomies simplify and obscure the real issues of gender and nationalism and their complexity.[119] By continuing to take this tradition of dominance for granted, and by not challenging it, our capacity to challenge these inequities is diminished.[120] This goes back to Scott's discussion of gender and power structures: the relationship is not necessarily a literal or explicit one, but one that nonetheless needs examination.

Combined with this socialising of gender, in order to control it, there is a vital connection between nationalism and nature.[121] The socialisation of bodies and their genders, and their connection to "organisations of power and inequality" lead to the gendering of the nation. This is where gender enters the arena of nationalism, and is where understanding gender roles and symbols becomes important.[122]

The concept of "nation" connects the individual to the state. The connection between an individual and the state is conceptualised as personal, rather than as distant, with state leadership far removed from the individual's day-to-day existence. Nationalism in this scenario bonds the natural with the civilised, and the individual with the state.[123] This makes the relationship between state and individual reliant on certain qualifications and conditions of memberships: it implies a relationship of

[116] Ibid., p 10
[117] Peterson, 1994, p 83
[118] Ibid., p 82-3
[119] Ibid., 82-3
[120] Ibid., p 83
[121] Verdery, 1994
[122] Ibid., p 226
[123] Ibid., p 227

belonging and other. This relationship renders "physical space socio-political"; in other words, with the body as a political unit, and with the aforementioned relationship between gender and state, gender then becomes an important aspect of nationalism.[124]

Models of Gender and Nationalist Movements

Before exploring the literature on gender and nationalism, this section first explores the inclusion of women into nationalist literature. One of the most widely accepted models of how women are incorporated into the nationalist "project" is that of Anthias and Yuval-Davis, who have presented five ways in which the relationship between woman and state can be conceived.[125] These concentrate on the relationship women have within the processes of nationalism, rather than on the roles imposed upon women.[126]

The first relationship is women as "biological reproducers of members of ethnic collectivities" with an emphasis on the biological part of that role.[127] Second is women "as reproducers of the boundaries of ethnic/national groups", in reference to policies that forbid women to have sex/children with men outside their group, and to cultural restrictions on marriages and rights that are along religious/ethnic lines. Third, women "participat[e] centrally in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture", as women are the main caretakers of young. Fourth, women are "signifiers of ethnic/national differences – as a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic/national categories". The formative state calls upon its members to "fight for the sake of our women and children". The notions of a nation as a "motherland" and the image of "raping the land" are images with very strong

[124] Ibid., p 227
[125] Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989
[126] Ibid., p 2
[127] Some possible policies are: immigration policies, which prevent the arrival of "undesirable" populations and therefore their reproduction; controlling the ability of certain women to bear children, such as sterilisation; state encouragement of high birth rates in certain sectors, including providing child care and denying abortions and birth control, and birth control policy in terms of either withholding or making very available. Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989

emotive power. Finally, women can be seen "as participants in national, economic, political and military struggles".[128]

Two aspects of this final category are key. Firstly, the authors discussed the role that women play in these struggles, such as women as actual fighters and the fact that they still seem to play a "supportive and nurturing" role. Secondly, the authors briefly discussed the very different ways that nationalist struggles perceive and portray women's "liberation" movements.[129] The authors emphasise that women are not merely actors being acted upon: "Women actively participate in the process of reproducing and modifying their roles as well as being actively involved in controlling other women."[130]

Yuval-Davis has revisited the roles of women in nationalism discussed above with a slightly different focus.[131] The categories are citizenship, culture, and origin, with emphasis on "the specific boundaries of inclusions and exclusions that [the roles] construct."[132] Yuval-Davis first looked at citizenship, and how it differs for women and men. The concept of citizenship, based on such formative theories as the "Rights of Man" involved particularly the rights of *man*. This was not accidental, but intentional: men were the "representatives" of the family. This is a relationship that is continued today through custom and through policies of the state. Therefore, when the discussion turns to Eastern Europe, the irony of using terms like "civil society" and the "state" is that women are often omitted from these spheres, since the state is often dominant in civil society.[133]

There is an argument that citizenship requires full participation in a community, and this, Yuval-Davis has argued, is where one of the great debates in Western feminism occurs.[134] This complete equality can be seen as requiring full participation, which "has led some feminists to think that the only way women could gain full equality would be if they were to share equally all citizenship responsibilities

[128] Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, p 7
[129] Ibid., p 10
[130] Ibid., p 11
[131] Yuval-Davis, 1993
[132] Ibid., p 621
[133] Ibid., p 625
[134] Ibid., p 626

and duties."[135] In other words, women had to have equal representation in all aspects of society, such as holding official and public positions of power. This is opposed to arguments that women are capable of holding separate but equal power, as is argued in many non-western societies.

Secondly, Yuval-Davis wrote on "gender relations and cultural constructions of collectivities", which was based upon two elements. First, women as symbols in nationalist conceptions, for example, motherland, mother tongue, etc. In these symbols women represent the collectivity of the nation. The second is the transmission of culture through women: both because of their role in raising the children of the national community, and through the appropriateness of their behaviour. In other words, they are signals, especially in multi-cultural societies, of what is acceptable within the boundaries of their culture. Any dissension from the norm threatens the homogeneity of the group, which feels it must present a united front to "others". The behaviour most often referred to is women's sexual behaviour, which is related to the third element in Yuval-Davis' framework.[136]

The third section is "gender relations and the biological reproduction of 'the nation'". This portion of the discussion concerns nationalisms that are not voluntary but "race" based. Here, the "purity" of a community is dependent upon preventing any outsiders from parenting children of the nation. This, in terms of policy, means no marriage between members of different nations/ethnicities. This also leads, as discussed in the Yuval-Davis/Anthias article, to population control methods such as sterilisation and access to birth control.[137]

In a review of the work of Yuval-Davis, Jayawardena and their discussions of the participation of women, Sylvia Walby (1992) has proposed "emphasising the question of women's differential involvement."[138] This is where Walby branched away from the framework of Anthias and Yuval-Davis, especially their claim that women participate in the national project as much as men, but in different ways. Walby contended that women participate when the national interests coincide with

[135] Ibid., p 626
[136] Ibid., p 627-28
[137] Ibid., p 628-29
[138] Walby, 1992, p 84

their own interests as women.[139] This appears to be a limited analysis, as it assumes a) that women make their decisions based on their identification as women first and foremost, and b) that membership and participation in the national project is presented as a choice, not a fact. Walby assumed that women perceive a choice about their identification with the nation and believed they often can and do make a decision to identify themselves in another way. Part of the reason Walby made this assertion is the belief that women are more peace-oriented than men.[140] She did not address the fact that women are usually excluded from the militarisation process, such as military conscription. Walby then went on to ask whether "women's greater non-violence [has] an effect upon their view of the 'national' project, in that they are less prepared to pursue nationalist goals by force than men".[141] Walby answered this through Western examples of women involved in pacifist projects that can be seen as opposed to the nationalist project. Later in the argument, Walby concluded that "women are simultaneously both less militaristic and less nationalistic because militarism is often seen as an integral facet of a national project."[142]

Walby's assertions ignored evidence from around the world of women's involvement in nationalist movements both militarily and in support of military action. Her argument also oversimplified the relationship between gender and nationalism. As will be demonstrated later in the case studies, there are many cases of feminist movements falling victim to nationalist movements as women choose their national identity over one of "global womanhood". While this may be unpalatable, it is nonetheless one of the realities of conflict, and ignoring it does not strengthen Walby's contentions.

Peterson has also presented a feminist critique of nationalism and gender that includes relevant issues. However, her argument revealed some general problems in the literature that are important to address. One of Peterson's main concerns, which provides a basis for some of the other points raised, is somewhat controversial. This is that men cannot bond with others by giving birth (mother-child bond), and therefore need to bond through the physical manifestation of an abstract concept. Peterson

[139] Ibid., p 90
[140] Ibid., p 92
[141] Ibid., p 92
[142] Ibid., p 97

maintained that nationalism satisfies men's need for group identity, which, presumably, women get through being able to have children.[143]

There are a number of problems in Peterson's analysis. One is the implication that women are a generic, monolithic group who identify themselves as bearers of children alone, and that men are also a generic group, whose need to create a nation is based on competition with women's ability to create life. These assumptions and generalisations undermine the validity of her argument, as they are based on single (and possibly erroneous) aspects of gender that ignore the complexity of such constructions. However, the real contradiction arises when Peterson later argued that women and people have a series of ways of identifying themselves, such as class, race, etc, and not just according to gender. Peterson also implied that women's roles are purely acted upon them, rather than also assumed by them.[144]

Peterson also argued that "reproduction [is] the most political... of all activities." Following the above point, the struggle of men to control the biological boundaries of the nation entails control over reproductive policy. This restricts women's autonomy of decision-making over their own bodies.[145] Peterson discussed this through the framework of Anthias and Yuval-Davis, with some alternative perspectives, as follows.

Peterson left untouched the first element of the Anthias and Yuval-Davis framework, which is that of biological reproducers of the state.[146] The second, that women are social reproducers of the state, Peterson referred to as the "battle of the nursery". In this situation, the state can utilise control over citizenship, marriage, and other means to regulate the continuation of the culture and people. Thus citizenship becomes increasingly important as the state requires it for basic rights.[147]

The third element is that women are "signifiers of group differences". This is the section that discussed the gendering of symbols. Here Peterson called on the claim I disagreed with above, arguing that men use symbols, images, myths, etc to

[143] Peterson, 1994, p 78
[144] See, for instance, Joanna Goven's (1993) discussion of the lack of feminism in Hungary, where women are often the ones decrying feminism.
[145] Peterson, 1994, p 78
[146] Ibid., p 78-9

reproduce the nation and have something to fight and die for. The reproduction of the nation through symbols, images and languages that are gendered produce "social groups that are based on abstract bonds between men, who are distanced from reproductive activities."[148] The objectification of women through such symbols and images makes them into possessions of men. It also helps to explain why women's appearance and adherence to cultural rules are so important. These are essential to the continuation and reproduction of the nation.[149]

A further intersection of gender and nation is through women's participation in "political identity struggles". Here Peterson disagreed with the picture of women as always peaceful and peacemakers.[150] For example, women can take up arms, nurse, gather information and, because they can often move more freely than men, are capable of taking messages back and forth. The misperceptions of women's roles in war and the lack of analysis of their roles is explained by the removal of women from the public sphere. War and high politics are therefore seen as the realm of men, thus excluding exploration of women's roles.[151]

The fifth and final element that Peterson covered is that of women as general members of society. In other words, women have other alignments aside from those with other women. These "social hierarchies" include "racism, classism, ageism, heterosexism, ablism," etc. These categories are interactive. This then led to a discussion of different contexts and different allegiances, and how people associate themselves with different categories on different issues.[152] Peterson's piece is useful in its further treatment of the five points of Yuval-Davis and Anthias. However, Peterson's rationale for men creating a national struggle is problematic, and, as pointed out above, large sections of her argument are unconvincing.

Nagel has taken a different approach by focusing on the masculinity of the state and its related institutions. One of the issues she discussed is that of essentialism. Essentialist definitions of inclusion, she argued, play an integral role in certain

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[147] Ibid., p 79
[148] Ibid., p 79
[149] Ibid., p 79-80
[150] Women's participation and how they contribute to the national struggle are outlined in Peterson's *Global Gender Issues*, 1999
[151] Peterson, 1994, p 80-1

nationalist movements, and rely heavily on gender definitions and norms. Nagel defined essentialism as a classification that relies on one central characteristic.[153] In other words, essentialism defines people by one aspect that then not only defines them and all others in that group in one way, but disregards any other affiliations an individual may have. Indeed, "the weakness of the essentialist approach is its arbitrariness and easy falsifiability."[154] Essentialism is an issue that is relevant to other theorists (Walby:1992, Calhoun:1997) who made assumptions about the roles women play in nationalist struggles. These assumptions usually portray women as more peaceful than men, and therefore not as involved in the nation and nationalism. This is an essentialist view of gender roles that ignores evidence to the contrary at its peril. By not examining the roles that men and women play, we will never have a true understanding of the intricacies of gender and nation.

In comparing the roles that men and women play in nationalist struggles, Nagel has relied heavily on the model set forth by Yuval-Davis and Anthias, above. One of the key elements of Nagel's discussion is her treatment of essentialism. In opposition to Walby's argument, which maintained that women are somehow innately more peaceful than men, Nagel demonstrated the flawed logic of such an argument. The complexity of identity and gender cannot be reduced to one characteristic to which the majority of a group will adhere. Women often choose their national identity over their identity as a woman. Nagel has outlined some of the ways in which women do participate in nationalist movements and conflicts, showing that their participation is different, rather than non-existent. Outlining some of the restrictions that women face in participating in nationalist conflicts, she then detailed the methods in which women utilise the conceptions others have of them to fight for their national project, including moving information, recruiting supporters, and forming their own military units.[155] These are roles that women often assume in times of conflict, as the conflict transforms the structure of the society in which the roles are constructed. Women assume many different roles in nationalist struggles, as roles are transformed and redefined in times of danger.

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[152] Ibid., p 82
[153] Nagel, 1998, p 245
[154] Ibid., p 245
[155] Ibid., p 253

Nagel addressed two important issues that are often left out of the literature. The first is that essentialism as a theory of gender is not a valid method to analyse what actually occurs in the construction and perpetuation of gender roles. However, it is utilised in nationalist ideology as a way of maintaining boundaries within and around a nation. The second is how the present literature defines in practice what studying gender entails. The need to include women in nationalist literature too often excludes discussion of the relationship between men and women in its analysis of feminine roles alone, while professing to analyse gender.

Turning to these essentialist constructions that are utilised in many nationalist movements, it is important to note that one of the most common conceptualisations of gender in Eastern Europe nationalisms is that of the nation as family. This establishes a gender hierarchy in which gender roles are then adopted according to one's position in this "family".[156] In other words, women become mothers, daughters, and wives, with the attendant roles, while men become fathers, sons and husbands. Family based societies also have an element of "naturalness" to them. Again, this construction draws on the inherent legitimacy of the natural argument. Socialist regimes attempted to eliminate gender-based differences in some spheres (i.e. making the private public)[157], while maintaining these same gender roles when drawing on a history that gave legitimacy to the nationalist leadership.

McClintock sees the family model as offering nationalist communities an "indispensable figure for sanctioning social *hierarchy* within a putative *organic unity* of interests."[158] The construction of the supposedly natural structure of the family lent legitimacy to similar hierarchies in the public arena. In other words, the family of nationalism was natural and thus impervious to criticism. When the "subordination of woman, and child to adult was deemed a natural fact", [159] there was subsequent legitimation for gendered, family-based hierarchies.

State socialist societies often drew on these conceptions of family structures in their relationships between individual and state. The contradictory approaches to

[156] Stychin, 1998, p 9; Verdery, 1994, p 229-30
[157] Verdery, 1994, p 227-29
[158] McClintock, 1993, p 64
[159] Ibid., p 64

gender taken under state socialism provide examples of just how problematic these constructions can be. Official state socialist rhetoric emphasised the equality of men and women, but in reality socialist policies relied heavily on maintaining the inequities of the past. Verdery's model of the relationship between nation and gender under socialism has three components. First is citizenship, in which women and men have unequal standing as citizens in regards to maintaining and enjoying the rights of that citizenship. Second are the symbols of gender utilised in nationalist dialogue and mobilisation. Third is the effort made by socialist regimes to "eradicate male-female differences to an unprecedented degree, casting onto the state certain tasks associated with household gender roles."[160] By making the connection between socialist regime and the re-assignation of gender and family roles, the integral role that gender has played in the creation and perpetuation of the socialist Eastern European state becomes apparent.

These conceptions of gender meant that a complex relationship between the state and the individual arose; one that was sexual, patriarchal, and familial. Verdery has explored the image of "nation as lover/beloved", which is an extremely emotive issue in national politics. This created a personal relationship between the individual and the nation, rather than a remote and distant one. This creates a bond that allows members of a nation "come to feel themselves national."[161] This process is enabled through the "cathexis" of sexualising of the nation state. In other words, the bond between the individual and the nation is manifested in an emotional, often romantic relationship. The nation becomes both female sexual object and the mother with her sons. [162] The importance of Breuilly's discussion, in chapter two is highlighted by this overcoming of the separation between society and state. The sexualising and personalising of the state makes it more accessible.

Conclusion

The acceptance of gender roles in various cultures/nations/communities as "natural" is as fraught with conceptual danger as is accepting a nationalist mythology

[160] Verdery, 1994, p 227-29
[161] Ibid., p 243
[162] Ibid., p 243

as accurate and objective. While there has been a general acceptance that histories and traditions are at least manipulated if not invented, there has not been the same realisation that gender role creation is just as important to the development and perpetuation of the nationalist project. It is essential that gender be incorporated into the study of this field, and not tacked on as an interesting aside that may or may not have relevance.

The examination of the way gender influences the construction of societies and communities, and in particular ones that base inclusion on nationalist definitions, is vital to understanding the nation in crisis. If the argument that women are central "in the ideological reproduction of the collectivity and as transmitters of its culture"[163] has validity, then the gendering of that role must have significance. If, for example, it was unimportant who perpetuated the cultural traditions and represented the societal boundaries, then this would be the domain of both men and women.

In chapter two, Anderson's discussion of the new relationship between time, power and fraternity was discussed, as was Breuilly's discussion of the family and the conception of a "natural" community. These are combined when we examine the gendering of individuals through family roles. Men and women are constructed in the nation through these professedly natural roles, which ties them to the family of the nation, which in turn is a natural entity. All of these connections with an organic and therefore positive and authoritative construction of identity are powerful and reassuring. The constructed nature of gender identities have allowed connections between nature and society, and between the individual and the state. Gendering the perception of the nation, such as identifying it as a mother or a father, makes the relationship of individual and nation not only closer but personal. The bond is an personal one that engenders loyalty on an emotional level.

The framework within which this thesis will examine gender and nationalism uses the lenses of the politics of reproduction and the politics of tradition. The models illustrated above reveal that these are the two avenues through which gender roles both influence and are influenced by nationalist movements. The symbolic representation of these archetypes in the traditions of the nation, along with the

[163] Anthias and Yuval-Davis, p 313-15

legitimating power of these traditions is a consistent theme in the literature. Consistent too is the reproductive theme of women as mothers and men as fathers, with women as the biological reproducers of the nation and men as the protectors.

The issue now becomes how to utilise this analysis. This chapter has presented strong theoretical arguments not only for including gender in an analysis of nationalism, but for concluding that gender plays an integral role in the creation and continuation of nationalist movements. The next phase of this thesis will present a framework of analysis to demonstrate how gender is used in nationalist discourse; particularly when that discourse seeks to legitimate a leadership in crisis.

Chapter Four
Politics of Tradition and Reproduction

This chapter discusses the context and the framework for the two case study chapters. The main body of the chapter is a discussion of the lenses through which gender and nationalism are examined: the politics of tradition and the politics of reproduction. [164] The next section canvasses several areas in which deviations from the nationalist "norm" occur, and how these contradictions are either assimilated or rejected within the nationalist paradigm. Finally, in order to understand the context in which these nationalist struggles for legitimacy were occurring and the relevance of the case study countries, it is important to understand the dynamic between state socialism and gender. This is followed by a discussion of the post-socialist status of gender, which includes a brief examination of the relationship between nationalism and socialism.

Politics of Reproduction and Tradition

Gellner contends that "nationalism is a theory of political legitimacy"[165]. This raises the question of how nationalist movements assert legitimacy. To begin with, we draw on the concept of a "natural" nation, one in which legitimacy is derived from the supposed uniqueness of the nation in which there are certain seemingly immutable norms for behaviour and identity. Because inclusion in this nation is initially based on

[164] Thanks to Joanna Goven for the concept of these lenses.
[165] Gellner, 1983, p 1

biological criteria (i.e., one must be born into the nation), women are categorised primarily as mothers. More specifically, they are mothers of the physical population of the nation. In this paradigm, men are classed as fathers, which has its own ramifications. The traditional nature of these roles is then apparent on both a physical and symbolic level. Women are mothers who are encouraged to bear children for the nation, to take care of the home, and to raise the children. Men are expected to work and earn the income for the family, and to protect the family.

These roles are then translated into the language and culture of the larger community. Women are not meant to work, at least not as a career, as their role is to have children and to care for them. Men are pressured to maintain their roles as providers, and also to assume the leadership roles in the community, as the community takes on the hierarchical structure of a "traditional" family. The nation is often presented as a family,[166] which means the nation itself takes on gender characteristics, such as the "motherland" or the "fatherland". This is then translated into a variety of symbols that define and delineate the nation, which also draw it closer to the members of the nation. In other words, the individual is actually a part of the national family: there is not the sense of distance and separation between the individual and the state apparatus. The tendency for people to imagine the nation as a family in part stems from a need to make the nation more personal and available. The symbolism of the nation as a body (usually with a significant gender) enables easier access to the nation for its members.[167] This tendency to "reify" abstract notions results in the images of the nation as a mother or father, with all the attendant implications. The personification of the nation is not a value-free characterisation, but is itself instructive and meaningful. Indeed, "these symbols provide a way to understand such abstract political entities as the nation and a means (indeed the compulsion) of identifying with them."[168]

The politics of tradition incorporates the more symbolic aspects of gender and nationalist legitimacy. As discussed above, the "natural" roles of the nation are usually along what are considered traditional lines. The symbolic reproduction of the

[166] See McClintock, 1993, p 64; Verdery, 1994, p 227-229; Scott, 1988, p 47
[167] Kerzer, 1988, p 6-7
[168] Ibid., p 13

nation is, as Yuval-Davis and others have argued, a gendered process.[169] The reinforcing of hierarchical and patriarchal systems through gendered traditions and national legends results in the maintenance of highly gendered nationalist movements. These movements draw on conceptions of the professedly essential roles of men and women to both metaphorically and tangibly represent the nation. Therefore, the politics of tradition, which operate on a more symbolic level, are intertwined with the politics of reproduction, in which the intangible is enacted on and through the actual bodies of the members of the nation.

The politics of reproduction is not solely an examination of the biology of the nation: it concerns the manipulation of reproduction, and the effects of perceiving gender roles as biologically determined. Earlier discussions of women and the nation have focused on the role of women as both the biological and the symbolic mother of the nation. By opening this discussion up to include men and women, and by examining the effects of this, we see this intersection of politics and reproduction. By viewing nationalist movements through this framework we see a number of areas where the politics of reproduction are used for political legitimacy.

Politics of Tradition

Under the rubric of the politics of tradition, this section will examine several concepts. These include a discussion of history as a conduit for nationalist legitimation; tradition as a way of reaffirming and reinforcing legitimacy; symbols of the nation and how these are gendered; and, finally, the influence of myths in the modern nationalist movement. It is my contention that the constant, modern-day reaffirmation of the nation through traditions results in a society in which the identifications of gender and nation are reliant upon one another. Intertwined with these traditions are symbols of various kinds, from those of Orthodox religion to the potent symbol of Kosovo in Serbian legend.[170]

[169] Yuval-Davis, 1993

[170] Eastern European nations maintain a great deal of their traditional cultures in a variety of ways such as dance, marriage ceremonies, and legends. See, for example, "The Legend of the Arges Monastery" in Miroiu (1997) and the importance of traditional wedding customs in Olsen (1990).

Gellner examines the way nationalist movements often manipulate history, transforming and creating mythology to make their nationalist movement appear natural.[171] This often occurs through certain presentations of the past by sympathetic historians. This is not to make the presumption that there is, in reality, an objective historian anywhere. Rather, it is to make the point that in many nationalist movements there is often state-sanctioned (if the nation also holds power in the state) and supervised manipulation of history.[172] There is a need to locate the nation in a common historical past in order to lend authority and unity to a nation. As Hobsbawm so aptly put it, "Historians are to nationalism as poppy growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts: we supply the essential raw material for the market."[173]

The invention of tradition as a means of legitimating power has been widely studied. As discussed in the first chapter, Hobsbawm makes a convincing argument that the historical anchoring of the nation through tradition is one of the main ways nationalist movements instil norms in the community. This is achieved through invented traditions that establish "certain values and norms of behaviour".[174] It is this particular facet of Hobsbawm's model that is important as we examine the relationship between the ways particular roles are adopted, enforced and encouraged within a nation, particularly when that nation is in crisis. The adoption of these traditions in part defines the nation and determines what is appropriate within the nation.

Part of what these traditions emphasise are symbols of the nation, which function as identifiers of what is important and desirable in the nation. In chapter two, I discussed Kerzter's definition of symbols, in which symbols are conveyers of meaning in the nation. Kertzer argues that, "the symbols at the heart of ritual observances are part of the tissue of myth that helps structure an understanding of the political world..."[175] Through symbols, members of a nation "learn both what are the

[171] Gellner, 1983, p 55-6
[172] An example of this is the Institute for Recent History of Serbia, which contains a variety of historical perspectives on Serbia and its mythology: http://www.barw.org.yu/
[173] Hobsbawm, 1992, p 3
[174] Hobsbawm, 1983a, p 13-14
[175] Kertzer, 1988, p 13

valued norms of conduct and what are the criteria of success."[176] These teach acceptable behaviour and norms in a society.

I would like to expand that conception to one that sees symbols, as presented in myths of the nation, traditions, and in the media, as instructive for the nation. I draw on Kligman's analysis of symbols and rituals, in which a ritual is a "dramatic form that articulates the relationship between a symbolically constructed order of meanings...and a system of interpersonal and institutional relationships."[177] Here I am using ritual in the context of traditions and myths as means of "mobiliz[ing] perceptions and values that are often not consciously recognized."[178] In this paradigm, the symbols that Kerzer refers to (which allow people to make sense of the community in which they live) are conveyed through these vehicles. For example, myths of the nation combine stories of history, be they of victimisation or heroism, with the presentation of symbols that are then used as touchstones for a nationalist movement.

Myths usually relate how the founders of the nation (allegedly) acted, which is then prescriptive for the present day members of the nation. [179] They often present an archetype of the idealised member of the nation. Benton, in her discussion of founding myths of the nation, refers to the importance of war and conflict in many of these myths.[180] The combination of the birth of the nation through conflict with the messages of self-sacrifice and valour that are imbedded in these myths are not merely to bond the population of the nation, they are instructive.

National myths convey a sense of community, identity, and history. They can be seen as lessons in appropriate patterns of behaviour and how interpersonal relationships, particularly gender relationships, should be enacted. Many relate to the foundation of the nation itself, rooting the nation's origins in a history that stretches back in time, thus legitimising the nation.[181] This concept of the "birth" of the nation

[176] Ibid., p 13
[177] Kligman, 1984, p 169
[178] Ibid., p 169
[179] Benton, 1998, p 28
[180] Ibid., p 27
[181] Ibid., p 28

is significant for its personification of the nation, which conveys both the organic and natural (and bloodline-dependent) nature of the nation.

There is an effort in these myths to present the nation as cohesive, particularly in times of national crisis populated with men and women who do their duty to the nation by fighting (and dying) bravely, by sacrificing children and loved ones, and by reproducing the nation. These images, generated through myth, media and other cultural transmitters, seek to portray a nation that stretches through time, both into the past and into the future, that is constant and unchanging. However, this appearance of immutability is not the reality. The definitions change according to what is necessary for the preservation of the nation in the present day.[182]

One of the key ways to disseminate information of any kind is through the media. As was discussed previously, Anderson showed how the nation was and is imagined through the print media. The shape of the community, both externally and internally, is imagined and defined at least partially through various media. It can be drawn from his argument, and from Kertzer's, that the constant imagining and re-imagining of the nation carries with it an identification of symbols and roles that are appropriate for the imagined community. The nation is delineated as much by these internal indicators as by its external ones: ie, the defining of difference from "others" who do not belong. I contend that this (Anderson and Kertzer's) explanation of the relationship between media and the nation can be extended to include gender, particularly gendered traditions and roles.

The manifestation of the traditions discussed above takes a variety of shapes. There is considerable emphasis on tradition in the communities discussed here, and there is a correlating emphasis on the methods of transmitting popular culture. Therefore, there is a great deal of epic poetry, folklore and folksong that is heavily referential to mythology of the nation. There are also many festivals and celebrations that promote the traditions of an idealised folk culture. These will be covered in depth in the case study chapters.

[182] For example, see Gellner's (1983) argument regarding the paradox of nationalism in chapter two of this thesis. Also see Haddock and Caraiani's (1999) discussion of the flexibility of nationalism in regards to communism. (p 261)

How does this symbolising of the nation actually manifest itself? Verdery refers to the way language is gendered, and the way gender is drawn on to mobilise the nation,[183] primarily through gender-specific language, such as the "fatherland", or the "mother-tongue". The utilisation of this type of gendered language is one of the most widely recognised ways that gender is incorporated into the nationalist project. Imagery such as the "rape of the motherland" or "going to war for the fatherland" evoke the nation as a body.[184] This coincides with the contention that women are "a focus and symbol in ideological discourses used in the construction, reproduction and transformation of ethnic/national categories."[185]

An examination of language reveals that gender is used in the construction and reproduction of the nation through imagery such as the birth of a nation. The relationship between the national family and the actual family is one that is reciprocal: as Scott contends, there is often a perception that "the well-ordered family [is] the foundation of the well-ordered state."[186] The concept of a nation as a mother or sister, daughter or lover gives a personal motivation to a male soldier going off to war, as well as supporting the notion that the female relative needs to be protected.[187]

Additionally, women are symbols of the nation, used to maintain the differences between the national "self" and the enemy "other".[188] Indeed, "defining and controlling women is central to demarcating ethnic and national boundaries."[189] The importance of women as the symbol of purity of the nation is evident in the multitude of cautionary legends and myths that convey this theme. If a woman is raped, it means the men who have responsibility for her in the nation have failed in their task, and that they are emasculated. With this emasculation comes a loss of legitimacy: "rape in legend frequently symbolises the destruction of male authority, which has lost its essential quality of rule, the will and power to protect the weak."[190]

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[183] Verdery, 1994 p 227-29
[184] Ule & Rener, 1997, p 228
[185] Anthias and Yuval–Davis, 1989, p 7; Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 627-28
[186] Scott, 1988, p 47
[187] Ibid., p 48
[188] Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 627
[189] Charles and Hintjens, p 2
[190] Benton, 1998, p 36

Because of the female construction of the nation, "violence committed against women is directed against the physical and personal integrity of a group."[191]

The converse of this is the need to then paint the enemy as impure and unworthy of such defence and respect. In order to differentiate between "us and them", enemy men and women must be portrayed as embodying the antithesis of acceptable characteristics. The need for women to remain sexually pure, for example, is cautioned against by portraying enemy women as promiscuous. Enemy men are rapists who threaten women (and therefore the nation), and yet are also portrayed as effeminate and not "real men". Salecl has discussed the delicate balancing act between portraying the threat of the enemy as a rapist and the need to portray the men of one's own nation as strong and virile.[192]

There are two assumptions on which these traditions rest: essentialist conceptions of the nation and, following on from that, the correctness of traditional society. These are described below.

Essentialism

Essentialist conceptions of identity, as discussed in the first chapter, focus on definitions based on one or two "fundamental" characteristics. When membership within a certain group is based on a particular criterion that is itself legitimised by its adherence to a "natural" order, it can appear to be logical to assign gender roles along these same lines: "What racism, nationalism, and sexism seem to have in common is that they are all categories which... divide the universality of the human species into exclusive transhistorical groups which are supposed to be separated by *essential* differences, or to become self-conscious and act *as if* they were separated by essential differences."[193] In many nationalist movements, gender roles and national roles are interdependent. The nation, as outlined in chapter two, is dependent upon adherence to social norms: if men attempted to assume women's roles in the care of children, for instance, the rationale for protecting women as the caretakers and conveyers of

[191] Seifert, 1996, p 39
[192] Salecl, 1992, 54-5
[193] Balibar, 1994, 192 (original emphasis)

traditional culture would be weakened. The use of biological and therefore seemingly indisputable (and "correct") roles for men and women is thus made clear.

Retraditionalisation

The theme of the role of the mother is constantly revisited in the literature on gender and nationalism. The imagining of women as mothers plays a crucial part in imagining the nation itself. This symbolic conception of the woman as mother, combined with the physical reality of motherhood, has a number of consequences. One is the removal of women from the private sphere, or the retraditionalisation of gender roles.

Retraditionalisation often emerges as a trend in nations that are attempting to assert their legitimacy, as many were after the collapse of socialism. Part of socialist ideology was to eradicate identifiers such as nationalism and religion, and the traditions that went along with them.[194] However, the relationship between socialism and nationalism was not this simple, for as will be discussed in the case study section, state socialism often resorted back to nationalist identities to assert its "flagging legitimacy".[195] Regardless, the perception of nationalism was that it represented a return to the natural roles that had been denied under socialism. By presenting themselves as "genuinely" Serbian, Romanian, Croatian, etc, nationalist leaders established the authenticity of their nation, and defined themselves in opposition to the previous regime of socialism.

Retraditionalisation is a way of defining difference between groups, and gender roles constitute integral parts of that difference.[196] Part of this traditional society is its basis on the naturalness of gender roles in the Serbian, Romanian, or Croatian nation, and therefore the naturalness of the nation itself. [197] Drawing on the model of women as cultural signifiers, Ule and Rener argue that through retraditionalisation, "only women who have dedicated themselves exclusively to their families are capable of preserving traditional values and the national consciousness of

[194] Gilberg, 1998, p 64
[195] Ibid., p 64. Thanks to Jim Ockey for highlighting this point.
[196] Ong, 1995, p 46
[197] Ong makes this argument regarding Malaysia, 1995, p 46

new generations."[198] In other words, the process of returning women to the home ensures that women will be there to properly educate the nationalists of tomorrow, as well as safeguarding the hierarchical roles that are normalised in the nation.

The politics of tradition as an analytical lens is a particularly apt one for Eastern Europe. The next section, the politics of reproduction, will further illuminate how gender and nationalism interact, and how gender constructions are manifested in the nationalist project.

Politics of Reproduction

This section examines the control of the concept of natural roles for men and women, discussing reproductive control, such as birth control and abortion, as the nation moves towards a perceived crisis. This includes pronatalist policies, which encourage and legislate attempts to increase the population of the nation. [199] This section also includes a discussion of rape as a tool of nationalist conflict, both in the presentation of a threat to the nation and as a means of warfare.

The conception of women as mothers and men as fathers entails the adoption of a variety of gender roles for both men and women, all of which are reinforced by mythical ideals and symbolic representations. The motherhood conception also results in attempts to regulate and control the sexuality of the members of the nation. "Not incidentally, those who are preoccupied with the 'purity' of the race would also be preoccupied with the sexual relationships between members of different collectivities."[200]

The need to control the sexuality of women becomes important when national membership is patrilineal: it is biological fact that the father of a child is harder to determine than the mother. This results in attempting to protect the nation through policies designed to maintain the purity of the nation (pronatalism) and cultural restrictions (no sex before marriage; no sex with members of another nation) that are reinforced by cultural taboos. All of these are direct descendants of the conception of

[198] Ule & Rener, 1997, p 225
[199] Yuval-Davis, 1989
[200] Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 628

women as mothers: of women serving a biological role in the nation.[201] Yuval-Davis and Anthias outlined the need of nations to control the reproduction of social boundaries through women, focussing on the "proper" way to maintain a group's identity.[202]

This need for maintenance of identity is heightened if there is a threat to the integrity of the nation. For example, Moghadam argues that a nation in crisis "constructs an ideological linkage between patriarchal values, nationalism, and the religious order. It assigns women the role of wife and mother, and associates women not only with family but with tradition, culture, and religion."[203] Just as these patriarchal values and religious symbols are the underpinnings of nationalism and define gender roles, so are these gender roles necessary for the continuing legitimation of the nationalist identity. By framing certain "guidelines" of appropriate behaviour in nationalist rhetoric, the validity of the nationalist identity and therefore the coherence of the nationalist community is augmented. The control over the "mother" of the nation becomes integral to the purported survival of the nation.

Pronatalism

When there is a crisis for the nation (which is how a crisis of leadership legitimacy is often portrayed), one of the top priorities becomes the physical preservation of the nation. This often leads to armed conflict in some form to militarily "protect" the nation, such as in the former Yugoslavia. Another form of protecting the nation and preserving its strength is increasing the population, in which gender constructions obviously play a major role. Anthias and Yuval-Davis' framework of gender and nation, as previously discussed, outlines the particular perception of women as biological reproducers of the nation.[204] These boundaries become particularly important when the nation is in crisis, as women become both the cause to fight for (the symbolic motherland) and the symbol of the boundaries of the nation. Pronatalist policies and rhetoric are frequently presented in times of crisis, both to present the image of an imminent threat, and to combat that threat. These

[201] Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989, p 8
[202] Ibid., p 9
[203] Moghadam, 1995, p 336

policies often seek to increase populations that are risk of diminishing due to battlefield casualties, or is in danger of being outnumbered by its enemy's population (as in the case of Serbs in Kosovo).[205]

Pronatalist policies, which seek to increase the population, range from restricting access to abortions and birth control, to media campaigns encouraging women to have more children, to the extreme of punishing women and families who have fewer than a specific number of children. The utility of women in the reproduction of the nation partially lies in pre-existing conceptions within the nation of gender roles. With the intertwining motivations of duty to the nation and the defining of oneself along essentialist definitions of gender, the call for women to surrender rights to abortion and birth control and to have as many children as possible is powerful. If a definition of self is reliant upon essentialist and biological elements, then the obligation to have many children (and therefore replenish the nation) becomes a high priority. Nationalist goals and natural duties provide potent motivation to have more children.

A perceived threat does not necessarily need to be military to prompt pronatalist feelings. National movements that perceive an ethnic minority within its borders to be a threat often encourage population growth to combat that threat. There are also economic factors: such as when a large population is perceived as an indicator of strength in international terms. In this scenario the leaders of a national movement may believe that a large population base will give international status and economic growth.[206] This threat to the nation is more nebulous than a direct military one, but is still motivating. When nations are competing in a region or within a state for legitimacy which may stem from resources, or even international recognition, there is a perception that a larger population helps to attain these.

In the context of the issues raised above regarding pronatalism, abortion policies can be seen in certain circumstances as indicators of nationalist movements in crisis. This is not proposing that abortion policy itself is an indicator of the level of nationalism in a country. Rather, there are specific cases where abortion has been

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[204] Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 627-28
[205] Zajovic, Stasa, p 169; Yuval-Davis, 1993, p 629-30; Kligman, 1998, p 20
[206] Cole and Nydon, 1990, p 470-71

targeted as "killing the nation" (i.e., killing the unborn population of the nation). Abortion, a right everywhere in Eastern Europe in the latter socialist years other than Romania,[207] has been decried by leaders who speak of the need to regenerate the nation. The calls to restrict or remove access to abortion have been in many cases intertwined with efforts to increase the nation's population.

The framing of abortion in nationalist rhetoric may have something to do with the validity such rhetoric lends. As Ule and Rener argued, "It is characteristic of many post-socialist countries that the opponents of abortion cite the 'threat to the nation' being posed by the decreasing birthrate."[208] Here the dynamic of nationalism and gender becomes even more complex, as gendered nationalist rhetoric is utilised to achieve *other* goals, such as garnering support for anti-abortion campaigns.

Although little is written on it specifically, men were affected by socialist pronatalist policies as well. They too were encouraged to have as many children as possible, although they were not held responsible for the care of the children. Kligman, in her discussion on socialism and pronatalism, makes the point that men's masculinity was, in a strange twist, assaulted by the policies. In these traditional societies, "the banning of abortion challenged men's patrilineal "rights" to the sexual and reproductive lives of their wives, which the paternalist state expropriated by fiat."[209]

The overarching conception of pronatalism is the subsumation of the individual body to the goals of the nation, in which the personal motivations of men and women become secondary to the nationalist project of producing more children for the nation. As the case studies will show, in Romania in particular this policy was carried to an extreme.

[207] Moghadam, 1995, p 344
[208] Ule and Rener, 1997, p 230
[209] Kligman, 1998, p, 26

Rape

Rape during conflict is a difficult issue: complex, emotive and rife with different motivations.[210] For the purpose of this thesis, there are particular aspects of the motivations and effects of rape in war that are related to nationalist conflicts and crises. The damage to the symbolic purity of the nation (i.e. the woman is seen as the symbol of the nation which has thus been corrupted by the rape) has been discussed in the tradition section, but there are functions that rape serves closer to the individual level that are vital to discuss. These include the physical violation of the woman on an individual level, the ramifications due to of her traditional culture (i.e. she is made unclean), and the possibility of "polluting" the actual purity of the nation: (i.e. having the child of the enemy).

Wartime rapes are used to achieve much more than basic sexual gratification.[211] The sheer number of rapes in times of conflict, the ways in which they are committed, and the way they are orchestrated demonstrate that the rapes serve a particular political purpose. What is it about rape in particular that is perceived to be such a brutally effective tool of war, particularly when the battle lines are drawn on nationalist lines? One reason is that it is one of the most effective ways of injuring a human, with all the attendant psychological and physiological scars it inflicts, and is thus an effective tool in any war.

Rape also creates a distinction between national groups and their characteristics. As Meznaric has argued, rape is used in creating difference between the men and women of one group in opposition to the other.[212] The threat of rape is used to portray threat, in that the men from the enemy group are rapists, and the purity of the women in one's own group needs to be protected. However, rape is also used to define the masculinity of soldiers. Through rape comes an assertion of power over the raped, which proves the rapist's dominance.[213] This ability to dominate is part of the construction of masculinity that we see in the gender constructions in nationalist movements: being male is to hod power.

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[210] For an excellent in-depth analysis of the complexities of this issue, please refer to Henry's (2000) "Why Soldiers Rape: An Integrative Perspective"
[211] Seifert, 1996, p 36

Another reason for raping multitudes of women during nationalist conflicts has been to impregnate them with the children of the enemy, then prevent them from obtaining abortions, so they are forced to "pollute" the nation's bloodline. As Brown argues "In cases of ethnic and racial conflict, women's sexual purity and their childbearing become not taken-for-granted realities, but instead, means of conflict... motherhood can become the battlefield."[214]

To quote Ruth Seifert, "One of the primary goals in war... is the destruction/deconstruction of culture and not necessarily the defeat of the enemy army. The deconstruction of culture, however, is achieved through injuring and destroying human beings because this is the most efficient (most forceful) way in which a decision can ultimately be brought about."[215] Rape as an attack on the culture of a particular group is particularly potent because of the symbolic position women hold in many societies. In the tradition section I discussed the roles women play in maintaining culture and embodying symbols of the nation.[216] When women are raped: "The destruction of women and/or their integrity affects overall cultural cohesion. Because societies derive their specific form, their self-image and their definition of reality from cultural cohesion, its destruction is of outstanding importance."[217] This cohesion is damaged when ethnic rape is used to divide a community, especially in the fear of the "other" it creates, and in the breakdown in communication it can cause.[218]

Rape becomes an attack on men, too, as it is used to prove that they are not masculine enough to protect their women. In some cases, rapes are used to project a feeling of threat from an enemy, and if this can threaten the legitimacy of the men in the nation to protect the women, then it is only more effective. As discussed in the previous section, the rape is an attack on the ability of men to protect women, and on a symbolic level, their ability to protect, or even lead, their nation.

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[212] Meznaric, 1994
[213] Hague, 1997, p 54
[214] Brown, 1994, p 86
[215] Seifert, 1996, p 38
[216] Yuval-Davis, 1993, for example
[217] Seifert, 1996, p 39
[218] Meznaric, 1994, 93

The way a nation identifies itself in times of perceived threat is significant in relation to gender: roles and identities are transformed and exaggerated. The link with gender is particularly potent because of its high emotive value. When an emotive issue like rape is involved, "...images of women under threat or violated [sic] serve to homogenise the nation and to define its boundaries in relation to others. This reaches a paroxysm in war."[219] The use of rape as a means to portray threat is also used: the threat of rape being one of the more horrific aspects of warfare, its spectre can be a motivator. As Nagel points out, "accounts of many wars and nationalist conflicts include portrayals of enemy men either as sexual demons bent on raping nationalist women, or as sexual eunuchs, incapable of manly virility."[220] Both of these portrayals of the enemy are presented in the next two chapters. As will be demonstrated in Yugoslavian case study, rape as a tool of warfare is a powerful weapon.

Deviations from Nationalist Norms

The variety of roles individual men and women assume in both peacetime and times of conflict often coincide with those already discussed: women as mothers and reproducers; men as warriors. However, some roles are less obvious and appear diametrically opposed to what are usually presented as normative roles for men and women.

Women as Soldiers

An interesting transformation that occurs in times of "national crisis" is the movement of women into military roles. This contradicts several long-held theories that women are more "peaceful" than men.[221] As discussed in chapter three, there has been a perception that women are somehow inherently more peaceable than men, often because of a biological imperative to bear and protect children. For example, Walby concluded that because women do not "take up arms for the nationalist project" as often as men, they do not have such strong nationalist sentiment.[222] This

[219] Morokvasic, 1998, p 75
[220] Nagel, 1998, p 257
[221] Zajovic, 1997, p 171
[222] Walby, 1992, p 92

disregards the social factors that prescribe military roles for men, not women, and assumes that women are more peaceful than men. However, there is an increasing perception that women engage in nationalist struggles and movements in different ways, but are not any less involved in the aims of these movements.[223]. Ong cautions "feminists against the assumption that nationalisms usually represent only male interests, or that women hold a separate vision of the imagined nation-state,"[224] because women are often just as involved in the national project as men are.

The movement of women into combat roles and other non-traditional roles presents a crisis for the way the nation imagines itself. As is discussed in the symbolism chapter, women are often held up as vulnerable and in need of protection. What happens when they partake in combat, and are no longer in need of this protection? What then happens to the justification for the conflict if it is based on the protection of the weak from the threatening enemy? The acceptance of women in this role by the nationalist movement, associated as it is with the vilifying of women who partake in the same action within the enemy camp, necessitates some ideological gymnastics. Unsurprisingly, as Milic points out, there is no statistical information in the case of the former Yugoslavia on how many women went armed into battle. She posits: "the mass media were obviously loath to promote this category of women participating in the national conflict."[225] The dilemma is that participation of women in the armed services and war "can erode one of the most powerful cultural constructions of national collectivities – that of 'womenandchildren' (Enloe 1990) as the reason men go to war."[226] This vilifying of women can also serve as a means to justify going against a vital gender role: protecting women and children. If a woman on the side of the enemy can be portrayed as monstrous, then it is possible to rationalise killing her. By adopting an unnatural role, she has given up her right to be protected and has become just another enemy.

[223] Peterson, 1994, p 102; Woollacott, 1996, p 373; Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1989
[224] Ong, 1995, p 48
[225] Milic, Andjelka, 1993, p 119
[226] Yuval-Davis, 1993, 626-7

Feminist Movements

As far as feminist movements are concerned, there are two general responses to increasing nationalist rhetoric and sentiment. One is to try to maintain the connection as women across nationalist barriers: in other words, to identify as a woman first. The other response is the division of the movements along nationalist lines, which is more often the case.[227] This has been discussed by some theorists as the subversion of feminist goals to the nationalist project.[228] The pressure on women to chose nationalism over any other type of identity increases as a nation moves towards violent conflict, as was shown dramatically in the collapse of the former Yugoslavia.[229] Feminists are often portrayed as whores, or not "real" women,[230] and face this labelling from both men and women,[231] especially in the context of nationalist conflict.[232] There is the additional perception that feminism is both foreign and frighteningly familiar. Goldfarb details how Western feminist thought is threatening both because it represents the "other", and because it has drawn heavily on socialist theory, which is something East European women are wary of after years of negative experience with it.[233]

One reaction to a "national" crisis is the re-evaluating of national priorities. The re-evaluation is manifested in the subsuming of smaller group goals and aspirations to the superior importance of the nationalist goals. This prioritisation is often discussed with regard to feminist movements, which are often put on hold until the nationalist struggle has been won. The sidelining of feminist movements in times of crisis, often voluntarily by the women themselves, (Mertus et al) is an interesting aspect of how gender roles are defined in a time of crisis. In times of national threat, "women's issues" (which would actually serve to redefine gender roles in society) are put on hold as the national interests are protected. The incidence of women putting women's issues on hold, as these issues are perceived as less urgent, is relatively common.

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[227] Benderly, 1997, p 60
[228] Jayawardena, 1986, p 259; Nagel, 1998, p 253
[229] Benderly, 1997, p 64; Boric, 1997, p 37
[230] Benderly, 1997, p 64
[231] Goven, 1993, p 224
[232] Funk, 1993, p 87
[233] Goldfarb, 1997, p 238

Women, when protesting against the national leadership or joining military service, are perceived as no longer vulnerable and in need of protection. This non-conformance requires a re-working of norms. This is one of the most important transformations apparent in nationalist conflict: the adoption of roles that would conceivably be unacceptable are rationalised in a variety of ways. The adoption of military roles by women is often justified by either the shortage of men or through the image of the "fierce mother" who will fight to save her offspring (another biological reference).[234]

Homosexuality

Because of its deviance from the prescribed sexual norms of the nation, homosexuality is often perceived as a threat in nationalist movements. Although this thesis deals with "traditional" gender roles (i.e. heterosexual male and female), it is important to note the importance of including other concepts of gender and sexuality into the study of nations and nationalism. Part of this stems from the idealised conception of what a man or a woman is. To cross the boundary into the other's territory is to attack the foundations of the nation's order, and this weakens the nation itself. As Nagel says, one of the worst insults people in general can imagine is to have their sexuality questioned.[235]

Another part of this discussion examines the practical utility of the assumption of particular roles for men and women. Yuval-Davis' discussion of the perceived need to control sexuality within the nation stems in part from the attachment of national identity to the notion of national security and safety. In a time of crisis, it becomes increasingly important to maintain proper gender roles in order to maintain the integrity of the nation. The result of this is often the repression of what is perceived to be "abnormal" sexuality, ie homosexuality.[236] There is also the threat of non-breeding men and women to the size of the nation. As Heitlinger has argued, homosexuality

[234] Zajovic, 1997, p 171
[235] Nagel, 1998 p 252
[236] Stychin, 1998, p 9-10. The subject of homosexuality and the nation is discussed in detail in Stychin's book, *A Nation By Rights*.

means these men and women will not be bearing children, and this presents a threat to pronatalist projects.[237]

In terms of masculinity, the representation of a man as less than a real man is often framed by calling him a homosexual. This not only degrades him for not being a real man (and therefore not a member of the nation), but for being actively abnormal. Indeed, Mosse contends that nationalist movements have perceived homosexuality to be as threatening as criminals and foreigners.[238] The masculinity of the soldier is threatened by this homosexual identity, which is perceived as feminine. As Hageu has argued, "homosexuality, in this reasoning, weakens military strength and the strength of the national army."[239] For women, charges of lesbianism are often hurled at feminists who contradict the national leadership in times of conflict. Again, these charges are intended to attack the normalcy of the women, and their right to belong to the nation.

The deviations from the prescribed norms of the nation discussed above point to the paradox of immutability that nationalist rhetoric is reliant upon. The constructions of gender that are prescribed for men and women are not consistent or set in stone, rather, they are subject to change depending upon the utility they have for the nationalist project. In the case studies, these deviations from the gender norm will be demonstrated to be both a weapon in the struggle for legitimacy and a source of aggravation for the nationalist leadership.

Case Studies

The inclusion of Romania and the former Yugoslavia as case studies is based on several specific characteristics of the two countries. Both countries were had by leaders who legitimised themselves through a nationalist discourse in both the latter years of state socialism and in the early 1990s. The utilisation of gendered rhetoric in the nationalist movements of both countries provided support for the legitimation of these movements. The constructions of masculinity and femininity were integral elements in the war in Yugoslavia, and concepts of motherhood and fatherhood were

[237] Heitlinger, 1979, p 22-23
[238] Mosse, 1985, p 25

the basis of Ceausescu's pronatalist campaign. Both the former Yugoslavia and Romania had poor relations with internal minorities which were manipulated to legitimate particular nationalist ideologies. This section will examine gender in the socialist and post-socialist periods, with a particular eye to how gender constructions and policies were useful to the nationalist movements in both case study countries.

The former Yugoslavia is the war-torn area in the Eastern European region, with nationalist hostilities breaking into violence over the last ten years. In Yugoslavia, the leadership legitimacy crisis began after the death of Tito in 1980 as the power-sharing relationship between the republics began to break down. Some republican political elites looked to ethnic identities to shore up their support, resulting in the continued movement of power away from the central institutions. The final nail in the non-nationalist policy coffin was Milosevic's speech in Kosovo in 1987. This followed moves by Milosevic to restrict Kosovo's autonomy. This speech is seen by many as a break with the officially non-nationalist principles of Tito's regime, and as the beginning of overt Serbian nationalism. In the following years, in which power struggles resulted in bloody civil war, there is consistent evidence of the efforts to grasp and maintain power by claiming legitimation through the nationalist project. The rhetoric in these efforts is highly gendered, as is evident in the allegations of rape in the region as tensions between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians intensified.

In Romania, it can be argued that a crisis of legitimation was occurring in the late 1980s as Ceausescu increasingly tightened his control over the country to maintain power. The ever increasing portrayal of the threat from outsiders (particularly Hungarians) and the efforts to increase the Romanian population through pronatalist policies were strategies utilised to shore up popular compliance as social and economic conditions worsened. Political groups since Ceausescu's death have used extreme nationalist rhetoric in an attempt to win mass support. Both Ceausescu and the post-1989 leadership have drawn heavily on highly gendered rhetoric and policies to claim a right to govern the country. Ceausescu's actions are some of the more blatant instances of utilising women as the reproducers of the nation's population.

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[239] Hague, 1997, p 58

It is important to re-emphasise here one of the points raised in the introduction to this thesis. There are some areas in the case studies that will have different emphases, as the different gender constructions have manifested themselves to varying extents in the two countries. In Romania, for example, there was a strong pronatalist campaign in the socialist years. In Yugoslavia, rape was one of the most important expressions of the connection between gender and nationalism. It is important to note that while almost all of the constructions discussed above occur in both countries, each has particular areas on which more importance was placed by the nationalist leadership.

Gender and State Socialism

Before 1989, gender issues in Eastern Europe were dominated by the state socialist leadership in what has been called "the gender regime of socialism".[240] This regime permeated both the public and private realms in these socialist communities. Havelkova claims that one goal of communism was to "remove the boundaries between public and private"[241], and others have discussed how this, combined with the gender equality policies of socialism, prevented people from identifying as a man or as a woman. For example, in Romania the pronatalist measures taken were so severe that women dreaded their own gender: to be a woman was to be constantly subject to state interference with their bodies.[242]

It is useful here to discuss briefly the relationship between state and society in socialist countries. The power basis for socialist regimes was in their ability to maintain control over resource allocation.[243] The state had three options: "relying on material incentives", which ultimately weakens the state's monopoly on production and therefore its hold on power; coercion, entailing the use of force to maintain power; and finally what Verdery describes as "symbolic-ideological" strategies, involving the normalising of state socialist rule through "moral imperatives, societal norms, or other ideological appeals".[244]

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[240] Verdery, 1994, p 229
[241] Havelkova, 1993: p 90
[242] Baban, 2000, 232, 239
[243] Verdery, 1990
[244] Verdery, 1991b, p 418

In the utilisation of the third method of control listed above (normalisation), the creation of these societal norms through cultural production (art, literature, the intellectuals) creates a similar paradigm to that of actual goods production. In order to ensure the legitimation of the state and its right to govern, there must be allocation control over cultural production. This ranged from control over the physical means of production, such as the registering of typewriters in Ceausescu's Romania, to the more intangible control of language, to the censoring and oversight of almost all written material.[245]

There are two key points to draw out of this discussion. One is the role of both coercion and normalisation in socialist societies as a way of maintaining and strengthening power bases. This provides an interesting introduction to the adaptability of socialist structures to nationalist ones, as will be discussed below. The second point is the interlocking need of the socialist state to intrude in almost every facet of people's lives. As the state sought to establish its legitimacy through these norms, it appropriated all means to achieve this aim: media, popular culture, and other social avenues.

Socialist regimes did not eradicate the different gender roles in the workplace, in politics, or in the home. There are those who maintained that women were better off under state socialism than previously, but even they conceded that there was much to be done before women achieved anything approaching equality.[246] One study conducted in 1989-90 led Massey et al to conclude that, "socialist countries have persistently emphasised their commitment to equal treatment for women in all spheres of society. The record of many of these societies in living up to this commitment cannot be dismissed... There were genuine structural transformations that improved women's lot... however, in socialist formations a highly visible gendered division of labour remained."[247] Despite the constant claims by leaders that they were promoting gender equality, women continued to do the majority of the housework, were responsible for the majority of the childcare, and often worked full time. As Cole and Nyden found in their research in Romania, the pressure put on women to both partake in the labour intensive economy and produce (often under severe duress) and care for

[245] Ibid., p 420-22
[246] Olsen, 1990, p 433

large families not only exacerbated what they called "gender repression", it also was a source of "social antagonisms" between men and women.[248]

One of the characteristics of this strange relationship between "gender equality" espoused by socialist leadership and the actual gendering of the community was the so-called "double burden" assumed by women. Even as women were being exhorted to work (a large labour force being vital in the "labour-intensive and capital-poor" societies[249]) there was no real reorganisation of gender and societal roles. Women were therefore still expected to work full-time, yet maintained the responsibility for housework and childcare. This resulted in women being defined "as both workers and mothers, while men in the labour market were considered only as workers."[250] William Moskoff also writes of this double burden, describing how in Romania (in the 1970s) there were some institutional supports for women with children. [251] However, these were often overcrowded, and were not in turn supported by attempts to alter the society's long history as a patriarchy, resulting in women remaining responsible for the home.

A second "hidden" aspect of the socialist equality policies was the retention of gender-based jobs.[252] Women were still confined to certain types of industries, such as textile, clerical, and light industry, while men maintained their dominant presence in heavy industry, the army, and positions of political power.[253] When women moved into positions that in the West are well-paid (and dominated by men), these occupations were devalued, becoming less well-paid and less prestigious.[254] This is presumably a result both of the aforementioned neglect to change the underlying attitudes to gender in society, and of the power that was maintained by the concept of the socialist society as a family that Verdery has discussed. This societal dynamic was one that placed extreme pressure on men and women to become equal, and yet

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[247] Massey, et al, 1995, p 375
[248] Cole, J W and J A Nydon, 1990, 474
[249] Verdery, 1994, p 230
[250] Grapard, 1997, p 677
[251] Moskoff, 1982, p 84
[252] Porket, 1981, p 243
[253] Verdery, 1994, p 233; Grapard, 1997, p 677
[254] Grapard, 1997, p 677-8; also Lobodzinska, 1996, p 528

maintained the inequities it claimed to discourage. In general, there was no real re-alignment of gender roles under socialism.[255]

Gender and Socialist Collapse

As the perceived solidity of the state socialist structures became suddenly uncertain, the collapse of socialism also represented a tremendous change in the relationship of gender in the community. There is an argument to be made that the structures of state socialism operated on a construction of "otherness" that was particularly adaptable to the nationalist movements that then appeared in Eastern Europe. [256] This "otherness" involved the creation of societal structures that relied upon an us/them dichotomy. The state socialist leadership, through the coercion and normalisation methods described above, often attempted to shore up its legitimacy through the portrayal of an enemy, whether that be the imperialist aggressor or the internal traitor to the revolution.[257]

The connection with this thesis is the blurring of the line between public and private in nationalist movements: there is an important contradiction for East European countries. There was so much intrusion into private life under socialism that most people were adamant about the return of the private sphere. This was one of the attractions of the nationalist movements in the region: the return to a presumably "natural" society without the state's involvement in one's private life. This is not necessarily the reality: nationalist movements also blur the line between public and private in their attempts to influence attitudes. As Hobsbawm has argued, the line between civil and state society is often obscured as nationalist movements try to create norms for the community that support the nationalist goals. The irony is that what seems to be the salvation from the evils of socialism perpetuates many of the same problems: "the very same nationalism that helped to bring about the shift away from socialism toward democracy perpetuates a public/private ideology."[258]

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[255] Kligman, 1984, p 167, 183; 1998, p 26
[256] Thanks to Joanna Goven for suggesting this concept; see also Verdery and Kligman, 1992, p 143; Verdery, 1993 (Slavic Review), p 191
[257] Ule & Rener, 1997, p 223-4; Mayhall, 1993, p 98
[258] Mayhall, 1993, p 98

The retraditionalisation of gender roles in nationalist movements gave identity after years of socialist "normalisation" and the uncertainty of private roles under socialism.[259] On a utilitarian level, retraditionalisation fits with the economic reality of high unemployment of post-socialist Eastern Europe. Encouraging women to leave the realm of public, paid employment to return to the private sphere would have the beneficial result of easing the demand for jobs when unemployment was skyrocketing.[260] The state could not afford to have women competing for jobs, and could not afford to help women work. The reality of the "transitions" of post-socialist countries has meant that "there is no longer any money for all those day-care centers and kindergartens, for lengthy maternity leaves and family allocations..."[261] As these transitions progress, it is possible to see Eastern Europe as an indicator of "how tightly interwoven are 'socialism' and 'capitalism' with specific – and variant – organisations of gender; and these in turn are bound up with the national idea."[262]

What did nationalist movements offer after socialism? For one, an apparent distinction between public life and private life. The degree of intrusion of the socialist state into private lives, especially in Romania, is hard to overestimate. The movement of women back into a clearly defined private sphere was a political movement in that while it adhered to a traditionally nationalist conception of male and female roles, it also helped to alleviate an economic reality of post-socialism; namely, skyrocketing unemployment. The nationalist ideology of retraditionalising gender roles simultaneously fit this economic situation and provided a comforting definitiveness about social roles. Rather than being trapped with the double burden of paid work and housework, women only felt obligated to work in the home. Ule and Rener point out that while "...women in the former Yugoslavia have an ambivalent attitude toward nationalism... they have no trouble finding themselves in its social matrix, regardless of whether they reject nationalism or accept it."[263] Perhaps this has been one of the fundamental appeals of nationalism movements in Eastern Europe. There is a possible connection between the maintenance of patriarchy in socialist regimes (despite claims

[259] Salecl, 1993, cited in Benderly, 1997, p 62
[260] Grapard, 1997, p 669, 680-1
[261] Verdery, 1994, p 252
[262] Ibid., p 253
[263] Ule & Rener, p 228

of equality for women) and the swift return to traditional roles for men and women under nationalism.[264]

After socialism, with its intrusion into private lives and dictation of private roles, nationalism gave security and stability with straightforward social roles, all while appearing to keep the private, private. Watson claims that women and men were not frustrated by the power imbalance under socialism , but the "extent to which the state has prevented some from being 'normal' women, and men from being 'normal' men...men tend to experience emasculation as a result of their inability to exercise real power and initiative in the public domain."[265] So perhaps Benton is correct when she alleges that nationalist ideologies "offer women a distinct role *as* women. Not as citizens, but as the female part of the organic, homogeneous nation."[266]

Although Benton does not address men's roles, we can extrapolate that men would then be re-adopting roles such as protector and provider. The masculine identity that relies on these roles would be reasserted with men's return to the position of sole breadwinner. In an examination of the history of citizenship and participation rights for men and women, Nira Yuval-Davis contends that the difference between the appropriate roles for men and women is integral to the gendered construction of society. "...women were not simply latecomers to citizenship rights... Their exclusion was part and parcel of the construction of the entitlement of men to democratic participation which 'conferred citizen status not upon individuals as such, but upon men in their capacity as members and representatives of a family (ie a group of non-citizens'"[267]

Therefore, we see that the characteristics of gender roles in socialist and post-socialist societies are not as divergent as would first appear. As is discussed above, despite socialist rhetoric of creating equality for men and women, there was actually little substantive change for the better in women's status under those regimes. With the collapse of state socialism, and the increase in nationalist sentiment in the region,

[264] Denich, 1995, p 64
[265] Watson, 1993, p 485
[266] Benton, 1998, p 33
[267] Vogel, 1989, p 2 as cited in Yuval-Davis, 1991, p 63

the corresponding retraditionalisation of women was reinforced. Although the collapse of socialism was meant to allow men and women to regain control over their private lives, the reality was that there was increasing interference in the private realm as nationalist movements began to define who belonged and who did not. It these efforts to define the appropriate gender constructions that will be explored in the case study chapters.

Conclusion

The framework of the politics of tradition and the politics of reproduction allows us to investigate the elusive but potent role that gender constructs play in nationalist movements. These lenses allow an examination of everything from the language of speeches to the actions of soldiers, in how they support and legitimate nationalist movements.

The themes above will be covered in-depth in the case study chapters, and will draw on several particular areas for illustration. In the section on politics of tradition, I will look at history, the media and its manipulation, and popular culture and how these utilise gendered language and themes. In the politics of reproduction I will focus on policies and attitudes that can be classed as pronatalist (including abortion), and on rape. The case study chapters will also include some discussion about the occasions of "deviance" from the nationalist norms and ideals, such as feminism, homosexuality, and the assumption by women of military roles.

In the first section of each case study, Hobsbawm's contention regarding legitimacy, which contends that nationalist movements rely to certain degrees on the invention of traditions, is demonstrated with alarming clarity. In both countries, tremendous effort was put towards presenting and manipulating the histories of the particular regions, and in promulgating particular histories and traditions that supported a particular leadership. Both the media and popular culture, such as songs and fiction, helped to incorporate national legends into modern life and demonstrate the conscious connection between the past and the present nation. Throughout, there was an underlying reliance on the essentialist nature of the nation. By rooting the nation in this conceptualisation, the "natural" order is justified and legitimated.

In the section on reproduction, some of the most potent evidence of the relationship between the construction of gender and the physical construction of the nation is presented. The leaders in both countries went to extraordinary lengths to manipulate and control the "body" of the nation; the symbolic constructs of the nation are made manifest in policies and actions. The pronatalist tactics outlined above were not only utilised with savage effect, but are indicative of how reliant upon the control of gender roles these movements were. The use of rape to not only symbolically challenge a right to lead but to individually devastate is also discussed. As we will see, systematic policies of rape have been integral to the "cleansing" of regions: part of an assertion of dominance in nationalist conflict.

Finally, the case studies deal with the incorporation or rejection of people who do not fit into the normative roles. In cases like these, there is a great deal of pressure, unsurprisingly, put on the "different" to conform, both by peers and through power structures. In the context of gender, the assumption of a "different" gender role is threatening to the cohesion of the national group. This threat was dealt with in various ways. In some cases there was co-option of a group, such as when feminist movements were subverted to the nationalist cause. In other instances, those who were different were imprisoned, as happened (and still does) to homosexuals in Romania.

The framework outlined here provides us with clear evidence of the utility in using gender as an analytical tool. It illuminates the constructed nature of nationalist movements that attempt to legitimise themselves as natural and inevitable. Simultaneously, this gender-based schema exposes the professedly firm roles of men and women in society as both fluid and problematic as they are manipulated for particular goals. The roles are fluid in that they are not the permanent and timeless roles that nationalist rhetoric would portray them to be, and they are problematic as a result. To accept that these roles are not in need of analysis is to accept what Gellner calls a "fundamental paradox of nationalism": that which is constructed is something natural.[268]

[268] Gellner, 1983, p 6

Chapter Five
Romania

This chapter examines the gender and nationalism theories and issues raised in the previous chapters in the context of Romania by examining the utilisation of gender constructions in the Romanian nationalist project.. Chronologically, it explores the early 1980s through the late 1990's, and involves discussion of both state socialist and post-socialist periods. This period includes the later years of the Ceausescu leadership, during which time Nicolae Ceausescu's leadership legitimacy was being questioned. The execution of the Ceausescu's in 1989 brought about another crisis of leadership, as increasingly varied groups vied for the right to rule in Romania.

State Socialism and Revolution in Romania

Before exploring the intersection of gender and nationalism in Romania, I will first outline the context of this intersection. Socialism in Romania was dominated by the rule of Nicolae Ceausescu. Although initially perceived by many as a reformer, especially in his defiance of Soviet hegemony, by the time of his execution in December 1989 Ceausescu had become a paranoid and ruthless tyrant. There was infiltration of the population by the state police (the Securitate) and informers at a rate as high as one in every fifteen people. The media was under the total control of the government, there were severe food and power restrictions, and extreme pronatalist policies meant that orphanages were overflowing and under-funded.[269] By the late 1980s, there were signs of growing discontent: increasing strikes and a riot in Brasov in 1987, as wages were often late and heat and food restrictions became unbearable.[270]

[269] Tismaneanu, 1997, p 410-12; Kligman, 1992 and 1998; Linz & Stepan, 1996, p 350-51
[270] Deletant, 1995, p 249-54. For a discussion of the growing resentment in rural areas, see Kideckel, 1983

The Romanian "revolution" began in mid-December of 1989, and was effectively over by the 25th of that month with the execution of Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu. What had started as a popular uprising in Timisoara had, at least to some degree, been co-opted by members of the communist leadership.[271] While there continues to be disagreement and speculation around conspiracies regarding the revolution, it is fairly clear that the overthrow of Ceausescu could not have happened without some complicity from both the Securitate and high ranking communist officials.[272] The National Salvation Front (NSF), made up of former communist leaders, took control of the state apparatus and positioned itself as a caretaker government. Ion Iliescu, head of the NSF and the interim leader of the country, was elected President in both 1990 and 1992. Iliescu, a high-ranking communist in Ceausescu's government, attempted to gain legitimacy for his party by claiming responsibility for the elimination of Ceausescu. Rather than undertake a period of reform, the new leadership acted on the premise that with the end of Ceausescu came the end of the problems of the socialist years.[273]

In terms of any differences in political culture in the socialist and post-socialist periods, Romania did not change dramatically from one period to the next. Linz and Stepan have argued that the personalisation of leadership like Ceausescu's often tends to crush any perceived opposition, thus preventing any burgeoning of civil society.[274] This was certainly the case in Romania, where Ceausescu immediately quashed any potential leadership threats. There were some significant changes made in Romania following the end of the Ceausescu regime (the restrictions on abortion policies were repealed almost immediately, as were other extremely unpopular laws[275]) but there was no real examination or dismantling of the style of government that had allowed Ceausescu to maintain his hold on power.[276]

This absence of "vital soul-searching" meant that there was no reform of the judicial, media or police systems, all of which would be necessary for any real

[271] Verdery and Kligman, 1992, p 121-2
[272] Ibid., p 121-2
[273] Linz and Stepan, 1996, p 359; Verdery and Kligman, 1992, p 118-9, 122
[274] Linz and Stepan, 1996, p 346-7, 351
[275] Bacon and Pol, 1994, p 55
[276] Verdery and Kligman, 1992, p 125,127

transformation from the former authoritarian regime.[277] As discussed in the previous chapter, the fall of the socialist system left power structures that were suitable for nationalist identification and rhetoric. This created a situation where the new semi-authoritarian leaders perceived nationalism as one of the few immediate means available to assert their legitimacy.[278] Nationalist rhetoric became a tool that no-one could neglect: "nationalism in the region's politics became a matter of degree rather than a distinct political option."[279] In chapter four, I discussed some of the ways in which the structures of socialist legitimation lent themselves to nationalist movements. In Romania in particular, the socialist construction of a threatening "other", whether external or internal, fit with the continuation of a leadership legitimised through nationalist rhetoric.[280] The threat from both neighbours and internal enemies created a constant atmosphere of uncertainty, and "became a convenient mechanism by which the population's vulnerability as well as national interest was aroused and maintained."[281] Ceausescu, as the national leader, was then portrayed as the shield against these threats.

It is important to clarify that unlike in Ceausescu's time, nationalists in post-socialist Romania are not part of a monolithic movement, in that they are not the "only game in town". However, they still wield considerable power in the government, press, and security forces.[282] Nationalism has become a "card" that parties have been required to play to gain power[283], and although there is dissension over whether this influence is currently waxing or waning, there is no doubt that nationalist rhetoric stills plays a fundamental part in Romanian political life.[284] In recent elections in Transylvania, for example, extreme nationalist Gheorghe Funar alleged that if his moderate opponent won, Hungarian would become the official language of the region and Romanians in the region would be evicted from their homes. Funar won the election.[285]

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[277] Tismaneneau, 1997, p 409
[278] Moisa, 2000, "Slippery National Interest"
[279] Verdery, 1998, p 294
[280] Tismaneanu and Pavel, 1994, p 405; Verdery and Kligman, 1992, p 143
[281] Kligman, 1998, p 37
[282] Gallagher, 1997, p 77-79
[283] Dragu, 1999
[284] Gallagher, 1997, p 80-81
[285] Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 2000, "Transylvania's Local Elections Show Nationalism is Strong Factor"

Nationalism in Romania, both under state socialism and in the present, has focused mainly upon the difference between Romanians, supposedly of Dacian descent[286], and those of German descent, Gypsies (as in most places in Eastern Europe), Jews (although the Jewish population is very small) and, most notably, Hungarians. The Hungarian population, particularly in Transylvania, has been presented as the main threat in part because of the tense relations with Hungary over the region of Transylvania. Nationalism under Ceausescu called for the homogenisation of the nation, which produced an interesting paradox. On the one hand there was the push to create a society with no internal difference, while on the other hand there was the impossibility of Hungarians being recognised as anything other than Hungarian.[287] The first requirement for being a true Romanian was to be born a Romanian. So, even though Ceausescu called for unity, there were some who would never be allowed full membership. Under both state socialism and in the post-socialist years, there has been tension between ethnic groups in Romania.

It is important to make a distinction at this point about the level of participation of the general population in the maintenance of Ceausescu's regime. Although the infiltration of almost every level of society with propaganda was designed to inculcate particular norms (in the case of this thesis, gender norms), this does not mean that there was full scale *acceptance* of these norms. Rather, in Romania during the 1980s, it was more a case of, as Kligman puts it, "an effective and manipulative technology to engineer psychological and emotional compliance".[288] The distinction is that rather than an embracing of Ceausescu's ideology, there was an acceptance of it; while people did not believe, they did not rebel either. In a country where the shortages were so severe and the party rhetoric was so far removed from the reality of life, no amount of propaganda could convince the public that life was a socialist utopia. This is revealed in the jokes of the time, such as:

> Even though no one works, the plan is fulfilled beyond expectation
> Even though the plan is fulfilled beyond expectation, nothing is available

[286] This is the lineage that was traced back literally thousands of years and is one of the mainstays of Romanian national identity. According to Deletant (1991), this was "not merely a matter of historical contention; it became entwined with a defence of the Romanian nation" (p 81). There are a variety of sources that examine this further: Deletant, 1991; Verdery, 1991; Gallagher, 1995; Tismaneanu and Pavel, 1994, p 402-3

[287] Deletant, 1995, 198

[288] Kligman, 1998, p 117, and footnote to this discussion, #7 on page 297

> Even though nothing is available, everyone eats
> Even though everyone eats, they are not satisfied (thankful)
> Even though they are not grateful, everyone claps their hands
> "(The last refers to people showing their adoration of Ceausescu by clapping on command even though they despised him.)"[289]

The vulnerability of Ceausescu's regime did not go unnoticed. Writing in 1989, Tismaneanu claimed that "Ceausescu's regime is probably the most vulnerable in East-Central Europe", and described the increasing failure of Ceausescu to actually instil the loyalty he demanded.[290] This is by way of clarifying here that there was not a blanket acceptance of the messages being disseminated. However, it is also important to note that while Ceausescu's message was not ringing true, this does not mean the Romanian people did not subscribe to a nationalist Romanian identity under state socialism.[291]

A large part of this propaganda was focussed on issues of gender, particularly in terms of encouraging women to take on particular roles. Gender was an issue for the socialist leadership in Romania just as it was in most other socialist countries.[292] There was official state rhetoric about gender equality, and about bringing women into the public workplace. Accompanying this was the "double burden" of women discussed earlier in the thesis, in which the work of women in the home was compounded by paid work outside the home.[293] As in the other state socialist countries, there was also the lack of change at the local level in social structures.[294] However, in Romania, there was the addition of what Kligman refers to as the triple burden: "when childbearing was declared a patriotic duty."[295] In all the other socialist states, abortion was legalised as part of the effort, even if only superficial, to give

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[289] Ibid., footnote #35, p 269
[290] Tismaneanu, 1989, p 189
[291] The argument can be made that many Romanians believed in such an identity, but that Ceausescu had betrayed it. The extension of this is that by 1989 Ceausescu was perceived as a traitor to the nation, and that this was the claim to legitimacy that post-socialist nationalists were making. The argument that Ceausescu's nationalism was "false" is made by far-right groups like the Movement For Romania. Gallagher, 1995, p 155
[292] Grapard, 1997, p 666
[293] Fischer and Harsanyi, 1994, p 203
[294] Kligman, 1984, p 184. In this examination of wedding rituals, Kligman made the argument that the wedding ritual was indicative of the reality of social interaction: that Romania was still a male dominated hierarchy that clashed with socialist gender prescriptions. This is because the "state ideology lack[ed] a transformative quality". See also Fischer (1985) on the lack of transformation of gender roles in the home (p 136)
[295] Kligman, 1998, p 25

women equality. In Romania, abortion was made illegal in 1966, the year after Ceausescu assumed control of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP).[296]

Politics of Tradition

As discussed in the previous chapter, the politics of tradition centre on the twin issues of essentialism and retraditionalisation. The relationship between the leadership of Romania and the symbolism of the nation was complex, and took several guises. The nation was portrayed in a variety of ways, including as a family, as a lover, as a daughter, and as a mother. These conceptions were then combined with the particular state socialism of Ceausescu, which resulted in a complicated and personalised leadership. Romanian nationalism in this period was focused on micro and macro conceptions of human relationships, in which the interactions of individuals with the nation were interpreted through sexual and maternal/paternal filters.

In Romania, the "traditional" family structure was a patriarchal one, one that fit well into the structure of large families and the woman's role as a mother that Ceausescu's nationalist goals would demand. This was then translated into legitimating the socialist "family", with Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu as father and mother to the nation.[297]

The gender regime in Romania has been referred to as almost literally a "parent state", in which "the family must be replaced by the communist party."[298] Understanding this conception of the socialist system leads to an understanding of a society in which gender themes are operational at every level, as the state redefined itself as a family. In Romania, this led to the ultimate "family" state system, with Nicolae Ceausescu as the absolute father. Within a society organised along these lines come various roles, both explicit and implicit. As the community became defined as a family, men and women were defined as sons and daughters, mothers and fathers, husbands and wives. In another framing of the nation, as mentioned above, Ceausescu himself was representative of the nation, and became the ideal Romanian. By the end

[296] Ibid., p 24
[297] Ibid., p 30

of the 1980s, the identity of the nation was completely intertwined with Ceausescu as the leader to the extent that he was representative of the nation. This in turn meant that any attack on Ceausescu was in turn an attack on the nation, and vice versa.[299]

It is helpful to address here the role of Elena Ceausescu and the attempts made to present her as the mother of the nation. In marked contrast to the professed "Romanian ideal", she and Nicolae did not have many children. However, she was held up as the ideal Romanian woman, as she was in charge of the women's groups in Romania and was the most public female figure in the country.[300] However, she was mostly disliked if not despised in Romania.[301] Other women held up as models of socialist Romanian women were also feared and disliked by the general populace.[302] It is unclear whether this dislike was the result of jealousy for the "affection" of the father of the nation (Nicolae Ceausescu), a basic dislike for a tyrannical human being, or an aversion (despite socialist rhetoric) to women in positions of power. What is clear is that Elena never engendered the sort of positive emotion that Nicolae did.

The understanding of the head of state as the ultimate father figure was carried over at least into the earlier days of the "revolution". Hausleitner discusses her own witnessing of "celebrations for the new 'state father', Iliescu, [when] the people – and especially the women – acted as they had under the enforced personality cult: simpleminded slogans of the leaders were chanted, and portraits of the new leader were kissed."[303] While the leadership of Iliescu did not go on to produce the same cult of personality seen under Ceausescu, this scene is indicative of the relationship many continued to feel with the head of state. That relationship was personal, and can be seen as partially a result of family structured socialism. This was translated into the nation as a family, the strength of which concept was discussed in regards to Breuilly in chapter two.

In the framework established in chapter four, I argued that the relationship between gender and tradition was not only embedded in symbols of the nation and

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[298] Verdery, 1994, p 230
[299] Deletant, 1991, p 80
[300] Lovatt, 1999b; Kligman, 1998, 130
[301] Harsanyi, 1993, p 48; Lovatt, 1999b
[302] Harsanyi, 1993, p 42
[303] Hausleitner, 1993, p 53

national identity, but that the national identity was reliant upon gender constructions. In Romania we see that the position of power and dominance held by Ceausescu was dependent upon his gendered role as the father of the nation; he was a patriarchal leader with the right to rule. In the post-socialist years, this position of father of the nation was initially held by Iliescu as part of his efforts to assume the power that had been held by Ceausescu.

These multiple portrayals of Ceausescu as the ideal Romanian, a father figure, and the ultimate husband (with ideal wife Elena) were supported in a variety of ways. The post-socialist nationalist leaders have not had the hegemony of Ceausescu, but have drawn on the same gendered nationalist constructions. I will first examine the way the history of the nation has become a means to justify and legitimate various policies and programs for both Ceausescu and the post-socialist leadership.

Historical Manipulation

Historiography in Romania has played an integral role in lending credence to the claims of an ancient and legitimate nation. Despite the actual malleability of history, the general perception that history consists of "facts" lends it authenticity, and has been utilised by many nationalist movements in attempts to give validity to nationalist claims. This malleability is evident in Romania, where nationalist goals and claims were often supported by historians.[304] History was drawn on both to anchor the Romanian nation in antiquity, and to provide symbols of the great Romanian nation. For example, in the late 1970s the new philosophy of protochronism was being promoted. Meaning literally "first in time", Deletant describes protochronism as "a promotion of a nationalist view of the Romanian past and a denial of external influences in Romanian culture."[305] This was not only to establish the Romanian heritage for claims to certain areas of land, but to establish the long and noble history of the Romanian nation.

In 1980, the Romanians were asked to celebrate the 2050th anniversary of the Dacian state, the predecessor of the Romanian nation. By 1986, Ceausescu was

[304] Deletant, 1991, p 65, 79-80, 83; Gilberg, 1998, p 65-6
[305] Deletant, 1995, p 186; for more on this see the chapter on protochronism in Verdery, 1991

glorified as the embodiment of: Horea (18th C Transylvanian leader), Stephen the Great (Prince of Moldavia, 15th C), Nicolae Balcescu (1848 Wallachia revolution leader), and Prince Michael the Brave (briefly unified Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania, late 16th C), among others.[306] These symbols from history were imbued with all that was noble in the Romanian nation, and that nobility was then transferred to Ceausescu.

One of the contentions of this thesis is that specifically gendered nationalist rhetoric was used for reinforcing power. In Romania, policy and history intertwined to do just that. The pressure put on women in Romania to bear children in the late socialist years coincided with a concerted effort to portray the historical, traditional Romanian family as large. For instance, one article was published in the Communist Party newspaper with the headline 'The Home with Many Children, Sign of a Good Citizen's Sense of Responsibility for the Future of the Nation".[307] The authors, two well-known academics, maintained that, "only with the founding of a family does a man acquire his true social identity" and that Romania's strength in the past came from its large families.[308] It is this combination of manipulated history and present day functionalism that renders the myth useful. In the Romanian case, it connected the attainment of true masculinity with a large family, and that same "traditional" large Romanian family with the goals of the modern nation.

Part of this conjunction of these themes of gender, history and nationalist goals was the promotion of the Romanian peasant ideal.[309] As Harsanyi points out, this patriarchal ideal, which continues into the current day, means that "Men's domination and women's submissiveness are seen as rooted in a natural and religious order beyond human judgement."[310] This was a "natural" ideal that combined the glorious history of the past with a family structure that promoted large families and patriarchal power systems. According to Kligman, after fieldwork in Romania in the late 1970s, "through the symbolic construction of a national ideology, the RCP legitimates itself... Part of the RCP's claim to legitimacy is seen to stem historically from the

[306] Gallagher, 1995, p 59
[307] Verdery, 1994, p 235-6
[308] Ibid., p 235-6
[309] Harsanyi, 1993, p 43; Verdery, 1991, p 227,
[310] Harsanyi, 1993, p 39

heroic tradition of the Romanian people themselves."[311] In this scenario, the ideal of the past provided identity for the present.

Identity was intertwined with the usefulness in accomplishing the goals of the nation. True Romanians were useful people, therefore women, in order to be "real" women, had to bear and raise children and be socialists: i.e., work. As referred to above, men found their true identity in fatherhood. Both men and women still had to be productive in society as workers. The true Romanian was "hardworking, productive, procreative and proper." Any deviation from this, as outlined in the section on homosexuality below, was seen as treason.[312] As Harsanyi puts it, "the ideal woman was depicted as an improbable cross between an ideologically distorted peasant model and a stereotypical Stakhanovite worker – the Bolshevik ideal combined with the traditional peasant one."[313]

In post-socialist Romania, protochronism has continued in political parties like the "Movement for Romania".[314] In historical revisionism in the 1990s, this has included the rehabilitation of a more recent, brutal past: the dusting off of reputations of the Iron Guard and Ceausescu himself and the presentation of these as noble and positive characters in history.[315] The Iron Guard was a brutal, anti-Semitic inter-war group that drew on religious and nationalist sentiment, whose political arm was called "Everything for the Fatherland".[316] In the post-socialist years, there have been several revisions of the group's history. One is that it was the original anti-communist movement, according to the political weekly Cuvintul.[317] The Iron Guard represents a harking back to a far-right ideal, in which a patriarchal national goal was sought through brute force.

The rehabilitation of Ceausescu is also interesting: there seems to be a belief that at least under Ceausescu there was stability. This revision of Ceausescu's legacy began within two years of his overthrow and execution. Ion Coja (who was soon to

[311] Kligman, 1983, p 84
[312] Kligman, 1998, p 32-3
[313] Harsanyi, 1993, p 48
[314] Tismaneanu and Pavel, 1994, p 404
[315] Gallagher, 1993
[316] Lovatt, 1999. See also Stephen Fischer-Galati (1994) for a discussion on the Iron Guard's nationalism.
[317] Tismaneanu and Pavel, 1994, p 408

become vice-president) claimed that "history will evaluate Ceausescu much differently from how many do today... I think we are much too harsh in our judgement of him."[318] Vadim Tudor, leader of the Romania Mare party and one of the most influential and extreme nationalists, is a Ceausescu apologist who has successfully utilised a revised version of the previous leader to bolster his own career.[319] The rehabilitation of the Iron Guard and of Nicolae Ceausescu are examples of the struggles for legitimation by various nationalist groups in Romania. One thing they all have in common is drawing on the same history of a patriarchal, victimised Romania. Indeed, Gallagher has argued that one of the reasons Iliescu won in 1992 was his ability to present himself as a "symbol of security able to shield Romania from the chaos around its borders."[320]

The memory of Nicolae Ceausescu's wife, Elena, has not undergone the same kind of revision. Elena's legacy has been harder to come for the Romanian population to come to terms with, and has been utilised in the post-socialist endeavours at retraditionalisation. One result of the retraditionalisation in Romania has been the reduction in numbers of women in public life, especially in politics[321], and the dislike of Elena has only made that easier.[322] As was discussed earlier, Elena was not well-liked in Romania, and her spectre is often all that is needed to either discourage women from entering politics or to disparage those who have.[323]

Media

The media plays an integral role in ensuring that particular "messages" get out to the populace.[324] In socialist Romania, the propaganda machine was particularly intrusive and almost omnipresent. As Kligman argues, Ceausescu's propaganda "created a relationship between parents fulfilling their patriotic duties to reproduce

[318] Gallagher, 1995, p 196
[319] Gallagher, 1995, p 209-10; Kligman, 1998, p 310, note 47
[320] Gallagher, 1993
[321] The ratio of women in national politics has dropped from 34% in 1987 to 5% in 1997. Baban's argument is that women are currently perceived to be less "suited" to politics than men. Baban, 2000, p 230.
[322] Lovatt, 1999b
[323] Ibid.
[324] It is interesting to note that the Romanian language itself is highly gendered. As Verdery (1994) has discussed, the name of the country, Romania, is feminine, while the word for all Romanians is masculine. (p 244)

themselves and the labour force, and fulfilling the laws of nature to ensure the evolution of life. The laws of the latter were presented as being synonymous with the laws of the state."[325] In the post-socialist years, the media has not been as monolithic as under Ceausescu – no particular group has had total control over the media. However, there has been governmental influence exerted to a considerable degree over the media in Romania, as is discussed below.

Under Ceausescu, attempts at indoctrination were aimed at all ages: one youth newspaper bore the title, "Handsome and Healthy Children for the Vigor and Youth of the Fatherland".[326] Education was aimed at indoctrination from very early in the school system, with pre-schoolers enrolled in "The Falcons of the Homeland", an organisation aimed at promulgating the greatness of the Ceausescus.[327] These efforts of indoctrination sought to produce a society that was both homogenous and that regenerated itself. Looking at the type of information being disseminated, it is apparent that this was used to create a society in which all strata of society believed in the common national goal.

Post-socialist media in Romania has for the most part remained under the control of the government and government-friendly organisations.[328] There have been numerous cases of journalists being harassed and imprisoned for writing pieces that threaten the "status quo".[329] Legislation has increased the punishment for defamation of public figures, with the most severe penalty reserved for defaming the president.[330] Access to television and print media has also been restricted,[331] and there has been a large degree of self-censorship where even opposition organisations do not mention certain "taboo" subjects.[332] The media has also been indicted in a recent report by European Commission against Racism and Intolerance for its racism and anti-Semitism.[333] In this post-1989 context come articles that encourage pronatalist policies and bemoan the decreasing birthrate of Romanians, condemning abortion as a

[325] Kligman, 1998, p 136-37
[326] Ibid., footnote #77 on p 302-3
[327] Harsanyi, 1993, p 43
[328] Perez, 1995
[329] Guruita, 1998
[330] Human Rights Watch World Report 1995; Carey, 1996, p 21-2
[331] Carey, 1996, p 25; Verdery and Kligman, 1992, p 144-5
[332] Carey, 1996, p 26-7
[333] Dragu, 1999

"demographic catastrophe".[334] The rhetoric of many of these articles, with their exhortations of "natural" roles for women, are reminiscent of Ceausescu-era propaganda.[335]

Popular culture

The role of popular culture has been discussed generally in chapter four. The following section explores the utilisation of popular culture in Romania to legitimate both nationalist leadership under socialism and by various nationalist groups seeking power in the post-socialist years. Popular culture in Romania, as is many Eastern European countries, has relied heavily on oral traditions of poetry, story-telling, and song. These are often highly gendered, with images of men and women sacrificing for Romania.

The influence of legends in Romania with the theme of an idealised past are as popular (and influential) today as they were under socialism.[336] The following well-known legend from Romanian folklore portrays men and women in a typically "Romanian" situation. The main character did his duty and sacrificed his woman even though his comrades did not. The woman sacrificed for her man, fighting against the odds to do her duty. The Legend of the Arges Monastery is the story of Manole, a man commissioned to build the finest monastery possible for Negru Voda, the black king. However, as Manole and his men started to build, they realised that everything they have constructed is falling down each night. Manole dreams that these collapses will stop when the first woman to arrive at noon with food and drinks is bricked into the walls of the monastery. Manole was the only one of the builders not to warn his wife, Ana, to stay away. Sure enough, she dutifully arrived at noon to feed her husband. Manole prayed to stop his wife, but although terrible winds and rain tried to drive her away, she still struggled to the monastery. Resigned to his wife's fate, Manole tricked her into being bricked into one of the monastery walls, despite her telling him that she is pregnant with their child. The requirement of the dream now satisfied, the monastery was soon finished. However, when Negru Voda came to

[334] Baban, 2000, p 238
[335] This is discussed further in the Pronatalism section of this chapter.
[336] Miroiu, 1997, p 138-140

inspect the building, he was enraged when the builders admitted they could have built a more beautiful monastery. He chased the builders to the roof, where Manole tried to escape by flying with wooden wings. He failed, but a small spring appears where he fell to his death, next to the monastery he built.[337]

The Romanian mentality has been described as one of "victimisation", and this myth would seem to support that perspective.[338] The theme of this particular story emphasises duty and sacrifice for what is perceived to be either a greater good or a higher power. Just as Ana performed her duty to a higher power (her husband), so did Manole perform his duty for his leader. Miroiu has argued that there is another meaning to this myth that calls for the participation in one's own walling-in. Under Ceausescu, a large degree of propaganda was directed at creating a self-sacrificing population, constructing people who would, "...ignore self; to ignore personal needs, desires, peculiarities; and to be devoted entirely to caring for the final goal, for nation and state..."[339]

This sacrifice for the nation that was called for in the above legend was mirrored in Ceausescu's urgings to sacrifice for the nation's continuity. Speeches and texts published in various venues (both state sanctioned and under state auspices) provide examples of these calls for sacrifice. Combined with portraying Ceausescu as the culmination of a long line of male Romanian heroes, these historical tracings detail the sacrifices made for the nation. All these heroes were men, while women were not referred to as heroic until pronatalist policies reached their peak in the 1980s. Thus, women's place in the national mythology was not promoted until they were useful in the national crisis.[340] During this period Ceausescu gave the title of "Heroine Mother" to women who bore and raised 10 or more children.[341]

The program of propaganda included public speeches from the Romanian leadership. There is a wealth of speeches and exhortations from Ceausescu that call

[337] Ibid., p 136-37
[338] Verdery, 1994, p 241-43
[339] Miroiu, 1997, p 139
[340] Verdery, 1994, p 239-42
[341] For women who bore fewer children than this there were lesser awards, such as the "Order of Maternal Glory" (nine children) and the "Maternity Medal" (six children). It should be noted that none of these awards came with any real compensation or material reward, and that the children not only had

upon the men and women of Romania to bear children for the nation, to be "good" Romanians themselves by being useful, and that draw upon the history of the nation for justification. As the 1980s were drawing to a close, it became clear that the efforts to pull these emotive strings were increasing, as the economic and social conditions deteriorated. For example, one speech claimed that "There cannot be anything more precious for a woman than to be a mother, to make certain that the laws of nature themselves are fulfilled in life, to procreate, to secure the continuous development of our people, of our nation."[342] In this one sentence are many of the concepts discussed so far in the thesis: motherhood, propagation for the nation, and the natural role of women. This speech can be seen as an attempt to draw on as much emotive rhetoric as was at Ceausescu's disposal.

As referred to earlier, Romania under socialism had a tradition of glorifying the Romanian peasant ideal. This involved holding up certain aspects of rural life as admirable and worthy of emulation, such as the large families that were meant to be part of the peasant tradition. Kligman outlines the very purposeful way that the RCP utilised populist methods of disseminating a particular and complex ideology.[343] This was actually spelled out by the RCP, in its use of poetry: "to popularize ideology, to disseminate it in a form both attractive and accessible to the masses."[344] In other words, the power of these forms of tradition was utilised by the leadership to legitimate itself in the way discussed in the framework: through a program of creating societal norms employing, in this case, nationalist rhetoric in popular culture.

The rhetoric and policy goals of the current nationalists in Romania bear a striking resemblance to those under socialism. In 1998, the leaders of the nationalist parties, The Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR) signed a protocol that they called the "first step on the road to set up the Great Alliance for the Resurrection of the Fatherland".[345] The familiar elements are there: the appeal to the historic homeland, with the patriarchal overtones of the protecting "fatherland". This utilisation of the construction of a male nation draws on

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to be born, but raised. Kligman, 1998, p 81. This concept of medals for women who bore many children was not peculiar to Romania, and was practised in Hungary and the USSR.

[342] Kligman, 1998, p 135

[343] Kligman, 1983, p 84

[344] Ibid., p 84

[345] Matyas, 1998

the history of a masculine Romania, in which the ideal is still a family-based social organisation. The ideal society is still a familial one with the concept of natural roles at the foundation. As discussed in the section on history in this chapter, the ties with a historical Romania are still at the root of nationalism in Romania today, and the legends that were woven into Ceausescu's propaganda are the same ones that have emotive power in post-socialist Romania.

Politics of Reproduction

As has been discussed above, nationalist politics in Romania were heavily reliant on the mobilisation of women in particular roles. The perceived need for a large labour force meant that the nationalist movement proclaimed the necessity for women to become mothers. As discussed in chapter four, the politics of pronatalism, in which national goals are paramount, base gender constructions on conceptions of women as mothers and men as fathers. The very bodies of individuals are considered to be tools for the national project. In socialist Romania's pronatalist policies, the national goal was a large labour force, and Ceausescu went to extremes to achieve this goal.

Pronatalism

Romania provides many examples of gender role symbolism and gender-based policy making, most particularly in regard to the pronatalist efforts undertaken by Ceausescu. Ceausescu's policies on reproduction eradicated the line between public and private spheres. [346] The maintenance and goals of the nation were locked into policies that promoted particular gender roles: "Ceausescu's socialist nation intersected with the ethno-nation precisely on the issue of women's 'nurturant nature.'"[347] The achievement of national goals, such as a large labour force, was intertwined with the legitimation of the power structure.

[346] Verdery, 1994, p 228-235

[347] This is in reference to the connection with Romania's glorious past and the preferably large family structures of the present. Verdery, 1994, p 236

Romania offers the most extreme example of pronatalist policies in Eastern Europe. According to Kligman, "nowhere in the Soviet sphere was the 'marriage' between demographic concerns and nationalist interests more extreme than in Ceausescu's Romania."[348] Ceausescu, in his bid to make Romania a powerhouse in the global arena, began a campaign of pronatalist policies that would ravage the country.[349] The push to increase the Romanian birthrate became an obsessive program of intrusion into the private lives of Romanians, which was a true eradication of the line between public and private.

The lengths to which Ceausescu went in order to ensure a population increase were extreme, and ultimately devastating for the psyche of the Romanian people and the children born under this regime. By the end of the 1980s, pronatalist policies meant that the lives of individuals, especially women, were dominated by state imposed efforts to increase the population. The measures taken included:

- constant messages in the media for couples to have at least three children as their "patriotic duty"
- mandatory gynaecological exams to ensure that women were not having abortions or using birth control
- incentives for couples to have children, and financial penalties for those who did not
- constant "vigilante squads" in workplaces to threaten and cajole people to have children[350]

These draconian measures resulted in women being subjected to psychological and physical trauma because of the physical nature of their female bodies. According to Baban, one woman said, "When I realized... that I was pregnant again, I often thought I would be better off going for a surgical operation, removing my uterus, ovaries, tubes, everything."[351] The severity of the policies, as they drew on the biological characteristics of women, drove women from expressing their femininity, and yet defined them primarily as Romanian mothers. There was no escape from the state interference with one's own body.

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[348] Kligman, 1998 p 20

[349] This was part of an attempt to make Romania an industrial powerhouse in the global arena. This depended on a large labour force, and in the 1960's the birthrate in Romania was in decline. See Moskoff, 1980; Cole and Nydon, 1990, p 470, Verdery, 1994, 234

[350] Gilberg, 1990, p 66

[351] Baban, 2000, p 232

These measures stemmed from an increasingly worried leadership in Romania as the birthrate continued to fall. In the 1980s, the measures became increasingly severe as what Ceausescu saw as the basis of Romanian strength, its large families, continued to shrink.[352] In 1986, Ceausescu declared that the fetus was "the socialist property of the whole society. Giving birth is a patriotic duty... Those who refuse to have children are deserters, escaping the law of natural continuity."[353] Ceausescu accused childless women of attacking the "continuity" of the nation. That is, they were assaulting one of the most important aspects of the nation: its longevity and presence in the past and future. The language Ceausescu used is militant: by referring to the uncooperative as deserters, he created the gendered image of the perfect member of the nation: women were to do their part by bearing children. According to Heng and Devan, this mobilisation through the rhetoric of patriotism is comparable to the mobilisation of men as soldiers. It constitutes a "sexualised, separate species of nationalism ...as patriotic duty for men grew out of the barrel of a gun...so it would grow, for women, out of the recesses of the womb".[354]

The de-criminalising of abortion immediately after the demise of Ceausescu came as no real surprise after the pain and suffering the policy had caused for so many years. Contrary to many other East European countries where abortion has been made illegal after many years of legality under socialism, Romania has kept abortion legal. However, there are moves afoot by the nationalist leaders in Romania to return to pronatalist policies. In 1998, of an anti-abortion bill was introduced in the Senate, and although it was subsequently rejected,[355] it is part of a general trend of nationalist leaders expressing "concern about the low current fertility rates and how these low rates affect the 'vitality' of the nation."[356]

Only a few years after abortion was made legal, Hausleitner talked about this disturbing trend, describing how a condemnation of "freer" sexual mores are combined with a "lament[ing] of the growing rate of abortions" in the context of the declining birthrate.[357] According to Baban, various nationalist groups were supported

[352] Verdery, 1994, p 235-36
[353] Harsanyi, 1993, p 46
[354] Heng and Devan, 1992, p 348-9
[355] Monitorul, "Abortion Banning Bill Rejected", 3/13/1998
[356] Bacon and Pol, 1994, p 57
[357] Hausleitner, 1993, p 56

by calls in the media to stop using the poor economy as an excuse not to have children: "To remain passive and not react against the millions of annual abortions is to consent to your people's extinction".[358] In addition, there has been a series of articles published in Romanian women's magazines that continue this lament, under titles such as, "A Family Without Children is Like a Tree Without Fruit", and "Birth Rate: The Future at Stake".[359]

These post-1989 calls for increasing birthrates, especially in relation to the threat posed by other nationalities with higher birthrates (such as Gypsies), are not only a disturbing link with the past, but provide further evidence of the link between nation and gender. The traumatic effects of the pronatalism of the socialist years are still being felt in Romania, and it is not surprising that the general population has been averse to restrictions on abortion. However, it is significant that even in this context there are moves to reintroduce some pronatalist policies, and that pronatalist nationalist rhetoric seems to be increasingly well-received.

Rape

The symbolism of rape has been used in Romania in regards mostly to territory that has been under contention. Thus, there are references to the "rape of Bessarabia" in regards to the Soviet annexation of the area.[360] This reference is in the context of what has been called a sexualised Romanian nation, in which Romania is a female "container". "The container is feminine and the residents masculine, the space of 'Romania' is feminine and the temporally deep lineage of its inhabitants... masculine, the body is feminine and the soul masculine."[361] The nation can also be seen as a lover, or an object of love in a sexualised way, which evokes strong protective emotions. The poet Ion Lancranjan writes (in Verdery's translation), that "...love of country, love of your places of birth...gives another meaning to everything...making of yesterday's child a daring and clear-headed man, transforming the adolescent into a hero..."[362]

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[358] Baban, 2000, p 238
[359] Ibid., p 238
[360] Verdery, 1994, p 248
[361] Ibid., p 248
[362] Ibid., p 246

This image of the female vessel Romania connects with nationalist conceptions of women as vulnerable and with general issues of the nation feeling threatened by other nations. "In Romanian historiography, where national victimisation is a central theme, this victimisation often has a spatial theme: the barbarian violates Romania's borders, rapes her, mutilates her."[363] This conception of women as the embodiment of the nation means that if women are sullied in any way, such as through sexual promiscuity or rape, the sanctity of the nation is tarnished. Rape as a symbol of victimisation has been utilised in Romania.

Interestingly, however, rape does not seem to have been a tool widely used as a means of demonising the minority "other" in Romania. The point is not whether rapes occur in Romania (they do, and the numbers have risen since 1989[364]), or whether there is rape between "ethnicities" or for "ethnic reasons". The key here is that rape was not used as a tool of vilification in Romania during Ceausescu's time or afterwards to any significant degree. There may have been symbolic representation of the rape of the motherland, but not on the personal level. This is an interesting point that deserves further investigation, as there seems to be no significant discussion on rape in Romania in this context. I will outline two hypotheses on the absence of this as a nationalist tactic in Romania.

It is important to point out here that the relevant threat is often not a "real" threat, but a perceived threat. The demonisation of the other, as discussed in this thesis, is the portrayal of an enemy on whom misfortunes can be blamed, either to distract national populations from national problems or in order to justify the acquisition of territory. In this case, however, Romanian nationalists did not seem to feel the need to portray the Romanian minorities in this particular way.

The first hypothesis deals with the complex subject of nationalism in Romania, and the project of "homogenisation" pursued under Ceausescu, versus the use of the threat of the "other". The desire to assimilate and increase the population clashed with the need to demonise minorities, and to present them as a threat.

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[363] Ibid., p 248

[364] Network of East West Women, from the Romanian feminist journal, Adevarul, via Beijing95Net, http://www.neww.org/countries/Romania/romania080398.htm; also the U.S. Department of State- Romania Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998; also Baban, 2000, p 248

Combined with the pronatalist emphasis on women as mothers and the need for women to bear as many children as possible, this meant that rape was too dangerous a device to introduce. The possibility of women having the children of "non-Romanians" was not something the leadership wanted to consider, as it wanted to ensure that as many children were born as possible. The rape and impregnation of a Romanian women by a Hungarian man would mean the issue of allowing abortion in some cases would have to be dealt with. In a traditional society like Romania, the stigma of rape may have been too great for this to come into the public arena.

A second hypothesis is that the position of Hungarians, Germans and Gypsies in Romania was simply not threatening enough to warrant such accusations. There were not (and are not) many members of minorities in government or with enough power to pose an actual threat to the Romanian leadership. Because there was no real threat, for example, of a Gypsy take-over of the government, the accusation of rape was not used. This is in contrast, for example, with Kosovo, where the Kosovar Albanian population numbered 9 to 1 Serb, and where Serb accusations of Kosovar men raping Serb women were widespread.[365]

Thirdly, if rape is a means of "ethnically cleansing" an area, Romania was already doing this in a more economical manner. Romania was utilising programs of "selling" people back to their homelands, which occurred with people of German descent living in Romania. According to Gallagher, as of 1978 the Bonn government had agreed to pay 10,000 deutschmarks for each German allowed to leave Romania. The number of people leaving under this arrangement was estimated at 12,000 a year.[366] Perhaps programs such as this meant that there was not the need to portray the "other" in the country as rapists, because the threat was mitigated by the fact that the Germans would leave when conditions become uncomfortable enough.[367] Apparently

[365] This is discussed in detail in the next chapter.
[366] Gallagher, 1995, p 83
[367] The number of Hungarians fleeing the country and applying for refugee status in Hungary skyrocketed in conjunction with Ceausescu's homogenisation policy in Transylvania, which was discriminatory towards Hungarians. While this was embarrassing to Ceausescu and he went to the extent of reinforcing the border between Hungary and Transylvania, the border was not too tightly patrolled as the departure of Hungarian refugees reduced the number of Hungarians in Romania. Deletant, 1995, p 139

this option was also available to Jews (presumably with Israel "buying" them), but not to Hungarians, as the Hungarian monetary unit was not legal tender in Romania.[368]

Deviations from Nationalist Norms

Under Ceausescu, the assertion of a primary identity on any basis other than Romanian (i.e. identities based on another ethnicity or on gender) was seen as a threat to the nation's leadership. Because of the inseparable nature of the Romanian national leadership and the nation, this threat was then to the legitimacy of the nation itself.[369] In the post socialist years, there has been an increase in the diversity of groups that are tolerated by the state. For example, women's groups have developed to an extent. However, the societal perception of what it means to be Romanian is still quite restrictive, and homosexuals are still persecuted.

Feminist Movements

In socialist Romania, the fear of difference, which had its roots in both the standard socialist perception of others as dangerous and in nationalist demonisation of the other, did not leave much room for women to identify as women first and Romanian second. The response of the Ceausescu leadership was to create nationalised woman's clubs, *Femina*, that would help to "transform the none-too-conformist attitudes and practices of their 'sisters'."[370] This is fairly clearly a co-option of women's groups by the state in order to subvert the groups' potential for dissension.

Post-Ceausescu, a number of feminist groups have arisen, such as ANA, the Romanian Society for Feminist Analysis. These have provided a degree of dialogue about women's issues and analysis, especially in the wake of the traumatic pronatalist policies. However, there is the impression that Romania is still primarily an anti-feminist country, which is congruent with the retraditionalised attitudes of Romanian nationalism. The push for women to return to the home does not mesh with

[368] Kligman, 1998, p 229
[369] Ibid., p 33
[370] Ibid., p 114

movements that advocate equal rights and political participation for women. There is also the added negative association of Western-style feminism with Marxist theory, which is repellent to many Romanian women.[371]

Women As Soldiers

There is not much literature on women assuming military roles in nationalist conflicts in Romania, as there was not the kind of nationalistic conflict there that there was in, for example, the former Yugoslavia. However, there are two perspectives I would like to briefly explore.

One version of "women as soldiers" relates to the mobilisation of women for pronatalist goals. This was tantamount to a military movement, in which women were the soldiers (although, to continue the analogy, they were drafted and did not volunteer). As was discussed in the pronatalism section, this was similar to male mobilisation into the armed forces. However, it does not fall into the category of deviation addressed here.

The other is that raised by Hausleitner, who has discussed the "women facing a hail of bullets in order to bring bread to the street fighters. One will also have seen the proud faces of young girls with MP1s in their hands who sought to protect the people from attacks by the Securitate."[372] The impression that Hausleitner gives is of courageous young freedom fighters, but as there was not conflict on the scale of war, the mobilisation of women as soldiers does not seem to be a paradox the Romanian leadership had to grapple with to any large degree. Indeed, in the re-framing of post-Ceausescu nationalism, the first of these actions could be interpreted as those of valiant young women bringing food to the male fighters, and thus fulfilling a traditional female role.

Homosexuality

As discussed in the framework, the spectre of homosexuality is one that is often raised in nationalist rhetoric to emasculate men and to demonise women. To call

[371] Fischer and Harsanyi, 1994, p 217-220

a man a homosexual is to imply that he lacks the characteristics of a "real" man: he does not father children, does not have a wife, and is considered foreign and strange. A homosexual woman, does not fulfil her duties as a woman by bearing children for the nation.

Homosexuality was declared illegal in article 200 of the Penal code under Ceausescu.[373] The outlawing of homosexuality in socialist Romania fits the profile of homogeneity that Ceausescu and the RCP sought: along with the handicapped, those who did not work, and foreigners, homosexuals were the "other". They were different and therefore did not have a place in the Romanian nation.[374] This added to the stigma already attached to homosexuality in Romania's traditional society and in the pronatalist policies.[375]

It should come as no surprise, then, to learn that the nationalist groups in Romania today often vilify gay men and women. Homosexuality is still an issue and has not yet been de-criminalised in Romania. Despite earlier rulings against the law by the constitutional court, Penal Code 200 was again discussed in Parliament in 1996, and the punishment for homosexual behaviour was increased.[376] One Deputy called homosexuality a "phenomenon placing in peril the birth rate of Romanians and the health of the Romanian people."[377] In response to the calls from the European Parliament for Romania to decriminalise homosexuality in order to meet obligations as a member of the Council of Europe, another Deputy claimed that 35% of the European Parliament were homosexual.[378] It is quite clear that this was intended as an insult, and as an insult that attacked the normalcy (i.e. sexual normalcy) of the European Parliament members, who were, not coincidentally, foreigners and therefore "other".

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[372] Hausleitner, 1993, p 53
[373] Kligman, 1998, p 143
[374] Creteanu and Coman, 1998
[375] Kligman, 1998, p 143
[376] Long, 1996, "The Romanian Chamber of Deputies Has Voted 'No' To Decriminalize Consensual Homosexual Acts Between Adults"; also ILGA Press Release, 12 September, 1996. For more information on the current status of homosexuals in Romania, see the Romania Action For Gay Men, Lesbians And Bisexuals website, http://www.raglb.org.uk/; Human Rights Watch World Report 1995
[377] ILGA Press Release, 12 September, 1996
[378] Ibid.

Conclusion

This chapter sought to demonstrate how gender was used in the legitimation of nationalist movements in Romania. Through an exploration of various elements of these nationalist movements, we have seen how these attempts at legitimation manifested themselves. What is evident in Romania is that the part played by women in the nationalist project matches with one of Yuval-Davis' key theoretical constructs: that of the woman as the reproducer of the nation. Under Ceausescu, the ramifications of this were the subsumation of men and women to one of the main goals of the state; namely, increasing the population.

The manipulation of history in Romania was one of the building blocks of Ceausescu's nationalist movement. As demonstrated in the section on history, the construction (and continuing re-construction) of the foundation of the Romanian nation was highly gendered, and was used to provide a rationale for both pronatalist policies and for the post-socialist retraditionalisation of Romanian society. The key conceptions, through such avenues as media, popular culture, and speeches, emphasised the integral characteristics of the idealised member of the nation, and the paramountcy of the nation over all other concerns. The media under Ceausescu was a forum for propaganda, which as Kligman has argued, was ubiquitous. The message delivered was one of mandatory conformity to a national Romanian ideal, which was bolstered by symbols and ideals portrayed in popular culture. This is particularly demonstrated in the explicit usage of folk traditions by the RCP, as discussed above.

As explored in this chapter, the politics of reproduction provide ample evidence of the intersection of gender and national goals. The overt construction of gender roles that supported the state's goals is impossible to ignore. The use of all the methods above to garner public support provide a case study that demonstrates how gender is integral to an understanding of nationalist rhetoric. The Romanian nationalist pronatalist project was dependent upon the manufacture and control of gender identity.

Under socialist leadership, Romania relied on gender for its nationalist project, particularly as the 1980s brought about a more desperate time for Ceausescu's

legitimacy. In the post-socialist period, we have seen how the various political parties have utilised the familiar themes of gendered rhetoric to promote the legitimacy of their own claims to power. In part due to the power structures in place, and in part because of the leadership that sought and gained control, the manipulation and construction of gender identity continued post-socialism via the same rhetoric and nationalist discourse. As we shall see in the next chapter, many similar gender conceptions were utilised by various groups in the struggle for power in Yugoslavia.

Chapter Six
Yugoslavia

This chapter investigates the politics of tradition and reproduction in the region of the former Yugoslavia from the mid 1980s to the early 1990s. The majority of the post-socialist section of this chapter focuses on Serb nationalism. This is primarily because of the limitations of space, as an examination of all the regions and their nationalist movements would unnecessarily extend this work. The decision to focus on Serb nationalism is due to the considerable body of literature in English that deals with the Serb nationalist movement and the role of gender in the rhetoric of this movement. Because this thesis is reliant on secondary sources, availability has partially dictated the choice of the case studies.

Institutional Problems and Legitimacy Crises

Under Josip Tito, regional nationalism (anything apart from Yugoslav nationalism) was actively discouraged. Indeed, it was quite ruthlessly repressed through purges of nationalist leaders.[379] However, the Yugoslav leadership, as Cohen put it, although uncomfortable with nationalism, nevertheless "found the notion of Yugoslavism a useful antidote for combating ethnic particularism and what they saw as a trend away from 'revolutionary unity.'"[380] As Banac has argued, "the political legitimation of the Yugoslav Communists cannot be separated from their efforts at solving Yugoslavia's long-standing national question."[381] The 1974 constitution reflected the pull between the constituent nations and the central government by

[379] Ramet, 1992, p 24-5; Denich, 1994, p 371
[380] Cohen, 1995, p 32
[381] Banac, 1990, p 150

giving each region the designation of a republic. This meant that the leaders of the different regions had to vie for power at the national level.

It can be reasonably argued that with the death of Josip Tito in 1980, there was a gradual crumbling of the federal structure of Yugoslavia.[382] The federal structure was such that, without a strong leader at the centre, the (aspiring) leaders of the "ethnically" defined republics sought to shore up their power bases in their regions by emphasising nationalist goals for these regions. With this came a devolving of power from the central communist party, which culminated (at least symbolically) with Milosevic's 1987 speech in Kosovo.[383]

In Kosovo, Serb nationalists began to realise their claims for more power and control in the region as Milosevic rose to power. Part of this struggle included attempts by Kosovo Serbs to take control of the police force in the Kosovo region, in which the population of 2 million was approximately 90% Kosovo Albanian. By 1989, Kosovo's autonomy had been considerably reduced and Serbs in the region were being supported by the central government in Yugoslavia. Milosevic effectively reduced the independence of the Kosovo, Montenegro and Vojvodina provinces to the extent that Serbia had control over their votes in the revolving presidency of Yugoslavia. According to Ramet, the result was that Milosevic could "produce deadlocks in the presidency at will."[384] By 1989, with the major changes that were to take place in Eastern Europe, the rising problems of central government had reached the point where nationalist movements were overtly secessionist.[385] The disintegration of Yugoslavia marked the end of the socialist period.

It is useful here to briefly address the shape nationalism took in the former Yugoslavia. As described previously, Sardamov details primordialist/essentialist conceptions of nationalism as ones that have "a redemptive historical destiny", in which the movement to reclaim the national identity and right the often bloody wrongs of the past are the overarching goals of the members of the nation. Sardamov applies this conception to the Serbo-Croat conflict, contending that the identities in

[382] Cohen, 1995, p 45; Denich, 1994, p 370; Miller, 1997, p 150-1; Morokvasic, 1998, p 69
[383] Cohen, 1995, p 51-2
[384] Ramet, 1992, p 69
[385] The references in this thesis to the situation in Kosovo are primarily to do with this period of unrest in Yugoslavia, rather than the events surrounding the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999.

this region have remained relatively consistent over long periods of time, and that these are then drawn on and utilised in times of crisis by elites.[386]

This was not pure instrumentalism; rather, the history and identity of the Serbs (in this case) is one of militant historicism: the very mythology of the Serb nation is one of conflict and "the prospect of messianic deliverance".[387] As both Serbs and Croats share this essentialist view, it becomes difficult to come to mediated, negotiated peace settlements when each side believes that the other is inherently, for example, "marked by a common 'genocidal nature'"[388]

The impact on Serbo-Croat relations is wide. First, identities are based on the community, not the individual. This results in the perception of the irredemptive nature of the enemy on the one hand and the belief that the nation needs its own state to survive. Second, any members of an ethnic minority are immediately reduced in status, often with fewer rights of citizenship. Finally, this can lead to "deep mutual suspicions about the authenticity of the other side's ethnic self-identification, and [in this case] to a shared dismissal of Bosnian Muslim identity."[389]

This is not to argue the position that nationalisms in the region are "natural" characteristics of the Serbs and Croats, and that these historical enmities have been in existence for so long that there is no hope in trying to change them.[390] Rather, Sardamov's argument above provides a perspective in which this demonisation of the "other" is key to one's own identity, and that this demonisation has been used to assert national dominance. Regardless of the veracity of the characteristics of a particular group (or the possibility of establishing such veracity), the perception is that these characteristics are natural and enduring. The power structures in Yugoslavia (as discussed above) meant that the seeking of legitimacy through nationalist rhetoric soon began to fit Gellner's portrayal of "nationalism [as] a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones."[391] This legitimacy was in turn justified by the history of misconception that

[386] Sardamov, 1997, p 463
[387] Ibid., p 464
[388] Ibid., p 465
[389] Ibid., p 465-6
[390] Ibid., p 463
[391] Gellner, 1983, p 1

Sardamov details: within the nationalist paradigm, the demonisation of the "other" in Yugoslavia made it impossible to conceive of a state which these nationalities could co-inhabit.

As Yugoslavia disintegrated, nationalist rhetoric became more extreme. The leadership in Yugoslavia had, in general, been less intrusive into all facets of private lives than in Romania. However, in the 1980s, discussion in the media and other areas of public discussion included more nationalist rhetoric and more opinions on appropriate gender roles and participation. This resulted in increasing pressure for men and women to adhere to more traditional roles, and the nationalist leadership became more involved in the private realm.[392] The manifestation of this pressure is discussed below in the politics of tradition.

Politics of Tradition

The politics of tradition in Yugoslavia follow the pattern outlined in chapter four. As the contest for the legitimacy to rule became more intense, so did the efforts to control and define the nation on a symbolic level. The manipulation of the image of the nation became important as nationalist leaders attempted to emphasise the difference between their group and the other, and to present the past in a manner that would draw attention to the need to see that other as a threat.

In terms of gender, masculinity in Eastern Europe has historically been defined by legends of military prowess and conquest. In Yugoslavia, this conception was continued under socialism, in which "universal military training provided a shared background for all males and a rite of passage that identified manhood with the ability to fight."[393] As a result, claims Denich, "Yugoslavia was a country in a constant state of military preparation."[394] The definition of true masculinity was dependent upon this conception of the warrior male, which was reinforced by the tradition of male conscription. As discussed by Lukic, there was an "assumption that manhood is proved in battle, or at least in military service".[395] Entry into the military

[392] Milic, 1993, p 112
[393] Denich, 1995, p 64
[394] Ibid., p 65
[395] Lukic, 2000, p 407

became a ritual for young males, celebrated by families as a symbolic rite of passage into adulthood. This ritual was commonly referred to as the "solemn oath".[396]

The double burden was a major problem for women in Yugoslavia. The issue of gender in socialist Yugoslavia was a complex one, in which gender equality, based partially on Marxist ideology, conflicted with traditional perceptions of gender roles.[397] Therefore, there was an expansion of women's roles and rights, such as employment opportunities, but little accompanying change in the domestic arena. As in other socialist countries, the efforts to bring women into the workforce were not matched by substantive change in social structures of housework and childcare. The traditional nature of the society, as noted above, was not conducive to this type of restructuring.[398] According to Woodward, women "accepted the necessity of both work and family but ... deemphasized their participation in the public sphere."[399] This conflict between work and family, common throughout socialist Eastern Europe, was conducive to the relief felt by many women at the initial retraditionalisation of nationalist movements, as discussed earlier in this thesis.

There were considerable advances for women in Yugoslavia under socialism, as women were educated and moved into the workforce. This was accompanied by some changes in some social attitudes, and this combined with a relatively non-oppressive socialist leadership meant that there was room for feminist groups, unlike the situation in Romania.[400] However, Yugoslavian traditional society was patriarchal, in which women generally organised the private sphere of the home, and men worked in the public realm. Under socialism, as discussed above, there was a push for women to enter the public work force, but (particularly in rural areas) this was not on the level of deep and pervasive societal change.[401] This patriarchal nature of Yugoslavian society is noted with some cynicism in the following anecdote:

> An anthropologist doing fieldwork in Montenegro is walking along a mountain path when she encounters a local couple. The man strides ahead, happily sniffing the air, while the woman trudges six paces behind with a pack on her back. Business as usual, she says to herself. After leaving the area for a few years

[396] Ibid., p 407
[397] Woodward, 1985, p 252
[398] Massey et al, 1995, p 376
[399] Woodward, 1985, p 256
[400] Ibid., p 240-44
[401] Milic, 1993, p 111

> because of a small regional war, the anthropologist comes back. On the same path, she catches up with the same couple. The woman's striding in front, the man is six paces behind her, leading a donkey with a pack on its back. Pleased, she greets them: I see your wife's in the lead now! what's happened? Lots, he responds--my house was shelled, my cousin was shot, but never mind, we're back to normal, except for the damn mines.[402]

This separation of male and female spheres is also illustrated by the images of public figures. A parallel can be drawn between the perceptions of Slobodan Milosevic and his wife Mirjana Markovic, and of Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife, particularly in the way they portray themselves as the family of a particular nation. As extensively discussed in the Romania chapter, Nicolae and Elena Ceausescu presented themselves as the mother and father of the Romanian nation. This would seem the same in the case of the Slobodan Milosevic and his wife. Elena and Mirjana, both of whom were distrusted and feared as powerful women, were seen as wielding an inappropriate degree of power for a woman.[403]

As Serbian nationalism became the currency of power for Slobodan Milosevic, the general rhetoric around the movement became more separatist and inflammatory. The next section discusses the utilisation of gendered historical concepts and perspectives to support nationalist legitimacy.

Historical Manipulation

The framework in chapter four included a discussion of the importance of history in nationalist movements, and this has been born out by the evidence of historical manipulation in Romania. The use of historical symbols and traditions was not unfamiliar to socialist Yugoslavia. In Tito's use of Yugoslav nationalism, he also relied on pageantry and symbolism to reinforce his own status as patriarch of the nation.[404] However, as nationalist rhetoric began to appear publicly in the 1980s in Yugoslavia, historical revisionism in particular became increasingly important.[405] Judah outlines the Serb history and its intersection with Kosovo, explaining how the importance of the 1389 battle was carried through Serb mythology and ultimately was

[402] Munk, 1999
[403] Silber, 1999
[404] See for example Dubinskas, 1983

manipulated by Milosevic in his consolidation of power in the 1980s.[406] With the disintegration of the socialist state and the parallel upsurge in nationalist rhetoric came a concurrent revising of national histories. In Kosovo, Serbian scholars started to write about Serbian history in a way that "reinterpreted the heroic tradition to emphasize loss and victimization."[407] This was not merely an informal encouragement of such revisions, but policy from the leadership, as "textbooks were rewritten to include the nationalist view of history. Beginning in Fall 1991 textbooks for elementary and secondary school in the Republic of Serbia had to include a 'detailed account of wars, exterminations, tortures, destructions of [Serbian] people'".[408]

According to Meznaric's research, the efforts of both Serbs and Albanians to assert the "right" to Kosovo resulted in the spending of "enormous amounts of money, energy and ideas on defining tradition and continuity."[409] Meznaric argued that there was difficulty in defining the "other" in a region where distinctions between groups had been blurred over time, and that this is one of the reasons rape was used in constructing identities of the "other". At a now infamous speech on the 600th anniversary of the defeat of the Serbs in Kosovo in 1389, Milosevic framed the Serbian experience throughout history as one of victimisation and of liberation, not one of oppression of others. In his claim that "the Serbs throughout their history never conquered or exploited anybody else", and he exacerbated the image of Serbs as victims of Kosovo Albanians, and removed any responsibility Serbs might have for the oppression of other groups.[410]

As war broke out in the early 1990s, a new dimension was added to this manipulation of history: the exhumation of the dead in various contexts. Salecl asserts that this is part of a comparison of present day heroes with those of the past: "bones play a special role in this dramatic identification with the heroic past."[411] There were subsequent allegations that enemy groups were mistreating the bones in other regions,

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[405] Judah, 1997, p 24
[406] Ibid., p 24
[407] Denich, 1994, p 371
[408] Hughes et al, 1994; see also Litrichin and Mladjenovic,1997
[409] Meznaric, 1994, p 82.
[410] Banac, Ivo, 1990, p 156
[411] Salecl, 1992, p 55

by performing medical experiments on them.[412] There were also arguments over how many corpses there actually were, with each side wanting to increase its dead so as to claim a greater victim-hood.[413] This physical resurrection of the past was not an uncommon phenomenon in the region, and has particular significance for this case study. One important aspect is the physical manifestation of just how important historical ties are to many groups in the region. The history of the bodies is one of struggle and oppression, so these are "historic revisions that reinterpreted the heroic tradition to emphasize loss and victimization".[414] This history of victimisation is one of death and of other bodily wrongs, such as rape. Another aspect is that these bones draw our attention to the relation of the dead bodies with the body of the nation. As has been discussed previously, the connection of the physical body with the concept of the nation is important in the bond between individual and nation. The body of the nation is bonded with these dead bodies, just as the nation in the present is connected with the bodies of the living through men and women.

These forays into the past provide evidence of the importance to Serb leaders of placing the validity of their nationalist project in the past. As discussed in the framework, the Serb history books were supplying the essential ingredients of the nationalist movement.[415] What we see in these examples are historical versions of events that promote two particular gender constructions. One is very similar to that in Romania: that the traditional family structure of the Serb family (with the woman looking after the home and the man earning the wage) was the one that was true to the Serb nation and therefore preferential to any other. The second point, which is related to the first and was of particular importance to a nation that was about to go to war, was the message of the self-sacrificing woman bearing many male children and sending them off to war, where they went gladly in order to fight for their nation.[416] This conception of the sacrificing woman and the fighting man is one that was drawn on heavily in both the history and mythology of Serb nationalism. As is discussed in the next section, this message was reiterated in the media.

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[412] Ibid., p 55-6
[413] Judah, 1997, p 42
[414] Denich, 1994, 371
[415] Hobsbawm, 1992
[416] This is illustrated in the popular culture section in the myth of Mother Jugovic.

Media

The part played by the media has been discussed in the framework section in regards to how internal cohesion is perceived and presented. In Anderson's argument, the media helps people to imagine who belongs and who does not. In the conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the leaders of all sides recognised the importance of the media – print, television and radio – in their continuing campaigns against their various enemies. These leaders only gained control of the various main media sources through either ownership or intimidation, and utilised these sources for everything from the promotion of negative images of opponents to the advocating of murder.[417] State television, for instance, has been called "Milosevic's most effective instrument of power".[418] Additional evidence of the perception of the media's power was the assassination of Slavko Curuvija, the owner of the leading Yugoslavian alternative newspaper in April of 1999.[419]

According to Miller, the media played a special role in Milosevic's demonisation of the Albanians in Kosovo in the late 1980s. The press in Yugoslavia had been relatively open, unlike Romania where the people were accustomed to not believing what they read.[420] Therefore, when Milosevic began co-opting the media for the nationalist cause, "Serbs, accustomed to believe what they read and saw in the media, fell victim to this newly radicalized press."[421] In this scenario, the influence of the press was particularly useful to nationalist leaders, as it was both under nationalist control and had a trusting audience.

The argument has been made that a 'media war' is part and parcel of an 'ethnic war', in which the media partakes in constructing the identities that are being fought over. Newspapers should not be seen as "...merely journalistic reflections on or reports about events, and certainly not as innocent or incidental...Both wars [ethnic and media] define those who belong to the nation and those who do not, and they both

[417] "Special Report On the Media" from the United Nations Commission on Human Rights 1994. Also see Lukic (2000) for a discussion of the relationship between regimes and media as often being a reciprocal one, in which the media plays a self-interested role in maintaining a particular regime. In such a scenario, according to Lukic, the media has a vested interest in legitimating certain leaderships.
[418] Lukic, 2000, p 393
[419] Dobbs, 1999
[420] Hayden, Robert, 1992, p 668
[421] Miller, 1997, p 163

define the ways the former and the latter should be dealt with."[422] As we will see below, the images and stereotypes presented in the Serb media at this time in Kosovo were constructs of the particular nationalist movements: the Serb men and women were positively portrayed while the Albanian men and women were often demonised or scorned.

There are a variety of examples of the utilisation of archetypal male and female roles as presented in the mainstream Serbian media as armed conflict intensified. Lukic, in an examination of gender portrayal in the media, details several of these examples. As an example of the "heroic mother", there was a newspaper piece on a mother who, while asking for the Croatian and Slovenian armies to disband, is "proud of her sons in the Army."[423] Men were presented as heroic sons who, as referred to earlier, achieve true manhood through their military service. In regards to the "solemn oath" ritual, the newspaper article entitled, "They Saw Him For the Last Time at the Solemn Oath", speaks of the loss to a family of the young son, and romanticises his death for his nation.[424] These two examples point to the use of historical images of men and women in which their purposes in life are to serve the nation: a nation that is constructed on images of heroic men and sacrificing women.

This is not to imply that there is always consensus on what appropriate roles are. When mothers in Croatia marched against the co-option of their sons for armed service, the newspapers seemed torn between portraying the women as "fierce mothers" for whom even enemy soldiers stood aside, and "tearful" mothers, more in line with submissive and defenceless women.[425] This once again points to the contested nature of the national image: there are multiple portrayals of the participation in the nationalist movement, and they are sometimes contradictory.

However, regardless of the role played by individuals, there is almost always an emphasis on allegiance to the nation above all else. One newspaper article told of a young Serb woman saying, " 'she would not hesitate killing her ex-husband if it were necessary'...The couple... 'had a child and used to live happily'...[however] 'he left

[422] Zarkov, p 306
[423] Lukic, 2000, p 407
[424] Ibid., p 408
[425] Zarkov, 1997, p 316, 320-21

me because he could no longer be married to a Croat. If one day we run into each other, I will kill him, otherwise, I know he will kill me.'"[426] As Morokvasic argues, "it is irrelevant whether the story is true or not", what is important is that the message in the paper was perceived as true.[427] The emphasis is on the noble sacrifice this woman is making, even though it contradicts her normal, peacetime role of mother and wife; to save the nation she will put that aside.

Popular Culture

The tradition of poetry, song and stories is strong in the former Yugoslavia, as in many other Eastern European countries. As in Romania, where poetry was specifically co-opted by the socialist leadership, in Serb nationalism there has also been an acknowledgement that these are effective vehicles for conveying nationalist symbols and ideals.[428] In chapter four there was discussion of how national cohesion and bravery are portrayed as the nation heads towards war. In the examples below, the ideals are of bravery, and the history is one that stretches back through the ages, and is filled with wrongs done to the Serbian nation.

The following poem was posted on the Yugoslavian government web page at the time of the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999. The poem is provided in both English and Serbian, and provides an interesting portrayal of Serbia.

I
divine daughter
Serbia
hereby freely state
with shackles and through the wire
before my witnesses
Force, Suffering and Injustice
that I am guilty and that I confess! (...)
Swarms of former men
Thieves and paupers
Packs of robots and other monsters yet
will pounce on my orchards and fields
and my little white houses along the roads

[426] Morokvasic, 1998, p 83
[427] Ibid., p 83
[428] See the nationalist Serbian Unity Congress website (http://suc.suc.org), which details the importance of "The Oral Tradition" in Serb history (http://suc.suc.org/culture/history/Hist_Serb_Culture/chi/Oral_Tradition.html)

adorned by green goddesses
cherry, apple and plum trees (...)
We are very important,
I and my sisters
Truth and Justice
for such mighty forces have rallied against us
and Wrong and Injustice are sneering at us.
Why are Jihad warriors
Crusaders or
Yanks
to quarter my sons and daughters (...)[429]

There are several aspects of this piece that I would like to draw attention to. Perhaps the most obvious element is the identification of Serbia as female – "daughter Serbia". This sets the tone for the rest of the piece, because with references to the sisters Truth and Justice, daughter Serbia becomes a noble female entity as well. Secondly, the images of Serbia as a victim are frequent, but I would like to focus on the stanza that portrays Serbia's enemies as, " Swarms of former men/Thieves and paupers/Packs of robots and other monsters yet". This not only conveys the image of disreputable men swarming over the body of this female Serbia, but portrays the male enemies as being *former* men: the poem seeks to emasculate the enemy. The enemy men are not actually men – they are emasculated or they are automatons. Thirdly is the section that refers to "my sons and daughters...". This is a classic illustration of the nation as a mother, with the sons and daughters being persecuted, and is an interesting progression from the portrayal of Serbia as daughter earlier in the poem. What we see is a progression of Serbia as a daughter, who can be "swarmed" over by men. She then becomes the sister of Truth and Justice; an equal of eternal virtues. She then becomes the sacrificing mother of the victims, in which the message is that her brave sons and daughters have been persecuted by the enemy. One of the important implications is the biological inclusion in the nation – in other words, being a son or daughter in the nation is reliant on being born into that nation, and others cannot truly belong. It also implies the strong emotive ties that belong to family members, for whom one would presumably kill and die.

There is often a blurring of the distinction between the mother of the nation and the nation as a mother. In the well-known legend of Mother Jugovic, it seems that this mother of the nation is also representative of the nation as a mother. The story is

of a Serb woman who sends all nine of her sons off to the 1389 battle of Kosovo, in which all nine are killed. The legend celebrates the sacrifice and bravery of the woman "offering her children up to death in defence of the fatherland".[430] The story of Mother Jugovic is well-known and potent; it constructs the appropriate behaviour of a mother (sacrificing her sons and not breaking down) and portrays the Serb version of the battle for Kosovo. The importance of this story throughout the history of the Serbs is heightened by the bravery of the sons, and their victimisation in battle.

A web-page organised by a group calling itself the "Belgrade Academic Association For Equal Rights In The World" presents an article by R W Seton Watson. This article includes a poem about Mother Jugovic and her sacrifice.[431] This poem and the legend it refers to frame Mother Jugovic's actions as admirable in their stoicism and sacrifice. The inclusion of this piece on this website is important, too, as the writing makes several assertions about the character of the Serb that mark the distinctiveness of Serbs as a group. Drawing these threads together, we see that this legend of the nation conveys several familiar themes: the sacrificing nature of Serb women, the courageous nature of Serb men, the victim status of Serbs at a key moment in history, and the difference of Serbs from the "others" around them.

The epic poetry and song that arose out of the battle of Kosovo are also connected with the present day. The symbolism of some of the most famous songs are referred to in the propaganda of current nationalist groups. One of the most famous poems is of the "Fair Maiden of Kosovo", about a Serb woman at the time of the 1389 battle.[432] During the NATO bombing of Kosovo in 1999, the Serbian Unity Congress placed a photograph entitled, "Maiden of Kosovo" on its website, in its "Destruction of Yugoslavia" section, in what seems to be an obvious reference the poem.[433] The woman is at a peace rally, protesting the NATO bombing (see Figure 6.1, below). It is an interesting connection of history to the present day, in a way that specifically connects the brave, sacrificing woman of 1389 with the brave young woman protesting in the 1990s. This is an example of how tradition is drawn on as discussed

[429] Eric, 1999, "Spiteful Verses"
[430] Zajovic, 1997, p 169
[431] http://www.barw.org.yu/spirit.htm
[432] Milosovic-Djordjevic, 2000
[433] http://suc.suc.org/exhibitions/destruction/50.html

in the framework of the case studies. The modern woman is connected with the maiden of 600 years ago, which illustrates the concept of the nation stretching unchanged through time, in past, present and future.



Figure 6.1: "Maiden of Kosovo"

Another phenomenon of the upsurge in nationalism in the former Yugoslavia was the increase in "traditional" music. Both in Croatia and Serbia there was encouragement of popular music that relied on national legend during the war between the two nations. The official encouragement by the Serbian leadership of "newly composed folk music" parallels the encouragement in Croatia. In the 1980s, a resurgence in Serbia of this style of folk music, which was supported by Serbian media, was becoming increasingly dependent upon historical legends such as the Serbian defeat in Kosovo in 1389. Some song titles were, "Six Centuries Have Passed Since the Kosovo Battle", "Oh Serbia of Three Parts, You Shall Be One Whole Again", and "Montenegro and Serbia Are Two Eyes in One Head".[434]

The increasing hostility in the region and the outbreak of open armed conflict saw increasing production of these "patriotic" songs, primarily in two categories: the new folk songs which "celebrate[d] and perpetuate[d] the conceptions about the brave [male] Serbian soldier", and those which utilised pre-existing songs, re-arranged in the modern folk style.[435] According to Ceribasic, "these songs, using traditional

[434] Ceribasic, 1995, p 94

[435] Ibid., p 94

literary figures and vocabulary...celebrate heroic intrepid fighters who remained undaunted even by almost certain death."[436] In some instances the Serbian music portrays Croatia as a woman, in order to emphasise its weakness. This is not as a normal woman who should be protected: Croatia is depicted as a "whore". In one song, "Why Didn't Croatia Get Married", the songwriter portrays, "the image of the Croatian divorcee who 'bares her calves, and sashays through Europe, but nobody wants the bride'..."[437] The imagery is of a "wanton" woman, a woman who is not pure, a woman who is not the equal of the chaste idealised Serbian woman. This symbolic representation of Croatia implies the country is not only weaker than Serbia, but that the country is not equal to Serbia's moral fibre. The portrayal of this type of woman has interesting ramifications for rape, as she is not chaste and pure, and is therefore possibly deserving of the rape, or even "asking" for it. De-humanisation of the enemy is achieved by branding the enemy as inferior through gendered rhetoric.

The Croatian popular music of the time is similarly instructive in its form. Although it addresses both men and women, there is a dichotomy presented of the two worlds (for that is how separate they are intended to appear): the men occupy the realm of "activity, power and fighting" while the women remain at home with, "passivity, indulgence, pleading for peace..."[438] There are differences in the representations of the two regions. Ceribasic argues that the Croatian songs focused on Croatia's victim status, while in the Serb songs "war...is perceived almost as a natural state."[439] However, the general representations are very similar in their portrayal of what is natural and therefore proper for the nation state, and in their delineation of those natural roles along gender lines. Both groups extol the virtues of "their" women, especially in terms of their sacrifice and virtue, and both groups portray the women in the other group as promiscuous and wanton. As is examined in the section on deviations in this chapter, the actual parameters of what is acceptable for women is subject to change with the fluctuating needs of the nation.

These "folksongs" were also used to present a particularly sexualised and apolitical version of women. In Lukic's account, one of the main images of women

[436] Ibid., p 94
[437] Ibid., p 96
[438] Ibid., p 95
[439] Ibid., p 95

that was available in popular culture was that the "young girl in very sexy, revealing clothes would sing about her wish to live for 'him' and for 'his mother', to serve him...."[440] These images became stronger and more prevalent in the early 1990s as instability increased and war broke out.

A novel by Croatian woman Neda Miranda Blazevic illustrates several of the themes discussed thus far. The storyline of *Dancing on Ashes* (1993) introduces a young Croatian woman who discovers that she is actually an orphan: given up because she is the product of the rape camps for Serbian and Montenegrin men in World War II. As a result, "it turns out she is the offspring of organised, officially sanctioned rape. The central character therefore acquires symbolic value as the embodiment of the 'rape' of Croatia by Serbia and Montenegro in the monstrous distortion that, in the novelists' view, was the state of Yugoslavia."[441] Not only is it a young woman symbolising the body and subsequent rape of the nation of Croatia, it is also an example of how women incorporate and appropriate nationalist discourses and identities. As Woollacott argues, "It should hardly surprise us that women have followed the same roads as men and embraced the same symbols in pursuing citizenship that men have."[442] All of the areas discussed in this tradition section, such as myths of the nation, the revision of Serb history, and the rhetoric present in the media, are all relevant for both men and women. The identification of women with Mother Jugovic or the modern Maiden of Kosovo are all likely, as these are compelling images. As was discussed in the chapter on gender and nationalism in this thesis, women have more than one identification: they do not identify solely as a woman. The adoption of a national identity by the member of the nation is one of the goals of, for example, the manipulation of history. The incorporation of the national identity into women's perceptions of themselves is part of the national project, and it is often successful.

[440] Lukic, 2000, p 399
[441] Hawkesworth, Celia, p 317
[442] Woollacott, 1996, p 378; while discussing the involvement of women World War I, Woollacott's summary statement provides additional insight into the nationalist movements examined here.

Politics of Reproduction

Part of the push in the late 1980s to define the various nationalist boundaries was through what has been defined in this thesis as the politics of reproduction. In this section I will be examining these themes in the specific context of the nationalist conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.

Pronatalism

The status of women under socialism, as has been discussed at length in this thesis, was a contradictory one. Official policies spoke of equality for men and women, while the reality of the societal traditions and the socialist need for large supplies of labour meant that women bore a double burden of work and responsibility for the domestic realm, and were expected to bear many children. This was demonstrated in the devastating effects of these policies in Romania. While the policies in Yugoslavia did not approach that degree of severity, there was still encouragement for women to bear children to build a large labour force.[443] However, there was not a concerted effort at increasing the population, and when the Serb nationalist movement began to publicly mobilise in the 1980s it noted with alarm the low Serb birth rate.[444]

In the former Yugoslavia, the most overt pronatalist sentiment was in Kosovo, where the Albanian population drastically outnumbered the Serbian population. Milosevic's movement to stir nationalist sentiment among Serbs in the region drew on many of the tactics discussed thus far in the thesis. By 1992, the new Yugoslavian constitution had eliminated Article 191, which had guaranteed women's reproductive rights. The cost of gaining an abortion was made prohibitive, and access to abortion was increasingly restricted.[445]

Part of the support the Kosovo Serbs gained, both in Kosovo and from Serbs elsewhere in Yugoslavia, was through campaigns of propaganda in the province against Kosovo Albanians, portraying them as a threat to Serbs. Part of this threat

[443] Wolchik, 1985, p 191
[444] Milic, 1993, p 113

was the increasingly large Kosovo Albanian population and the small Kosovo Serb population. In this section, I will examine some of the pronatalist policies and propaganda in both Kosovo and in Yugoslavia in general around this time.

Pronatalist rhetoric was becoming prevalent by the late 1980s as nationalist sentiment heightened. Just as the decline in the working class birthrate was a concern under socialism, "as nationalism replaced class struggle as the basis of political discourse in Serbia, this obsession with reproduction was transferred to the nation."[446] The push for a strong labour force, common in the Eastern European socialist countries, changed to a nationalist drive to protect the nation by reproducing it. There were calls from Serbian politicians for " 'all Serbian women to give birth to one more son in order to carry out their national debt.' Following the war in Slovenia, another politician said, "For each soldier fallen in the war against Slovenia, Serbian women must give birth to 100 more sons".[447] Mertus writes of charts in Serbian media with portrayals of Albanian and Serbian birth-rates: these "speak of the need to populate the 'Serbian nation, otherwise Serbs will be a minority in their own country'".[448] This is a clear indication of the threat felt by many Serbs in the region of Kosovo, as relations between the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians deteriorated. While relations had not been good for a long time, the push for restrictive abortion laws demonstrate that there was a fear regarding the strength of the nation in terms of sheer numbers.[449]

An example from the Serbian media also demonstrates how Albanian women and Serbian women were portrayed as "mothers of the nation". The mothers of the Serbian nation were exhorted to bear more children as "Serbia's demographic slump [was] described as 'one of the greatest tragedies of the Serbian women'".[450] Zajovic makes the point that this not only dictates to women what their role is, but also holds them accountable, and therefore open to blame when the demographic goals are not achieved.

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[445] Hughes et al, 1995
[446] Zajovic, 1997, p 169
[447] Hughes et al, 1995
[448] Mertus, 1996, p 266
[449] Ibid., p 266-67
[450] Zajovic, 1997, p 169

In another example, a portrayal of the high birthrate of Kosovo Albanian women as a "democratic counterrevolution" was an obvious attempt to frame the issue as an actual attack on the Serbian nation. In such a statement, Serb leaders portrayed the high birthrate of Albanian women as a political act. Negative images in Serb media pre-1991 included those of Kosovo Albanian women as "illiterate village women in traditional Muslim dress, encircled by a dozen children and imprisoned by a brick wall."[451] These Albanian women were portrayed as threats to the Kosovo Serb population because they had so many children: they were dangerous to Kosovo Serbs.

Pronatalism can also include the provision of certain services to certain groups. It is clear that much of the motivation for certain pronatalist policies was functional, rather than coming from a moral objection to abortion, as examples of access to abortion in Kosovo demonstrate. Access to abortion was denied for some and allowed for others, depending upon which nationalist group the mother belonged. According to Mertus, the medical commission that approved abortions, "started denying abortions to more Serbian women when the grounds were 'social reasons' but... continued to permit abortions for the same reasons for Gypsy and Albanian women."[452] Abortions were therefore still permitted for the undesirable minorities, whose high rate of reproduction presented a threat. For Serb women, whose babies were more "valuable", at least to Serb nationalists, abortion was restricted. The criteria for determining when abortion was appropriate were not universal, and in this case were subject to change depending upon the particular needs of the nationalist project.

The connection between the movements of nations into crisis and the pronatalist moves of restricting abortion is illustrated by Nikolic-Ristanovic, outlining the cases in Croatia, Slovenia and Serbia. The pressure of anti-abortionist groups coincided with the pronatalist goals of the nationalist leadership. According to Nikolic-Ristanovic, nuns witnessed any examinations of women seeking abortions, and insisted there be no abortion.[453] A further example of this was a "...1995 Christmas message from the Patriarch of the Serb Orthodox Church, which called on women to stop 'killing' their unborn children, to bear more children despite economic

[451] Mertus, 1996, p 266
[452] Ibid., 267

hardship and to learn from mothers who lost their only sons in the war and who now regret not bearing more sons who could bring them consolation."[454] Again from the Serbian Orthodox Church: "abortion is the unspeakable slaughter of little Serbs", and "Serbian people are dying and bleeding at the same time, both on the battlefield and on the medical table."[455] Nationalist rhetoric is employed to draw the attention of people to the impact of their individual actions on the nation as a whole: the slaughter of the Serbian nation at their own hands.

This pronatalist nationalist mobilisation was not peculiar to Serb nationalists. Slovenia was another region in which the threat of increasing non-Slovenian populations within the state caused concern among nationalist leadership. Indeed, the right to abortion that was ensured under socialism became "seen as a great hazard to the future of the Slovene nation, which, according to most of the parties in the governing coalition, is on the brink of dying out."[456] The Slovenian Constitution is worded such that it can be interpreted as anti-abortion, and, after women were guaranteed access to reproductive control under socialism, the new constitution was used to restrict that access in order to populate the nation.[457]

Rape

One of the most prevalent and disturbing aspects of the conflict over power in the former Yugoslavia was the widespread use of rape as a tactic of war. As a symbolic and physical way of asserting dominance, rape in the context of this case study demonstrates how strong the power of gender constructs can be, particularly in a nationalist conflict.

It is important to address here the symbolic nature of rape, particularly as it relates to the legitimacy of the nationalist leadership. On the individual level, when a woman is raped, it demonstrates that the men responsible for her (father, husband, brother, etc) are incapable of protecting her and are therefore not true men. To relate this back to the symbolic political utility of rape, a man must be able to protect

[453] Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996, p 360
[454] Ibid., p 360
[455] Mertus, 1996, p 267
[456] Antic, 1991, p 152

women from rape, and if he cannot, he is not fit to hold power, whether on a local or national level. The rape of a woman can be seen as the symbolic rape of the nation, and can be seen as emasculating for the male leadership, effectively removing its legitimacy to govern. The rape of the nation, therefore, is often used as a means of portraying the nation as defiled by the enemy – the "other" – and is a means of creating both fear and outrage at that other. Rape in the former Yugoslavia was often performed in front of the woman's husband and/or other family, which suggests that part of the purpose of the rape was to show that those who bore responsibility for the woman were incapable of protecting her. This symbolic attack on the capability of men to protect those dependent on them can be seen as showing a nation's weakness and inability to protect itself.

One of the signs of organised rape as a tool of war was the allegations of rape camps organised by various sides in the conflict.[458] Benton, in her discussion of the Serbian rape camps, states that these "...are but the most notorious examples of rape as an actual assault on women, on a nation's honour and on men's capacity to protect their women..."[459] This returns the discussion to a point raised earlier. A neglected aspect of the individual gender roles that are promoted in nationalist ideology is construction of conceptions of masculinity. While a great deal of literature deals with the impact on women, men's roles and relationship to the nation needs to be analysed as well. The above quote points to one area where the impact of rape also affects men: they have failed in their role as protector of their wife or mother or daughter. It is an attack on the masculinity of the man and his responsibility to the nation. For the rapist, it is a sign of his dominant masculinity, as he has proven that he is more powerful than the enemy men, and that he has the capacity to dominate and control the woman and the man who is meant to be protecting her. As discussed in the framework, when women's purity is a symbol of the demarcation of the nation's purity, the rapist renders the national boundaries unclean.

The ramifications of biological inclusion in the nation as discussed in the pronatalism section also play a role in the use of rape to achieve wartime goals. When a woman is raped and impregnated by the enemy of the nation, and the nation is

[457] Ibid., p 152-3
[458] Olujic, 1995

defined at least partially biologically, the woman and the child are both considered to be impure and to have at least partially lost membership in the nation.[460] The mandatory element for inclusion in the nation is the patrilineal gene, regardless of the child's mother. This is in accord with Denich's argument that, "It is significant that the newly resurrected nationalism of the contending Bosnian factions should include a patriarchal claim that equated biological paternity with social fatherhood, and presumed that children of mixed parentage would belong to the father's ethnicity."[461] The continuation of this patriarchal conception of the right to membership in the nation means rape will continue to be used in this type of nationalist warfare.

> Serb soldiers and paramilitary troops who raped women told them that they would give birth to 'little Chetniks' or Serbian soldiers, who would grow up to kill them. Other Croat or Muslim women were told that if a woman carries a Serbian baby, then she too is Serb (State Commission for Gathering Facts on War Crimes in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, October 1992)[462]

These tactics are not limited to one group. When nations identifies themselves along lines that place such importance on biological indicators, there is a relatively consistent use of the methods outlined above. Denich found that many Serbian victims of rape described the same methods of rape as Croatian and Muslim women, and that the "patterns" of rape were the same, indicating that they were used for the same purpose.[463] The similarities arose from "male perpetrators [who] appropriated women simultaneously as objects of sexual violence and as symbols in a contest with rival males that replicated the traditional forms of Balkan patriarchy".[464]

Because the patriarchal system dictates that national membership is dependent on the father's nationality, rape is often used to both devastate the enemy nation and populate one's own national group. The rape of women in this war, as Nikolic-Ristanovic described it, is multi-functional.

> "Wartime inter-ethnic rapes forced women to bear children who belonged to their enemy's ethnic group. In this war [in the former Yugoslavia], rape has

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[459] Benton, 1998, p 38
[460] Brown, 1994, p 87; Denich, 1995, p 68; Stojsavljevic, 1995, p 39
[461] Denich, Bette, 1995, p 68
[462] Hughes et al, 1995
[463] Denich, 1995
[464] Ibid., p 68

been used as a method of "production" of children for the rapist's nationality..."[465]

The result was the rejection of the women by their husbands, who, subscribing to nationalist definitions, saw the women as defiled by the enemy. To many men, rape rendered women unclean. The children of the rape could not be accepted.[466]

The distressing number of allegations concerning rape camps supports this argument. During the war in the former Yugoslavia, Allen discussed some of the reasons for the camps.[467] The women were raped both as part of a system of torture, in which they were either killed or impregnated. The women would often be raped continuously and held until they were in an advanced state of pregnancy, and would then be released.

> In the first case, the death of the victim contributes to the genocidal goal; in the second, the birth of a child does, for the perpetrator – or the policy according to which he is acting – considers this child to be only Serb and to have none of the identity of the mother.[468]

Seifert has provided a disturbing example of how Serbs used rape as part of a plan to destroy and pollute significant aspects of a culture.

> It is reported that once an area or town had been invaded, a phased course of action was followed. The first step obviously consisted in destroying objects of cultural heritage. In a second step, the intellectuals were taken captive and frequently killed because they are people who play a particularly important role in the preservation and tradition of a nation's culture...The third step was the establishment of rape camps for women.[469]

The rape of women in front of their families can only be considered a conscious act to degrade the woman and her family and community. Meznaric's detailing of this shows how widespread this was, and that the purpose of the rape was at least partially to inflict this degradation.[470] This is apparent in the testimony of the women Meznaric interviewed, as many describe the public nature of their rapes and

[465] Nikolic-Ristanovic, 1996, p 361
[466] Ibid., p 361
[467] Allen, 1996
[468] Allen, 1996, p vii-viii. See also Meznaric, 1994, p 92-3
[469] Seifert, Ruth, 1996, p 39
[470] Meznaric, 1994, p 92

the effect it had: "Salih's son... hung himself after his wife Ramza had been violated by several Chetniks who raped her before his eyes."[471]

Rape is often used in propaganda to provoke emotional responses, as demonstrated in the example of Albanian men allegedly raping Serbian women. As discussed above in the pronatalism section, in the 1980s the power struggle in Kosovo between Serbs and Albanians was intensifying. As the struggle for control over the Kosovo police force increased, accounts of rape by Albanian men of Serbian women were widely reported in Serbian media. Included in this was an allegation of the rape of a Serbian nun by an Albanian policeman, an accusation guaranteed to heighten emotions. It was never verified. Mertus has contended that this "served to create a truth about the gender behaviour of Albanian males - painting them as primitive, oversexed, out-of-control animals who threaten the purity and very survival of the Serbian nation."[472]

The irony of rape as a tool of propaganda is that the stigma it induces is a double edged sword. Its usefulness as propaganda capable of stirring great emotion is weighed against its effectiveness as a method of destroying the "purity" of a woman. One anecdote from Mertus demonstrates the agony of deciding whether to report the rape of a 19 year old Albanian woman raped by a Serbian policeman (1995). "While the incident can be touted as an example of Serbian oppression and this benefits the Albanian cause, it can also be seen as a shame. 'Her life is ruined in her village now', one woman explained. 'No one will touch a girl that [sic] has been raped.'"[473] One Serbian newspaper, referring to a woman raped by the enemy, concluded, "She would be better off dead than alive to shame her husband, her family, and her community by giving birth to a child from the seed of the enemy."[474]

However, there is often a limit on how much of a threat an enemy male is allowed to present. If he presents too much danger to the women within the national community, then he may be perceived as too strong for the men of the nation: i.e. they will not be men enough to protect their women. "What is important here is that the

[471] Ibid., p 97 (n 43)
[472] Mertus, 1996, p 264
[473] Ibid., p 271
[474] Stojsavljevic, 1995, p 39

rape is always an attempted one. A picture of the enemy thus takes shape of an Albanian who tries to rape Serbian girls but is unable to do so... The enemy tries to attack, to rape, but is confounded, is impotent, in contrast to the macho Serb."[475]

One of the indicators that rape is specifically used as a *nationalist* tool is the way rape is handled in the political sphere. In Serbia, " 'political rape' is distinguished from 'ordinary rape.' The violence of 'ordinary rape' is less severely punished because victims and perpetrators are presumably not of different nationalities..."[476] Morokvasic claims that while women who have been raped are "directly exploited as a symbolic image of the threat that mixing represents for a nation", rape is disregarded and the women shamed when the rapes are perpetrated by men of their own nation. "...In nationalist discourse rapes are condemned only in so far as they are committed by men of the other group."[477] It is interesting to note that this interpretation of rape allows the nationalist identity to remain noble: there is a lesser charge for "inter-Serb" rape, because the image of a Serb man as a rapist contradicts the image of the male Serb as a hero. To equate him with the Albanian or Croatian rapist would be to equate him with the enemy, and weaken the Serb nation.

One of the most marked aspects of the wars in the former Yugoslavia has been the international attention paid to the gendered nature of much of the warfare. This is usually in reference to the atrocities that are specifically wrought on women and girls: rape, the intentional impregnation of women by rape, and rape camps.[478] However, what is often ignored is that men are singled out and killed because of their gender. They are killed because of the perception of men as warriors. Just as the horror stories are told of young, attractive women being chosen by enemy soldiers, so are the men of fighting age selected and killed so they cannot continue to fulfil their gender role: that of warrior for the nation. The failure of men in the role of protector and defender of vulnerable members of the nation results in a perception of "men's inability to protect 'their' women and to control their sexuality and procreative powers is perceived as a critical symptom of weakness."[479] This, as Jones describes in his

[475] Salecl, 1992, p 54-5
[476] Meznaric, 1994, p 79
[477] Morokvasic, 1998, p 75. This, claims Morokvasic, is an attitude that holds true for both participants and observers (i.e. journalists and scholars).
[478] Benderly, 1997, p 64-5
[479] Denich, 1995, p 68

examination of the neglect of men in the discussion of gender in wartime, results in a particular method of attack in wartime.[480]

Raising three main ways in which men are persecuted and killed because of their gender, Jones examines a perspective rarely covered in gender studies. First is the "forcible conscription" of men. This contradicts a perception of a universal "eagerness" on men's parts to fight in nationalist wars. When 4,000 men attempted to escape conscription in Bosnia by fleeing to Croatia, President Franjo Tudjman sent them back. His reasoning was that, "Croatia, which already has accepted 400,000 refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, cannot undertake to care for those who in conditions of war should stay on the battlefield and defend their homes against the aggressor."[481] The point Jones makes is that it is considered acceptable for men to be turned away as refugees because they are the ones who do the fighting. It is regardless of whether they want to fight, and is not considered a gendered part of conflict.[482]

His second category is of "retributory or 'pre-emptive' execution". In this scenario men are killed in order to prevent them from fighting. The horrifyingly common stories of men being rounded up and killed are not usually put in a nationalist conflict framework: these men are being killed because they are of fighting age, and they are killed because their duty, as Tudjman and many others have said, is to fight for their nation.[483]

Finally Jones discusses "incarceration", which has much the same motivation as the executions. While much rarer than the raping of women, men were sexually abused in these prison camps as well. Jones discusses the sexual abuse of men at he hands of some women prison guards, either with the men being forced to have sex with each other, or being abused by the guards themselves.[484] The incarceration prevented fighting-age men from being able to participate in the warfare, but the sexual abuse proved the men's loss of power and their subjugation to their captors.[485] The gender-based selection is never more apparent than in the multitude of stories

[480] Jones, 1994
[481] Ibid., p 123
[482] Ibid., p 122-24
[483] Ibid., p 124-26
[484] Ibid., p 121 and note 12
[485] Hague, 1997, p 53

about separation of men and women.[486] Jones referred to documentation of, 'the gender- and age- based separation process carried out by occupying forces [which] led to men being detained while women and children were allowed to flee the area as refugees."[487]

These atrocities have a familiar theme: they were perpetrated with a sense of purpose, which draws on the themes and concepts outlined in the previous chapter. The purpose of the selection and killing off of men of fighting age is fairly obvious: it not only cuts the number of men who can fight for their nation, it also reduces the number of men available to father the future fighters for the nation and acts to intimidate to anyone who remains to fight.

Deviations from Nationalist Norms

Socialist Yugoslavia was not as restrictive as socialist Romania in many ways, and this included more general tolerance of deviations from gender constructions. While Yugoslavia was not open and accepting of a great deal of diversity, there was room in the Yugoslav society, for example, for women's groups. However, as conflict began to spread through the regions and national identities became more strictly defined, this room for tolerance was restricted.

Feminist Movements

Feminism in socialist Yugoslavia was a flourishing movement, especially in the early 1980s, due mostly to the relative openness of the socialist leadership in that country.[488] There was considerable support for women's groups. But, as the nationalist rhetoric turned into nationalist conflict, feminist movements were either co-opted by the nationalist cause or were denigrated for their antiwar, pacifist messages.[489] As the situation in Yugoslavia dissolved into armed conflict, the strain began to show on many women's groups that crossed nationalist boundaries. Groups

[486] Jones, p 126-28
[487] Ibid., p 126-27
[488] Benderly, 1997, p 60-61; Stojsavljevic, 1995, p 37; Munk, 1999, Litrichin and Mladjenovich, 1997
[489] Hughes et al, 1995

that had pacifist tendencies found that they were split either along internal, nationalist identity lines, or by external pressure to conform to societal norms.

As has been illustrated above, when women are encouraged to raise children for the nation, this protective role conflicts with having to send these same children to be wounded or killed in battle. As has happened many times in the West, women in Yugoslavia organised against war. The Women in Black are the most well-known group, and maintained their silent protests throughout the conflict. Denich has also traced the reality of mothers during the conflict by looking at the protests of many mothers in Yugoslavia.[490] These mothers, from all areas of Yugoslavia, insisted that their sons return home and not fight.

However, as the fighting became more intense and the conflict dragged on, many women began to withdraw along traditional nationalistic lines, and protests dwindled.[491] Not only was it difficult for the women to continue to protest as nationalist sentiment grew in response to the intensity of the fighting, but the women themselves began to feel threatened by the "other" - the enemy - and in need of protection.[492] As hostilities increased in Kosovo in the late 1980s, Serb women in Kosovo marched with placards reading, "We gave up our sons for Yugoslavia, now the Yugoslavian army should protect us!"[493] These women were calling for the armed intervention of the military, not for the cessation of hostilities: they felt the threat of the "other" in the form of the Kosovo Albanians.

Woollacott has made the very valid point that women are participants in the machinations of the nation just as men are. In many cases, the nation exerts more "identity pressure" than does the gender. An increase in the intensity of the conflict leads to a correlating increase in the pressure for men and women to conform to stricter nationalist norms, to align themselves with their national identity, rather than their identity as a woman or mother.[494] While the national identity incorporates such associations as woman with motherhood, the paramouncy of the nationalist identity

[490] Denich, 1995, p 69
[491] Stojslavjevic, 1995, p 36
[492] Denich, Bette, 1995, p 69
[493] Stojslavjevic, 1995, p 38
[494] Benderly, 1997, p 60; Litrichin and Mladjenovich, 1997, p 181-82

means that aspects of being a mother must fall to the side. The desire to protect one's children must be sacrificed to the nation, as sons go off to war.

Yugoslavia is definitely a case in point. Women's groups were pressured into supporting the war, both through "official" channels and from their neighbours and friends. As Stojslavjevic put it, "women who did oppose the conscription of their sons into their own national armies were vilified and accused of wanting the destruction of their own people, by not wanting the country to defend itself."[495] In one well-reported instance, a Croatian women's group leader compared the Serbian aggression with the sexual assault on the body of Croatia.[496] Unsurprisingly, the sexuality of the women protesters was questioned. Benderly describes the Women in Black being spat upon and called whores as the women stood in silence.[497]

Women as Soldiers

While this thesis has discussed a variety of roles women "should" play, the actual elasticity of these roles becomes apparent in times of crisis. Indeed, the roles that are appropriate could be seen to change according to what is useful to various parties at various times. For example, this is true of the need for women to become mothers when the population of a nation is under threat due to large numbers of casualties. One of the most interesting switches, however, contrasts sharply with the role of the nurturing mother: the role of women as fighters or soldiers. In this scenario, the perception of women changes depending upon the group with which she is associated. In the former Yugoslavia, in both Croatia and Serbia, a number of women fought as soldiers. Needing to legitimate this, "the media celebrate[d] these women when they kill[ed] the enemy; but when women fighters from the other side are captured, they are denounced as 'monstrous women'".[498] This switch, contends Morakvasic, was portrayed in the media as showing " the superiority of the nation over other identifications and allegiances."[499] How gender should manifest was dependent upon the utility for the nation in a particular scenario. Therefore, when

[495] Stojslavjevic, 1995, p 38
[496] Ibid., p 37
[497] Benderly, 1997, p 64
[498] Zajovic, 1997, p 171
[499] Morakvasic, 1998, p 83

women acted outside of what would seem to be appropriate gender roles, if those action were nonetheless useful for the national project, they were acceptable. These same actions were condemned as unnatural when in opposition to the national project.

It is worthwhile to briefly address the position of men as pacifists, which is more difficult to reconcile with the goals of the nation than a woman soldier, especially during armed conflict. The position of a woman soldier can be rationalised by her portrayal as a fierce mother fighting for her children. Functionally, that means she is another soldier on her nation's side. However, if a man does not fight, he is not only another soldier *not* fighting for the nation, he is a threat to the definition of a true member of the nation: men fight to protect the nation to achieve the glory and goals of the nation. This is such a pervasive theme that it was vocalised, as we saw above, by Franjo Tudjman in the case of male asylum seekers. Unsurprisingly, in Serbia male refugees were forced into battle, and those who tried to avoid were this branded as "unpatriotic, unmasculine, even cowardly and treasonous, negative examples that would shame the others into abiding by the heroic nationalist ideal of manly behaviour."[500]

Homosexuality

Homosexuality follows on from the case discussed above, of men pacifists, as a threat to the nation. In Romania, we saw that there was hostility towards homosexuality because it threatened the homogeneity of the nation. In Yugoslavia, it would seem that the closer the country came to civil war, the more this hostility increased. Homosexual males were seen to present an actual threat to the nationalist community because they threatened both masculinity and the combat capacity of the group (i.e., homosexuals were not considered capable of fighting as true warriors). I would contend that, in line with Mosse's argument that homosexuals are as dangerous as foreigners, foreigners are never as dangerous as when a nation is at war.

This point is demonstrated quite graphically by a report of a state news-broadcaster's comments within hours of NATO's bombing of the Serbs in 1999. This newscaster's claim "was that the leaders of the West are gay, only he used our word

[500] Lukic, 2000, p 414

for fag, peder. He talked about the gay government of [British prime minister] Tony Blair, about how the wife of Tony Blair is a lesbian, and that her best friend, the wife of Bill Clinton, is also a lesbian."[501] It is difficult to imagine a more overt example of Mosse's argument: the dangerous foreigners are portrayed here as homosexual, making them even more alien and menacing.[502]

Conclusion

This second case study provides further insight into the gender/nationalism dynamic. One of the most significant issues demonstrated by the case of Yugoslavia (and its disintegration) is how gender roles are exploited in a time of outright conflict. The utilisation of the concepts outlined in this thesis go far in indicating just how strong the link between gender and power legitimation is.

As in Romania, the use and abuse of history played a large part in the manipulation of the Serb identity, particularly after the death of Tito. As outlined above, the dispersion of power to the various republics paralleled the efforts to control the history of the various regions. In Serbia, the emphasis was placed on the victimisation of Serbs in previous struggles, on the valour of Serb men and on the self- sacrifice of Serb women. Additionally, the above review of the media and popular culture makes clear that demonisation of the enemy played a large role in the reassertion of the national Serb identity. A large part of this demonisation was based on various attacks on the enemy's sexuality, whether through symbolic attacks in the media (the Kosovo Albanian women as breeders), the labelling of foreign leaders as homosexual, or the very physical act of rape.

As the politics of reproduction section shows, the subject of rape permeates the discussion of gender in the former Yugoslavia. The widespread use of rape as a tool of warfare is a chilling example of how gender constructs are used to assert dominance over another group of people. The different levels on which this is effective – symbolic, cultural, individual – demonstrates how the utilisation of gender constructions manifests in power struggles. The efforts to control male and female

[501] Friess, 1999. For more anecdotal examples, see Aravosis, 1999

bodies are shown through the examples of rape in the collapse of the former Yugoslavia, and in the pronatalist attitudes and policies that were present, although to a lesser extent than in Romania. The significance of rape presents perhaps the most compelling evidence from this region that the study of gender is important to the study of nationalism.

The case study above shows, through both policy and rhetoric, that the manipulation and construction of gender identities are integral to the struggle for leadership legitimation: Milosevic's manoeuvres to gain control of Serbia and to maintain his popularity relied on a heavily gendered construct of nationalism. It is with this in mind, and with the examples discussed in the chapter on Romania, that I examine the main themes in the final chapter.

[502] To carry this analogy further, there were a series of articles and magazines that contended that Blair and Clinton were controlled by aliens. See Toncic's article entitled, "Tony Blair is an Alien!"

Chapter Seven
Conclusion

This thesis has provided an examination of the gendered discourse in the legitimisation of nationalist movements. By exploring the incorporation of gender constructions in nationalist theoretical literature, and then examining two case studies through a gender framework, the importance of these constructions has been demonstrated. Conceptions of gender played an integral role in the seeking and maintenance of legitimacy by nationalist movements, particularly because gender is a basic unit in the construction and maintenance of national identities. In both case studies, this thesis has demonstrated how nationalist projects are legitimated by and are reliant upon particular constructions of gender.

A review of the theories and framework of this thesis is useful before exploring the major findings. The nationalism theory utilised in this thesis is based in the modernist paradigm, in which nationalism is defined as a modern, constructed phenomenon that is reliant upon certain elements for its construction and continuing appeal. One of the key elements of this paradigm is the conception of nations as imagined, as argued by Anderson.[503] The model of nationalism utilised in this thesis has argued that in these imagined communities, histories are manipulated and traditions invented.[504] This discussion also revealed some of the gaps in the nationalist literature; most specifically, the neglect of gender in the analysis of nationalism.

The critique of nationalist literature in this thesis focussed on the failure to recognise that gender is one of the key elements in a national identity. This critique is primarily justified by the importance of gender as a social identifier. This thesis has utilised theoretical arguments that constructions of gender are integral to the

[503] Anderson, 1991
[504] Hobsbawm, 1983a, Gellner, 1983

reproduction of both the symbolic body of the nation and the reproduction of the actual population of the nation.[505] These were then translated into the lenses of the politics of tradition and reproduction.

The lenses of reproduction and tradition served to integrate the various theories of gender and nationalism into a framework for the analysis of the case studies. The framework posited that there were several main areas in which the gendered nature of nationalist discourse became apparent. The section on tradition focussed on the way in which nationalism is transmitted. The means of transmission ranged from the utilisation of historical events to define the nation, to the manipulation and creation of traditions to strengthen and support the nation, to the use of symbols, embedded in these traditions, to identify the individual with the nation.

The reproduction section posited the various ways in which gender constructions, such as those of mother and father, can manifest themselves in a nationalist project. Drawing on biological characteristics of men and women, the nationalist projects discussed in this thesis have presented these constructions as the only appropriate roles for men and women in the nation. The containing and controlling of gender in pronatalist policies and the exploiting of the emotive power of rape in warfare were discussed as the two most potent ways this reproductive lens demonstrates gender's central role.

The final section of the framework dealt with the deviations from the perceived or prescribed gender norms within the nationalist project. The basic responses were either incorporation or rejection. People who deviated from the constructed roles had to be either incorporated into the nationalist project through ideological gymnastics, or rejected as enemies of the nation. This section demonstrated not only how flexible gender constructions can be, but how these constructions can be used to vilify and isolate those who are rejected from the national community.

Both case studies demonstrated the very potent role of nationalist identities in socialist and post-socialist legitimacy struggles. As argued in the theory chapters,

[505] Particularly Yuval-Davis: 1991, 1993

nationalist identities were based in part on definitions of gender that prescribed both criteria for membership in the nation and appropriate behaviour within the nation. The manifestation of tradition and reproduction in the gendered nature of the nationalist discourse in both countries was demonstrated.

As in much of Eastern Europe, Romanian society was patriarchal, with "traditional" conceptualisations of male leadership and female passivity. Although socialist policy called for gender equality, women bore the double burdens of employment and domestic responsibility. As demonstrated, the major manifestation of the gendered nationalist project under socialism was through the pronatalist campaigns of Nicolae Ceausescu. In the post-socialist years, the emphasis was on the retraditionalisation of the roles of men and women. These professedly natural gender roles were manipulated to legitimate the goals of various nationalist groups in their post-socialist attempts to gain power.

The Yugoslavia chapter canvassed the particular aspects of gender as incorporated into the Serbian nationalist project, as led by Slobodan Milosevic, in the 1980s and 1990s. Again, the community was a patriarchal one, the effects of socialist equality policies generally did not penetrate beyond the surface of society, and Yugoslav women bore the double burden of domestic responsibility and work. Post-socialist conceptions of gender were dominated by armed conflict. The use of rape as a tool of war, for instance, was widespread.

There are a number of differences and similarities between Yugoslavia and Romania that shed light on the nature of gender in nationalism. In Romania, nationalism was an almost monolithic force under socialist leadership. Nationalist ideology was inculcated by the state socialist leadership and nationalist policies were enacted. In the post-socialist years there have been different groups vying for legitimacy through a nationalist ideology. The situation in Yugoslavia is almost the reverse. The struggle to legitimate a particular leadership came in the latter years of state socialism, and it has been the nationalistic hegemony of Milosevic that has dominated the post-socialist years in the former Yugoslavia.

As the manifestations of nationalist projects took place in different periods, i.e. socialist and post-socialist, it would be reasonable to expect that these radical changes

in both politics and social structures would lead to different social constructions of identity, such as gender. What is remarkable in both of these countries is the similarity of the gender constructions the nationalist leaderships have drawn on, both internally from period to period, and between the two countries. There are several facets of this similarity that need to be explored.

As to the similarity of gender constructions between the socialist and post-socialist years. As discussed in chapter four, the dynamics of state socialism and nationalism were mutually compatible in certain ways. These included the similarity between state intrusion into the private sphere, the efforts of both nationalist movements and socialist regimes to inculcate certain norms in society, and the use of an enemy "other" to support the legitimacy of the leadership. The association between identity construction and ideological legitimacy in both nationalism and socialism stemmed from the need to inculcate norms in the community and from the need to construct these identities in a way that situated a benevolent nation against a malevolent enemy. Socialist leaderships, for example, placed themselves in opposition to capitalist ideologies, while nationalist groups posited themselves against other nations.

In socialist Romania, socialism and nationalism were combined, as the perceived threat to Romanians was not only from capitalist ideologies, but from other socialist countries, like Hungary. Therefore, there was official pressure to be wary of internal enemies under socialism that was rooted in both nationalist ideology and socialist ideology. The construction of the internal enemy had one of the most potent impacts on gender in socialist Romania. The Romanian woman who would not bear children for her nation was a threat to her nation, as she was not fulfilling her natural role and was endangering Romania by not reproducing the body of the nation. In socialist Romania, nationalist gender constructions were combined with socialist gender constructions: women bore the triple burden of work, domestic responsibility, and childbearing.

Socialist Yugoslavia did not have this same combination of nationalist and socialist goals. Until Tito's death in 1980, the socialist leadership purposely avoided regional nationalism, only condoning a Yugoslav identity. It was after his death, as

socialism began to lose its legitimacy in Yugoslavia, that nationalist groups throughout Yugoslavia began to strengthen and grow, asserting their power from the periphery and weakening the central federal structures. There was not the same construction of an internal enemy, partly because there was not the same conflation of the socialist and nationalist goals. Indeed, if there was an internal threat under Tito, it was regional nationalism itself. Therefore, in socialist Yugoslavia, a more open society than socialist Romania, the formation of women's groups was not perceived to posit the same sort of internal threat as it did in Romania. The lack of a concerted pronatalist policy was also a factor in a the more extensive realignment of gender roles in Yugoslavia, albeit for a brief period. The feminist movement, which was really only nascent in the early 1980s, was reversed by the increasingly violent nationalist struggles that were occurring in Yugoslavia.

The Serb leadership needed to emphasise the difference between the Serbs and the enemy others, although these groups had lived in relative harmony and had intermarried for decades. The need to delineate between Serbs and other enemy nationalist groups forced Serbs had to define themselves as different from these other groups. As we have seen in the chapter on Yugoslavia, this was accomplished through highly gendered issues and images. The constructions of gender as explored in this section were used to create difference between two groups. This concept of gender as an "ethno-marker", as Meznaric has called it, is often utilised not only to create difference between groups, but also to portray threat.[506] When two groups have very little else to distinguish them, demonisation and degradation of the other is often used to demarcate boundaries between groups. The degrading of women in particular is important, for as Yuval-Davis has argued, the purity of women is often representative of the integrity of national borders.[507] Gender is a particularly potent device for this purpose, as the portrayal of an enemy woman as a whore dehumanises her, and helps to justify her being raped in war. The portrayal of enemy men as savages and rapists, on the other hand, provides justification to kill them, as they present a threat to the pure women of one's own nation. In newspapers, Albanian men were rapists; Serb men were not. In popular music representations, Serb women were pure and chaste; Croatian women were whores. Gender representations became the way that

[506] Meznaric, 1994, p 82; see also Rejali, 1996

differentiations were made between the Serbs and the Croats, for example, who spoke the same language. By portraying Croatian women as wanton, the distinction was made in a way that allowed Serbs to be disgusted by their enemy, and to see them as fundamentally different from themselves. This dehumanisation allowed enemy women and men to raped and killed.

Post-socialist Yugoslavia was characterised by a retraditionalisation of gender roles, in that men and women were encouraged to "return" to their traditional roles of women in the home and men in the workplace. This was often framed in nationalist rhetoric, as Serb women were "naturally" meant to care for their husbands and children and Serb men were "naturally" meant to protect and provide for their families. This coincided with the increasing tensions of civil war, which was by then ravaging the country. The post-socialist period is also marked by the consolidation of Milosevic's power, which was based on a nationalist ideology of Serb superiority and victimisation. The disintegration of all but a few women's groups organised along nationalist lines indicates the collapse of state-condoned diversity, as conformity to nationalist goals became paramount, and deviation was either absorbed or quashed. In many ways, the situation in post-socialist Yugoslavia resembled that in socialist Romania. The perception of threat to the Serbs meant that gender roles became more restrictive as defining the nation became more important.

While post-socialist Serb nationalism became ever more militant and embroiled in violent conflict, and was increasingly controlled by one man and his wife, post-socialist Romania moved incrementally in the other direction. The execution of the Ceausescus brought with it a break from tyranny but no significant change from the ideology that had helped Nicolae Ceausescu to maintain his hold on power. As those vying for power utilised variations of Romanian nationalist rhetoric, the general trend was to encourage women back into the home and men into the workplace. This retraditionalisation was evident in the reduction in the number of women in the public sphere, and in calls in the media for women to bear children, as in the article entitled, "A Family Without Children is Like a Tree Without Fruit".[508]

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[507] Yuval-Davis, 1993
[508] Ibid., p 238

Some basic elements of both the Romanian and Yugoslav nationalist identities is often seen as "typically" East European. They are traditional, delving deep into the past to co-opt events and to invent legends both for historical legitimacy and for rituals and traditions that emphasise community. They draw on and create folk traditions such as oral poetry and music to re-emphasise that community and to create ties with the past. The national identity is also seen as one that relies on "natural" conceptions: the national identity is one attained through birth, and through adhering to natural roles. As has been discussed at length, an emphasis on these natural roles has resulted in the retraditionalisation of men and women's roles in these countries.

These basic elements in constructions of gender in both the Romanian and Serb cases were essentially the same. Throughout, the primary means of defining these nationalist identities and presenting the threats to them were in a gendered rhetoric. These concepts of gender were then used to further the goals of particular nationalist agendas by utilising emotive rhetoric and historic ties to separate people into particular groups. For example, in the pronatalist policies in both Yugoslavia and Romania women were exhorted to bear children for the nation, as it was their national and natural duty to do so. Abortion was referred to as killing the nation in both countries with similar imagery. In post-socialist Romania, to have an abortion was "to consent to your people's extinction".[509] In Yugoslavia, "abortion [was] the unspeakable slaughter of little Serbs".[510] It was through this gendered rhetoric that national groups were demarcated as unique and under threat from some foreign influence, whether that was a foreign ideology or the threat of rape.

There are specific distinctions between the two countries, however, which raise some interesting questions and points for discussion.

In Romania, the need for women to bear children for the labour force of the nation shaped the construction of gender roles. The need to present an internal threat from another ethnic group was not as great as in Yugoslavia, and the portrayal of imminent threat from an enemy within was not seen as integral to the national project. As discussed earlier, this is in part because the ethnic minorities had little chance of actually assuming power. Rather, for socialist Romania the external threat was posed

[509] Baban, 2000, p 238

either by other socialist countries (the USSR or by Hungary) or by capitalism, while the internal threat stemmed from the inappropriate behaviour of members of the Romanian nation. The internal threat in socialist Romania was from women and men who did not bear enough children. This was portrayed as a betrayal of the Romanian nation, not as a personal choice. The internal threat was a shrinking birth-rate, and those who did not help to combat this were traitors. The constant representation of women as fulfilling their natural, national role by bearing children is congruent with the assertions of the politics of tradition framework, that gender roles are posited as natural in order to achieve national goals. The integration of the roles of mother and father with the role of member of the nation is in accord with the argument in the framework that these constructions are interdependent.

In Yugoslavia, on the other had, part of the purpose of gender roles was to present the spectre of an external threat. This external threat was a key element in the definition of Serb nationalist identity. Warfare in the 1990s meant that there were both internal and external threats in Yugoslavia, and the violent use of extreme gender constructions (i.e. rape) reflects this. The external threat is the more obvious, as anyone outside of the nation was presented as dangerous. For example, Albanians in Kosovo were people who would rape, while Serbs would never do this. The internal threat was the traitor within, a much more paranoid construction, that the Serb nation was in danger from its own members. These threats were often presented in gendered form, as examined in the deviations section of the case studies. For example, women's groups that reached across national boundaries were seen as threatening on a basic level because they demonstrated that those national boundaries were imagined. Because the capacity for this trans-national bond needed to be discredited, the women were presented as abnormal and deviant.

In the increasingly violent nationalist discourse in the Serbian case, rape became the most prominent manifestation of the way gender constructions were utilised within this discourse. Symbolically and physically, rape became a means of cultural domination and physical control. As a means of propaganda it was used to create a threat by an enemy (but not too much of a threat, or it would become an assault on the masculinity of Serb men). Rape was utilised in rape camps both as a

[510] Mertus, 1996, p 267

cultural means of rendering large numbers of women "unclean", and to force the women to bear the children of the enemy. As has been argued throughout this thesis, the gendered warfare of rape also affected men, as their status as protectors was challenged when women were raped, as they themselves became the perpetrators of the rapes, and occasionally the victims of sexual abuse as well.

The premise of women as mothers and men as both fathers and rapists creates a complex situation for the society in which these conceptions are utilised. Both are used to demonise the "other" (non-members of the nation) and to goad those who do belong into action for the nation. For example, Mertus traced a progression of "gender-based campaigns" in Kosovo, in which Albanian men were presented as rapists, Albanian women were portrayed as "baby factories" and therefore a threat to the Serb population, and finally, Serbian women were exhorted to increase the natality rate in the region.[511] These are indicative of the way one concept (in this case, "woman as mother") can be used to demonise an enemy, to frighten people into believing a negative stereotype about an enemy, and to help push a nationalist group into action.

In the case study sections, there has been a difference of emphasis on the various sections, depending upon what importance was placed on particular areas by the nationalist leadership. The most significant issue with a difference in coverage was rape as a nationalist tool. In Yugoslavia, this was one of the main mechanisms of gender constructions, whereas in Romania there was no evidence that this means was used either in presenting the perception of threat or as a tool of conflict. As argued in the Romania chapter, rape was probably not utilised because of the power imbalance in Romania. The minority groups in Romania were small enough to not present a serious threat to the leadership, despite the occasional representations by Ceausescu of them as a danger. It was easier for the groups to be "bought" by their "home" countries, such as Germany, or to be assimilated or moved than to create the spectre of rape as a tool of differentiation and threat. Although rape as a nationalist implement was not utilised in Romania, the general conceptions of motherhood and purity were utilised, as were symbolic representations of the rape of Romanian lands, as in the

[511] Mertus, p 264-67

case of Bessarabia. Therefore, we see that all of the conceptualisations discussed in the framework were manifested in the two case studies.

This discussion of rape and the differences between the two countries raises an important finding of this thesis. One of the major differences between the Romanian and Yugoslavian cases were the manifestations of the perceptions of threat to the national movement. In Romania, Hungarians were seen as a threat, but, as argued previously, were not enough of a threat to be demonised through rape. This is in contrast to the Albanian population in Kosovo, with the high incidences of alleged rape of Serb women by Albanian men. Hungarians, who could have been considered the largest internal threat to the Romanian nation, were not presented as such, possibly because their birthrate was lower than the Romanian one. Gypsies were often portrayed as the population threat because of their higher birthrate, but in terms of actual population numbers were realistically not threatening.[512] The biggest threat in the Romanian case was the internal threat.

The difference between internal and external threat in Yugoslavia and Romania brings up a variety of issues. The external threat in Romania, particularly under socialism, can be seen as a peripheral one, that was raised to show the spectre of threat from the inside to Romanians. This was then heightened by the internal threat of the enemy within. This enemy was portrayed as lurking everywhere, and was combated by the ubiquitous Securitate. For Yugoslavians, the threat was basically external, in that there were foreigners living in the land that rightfully belonged to Serbs. In this way, the conflicts were different. Serbs were seeking to demonise and drive out the enemy. Romanians were fighting themselves and the enemy within. The gender constructions illustrate this. Romanian women bore the brunt of the fight against the internal enemy, as their bodies were utilised to achieve pronatalist goals. In Yugoslavia, the terror of rape was used to dominate and drive out the enemy. This entrenched the conflict, as the use of this powerful tool of war set people against their enemies. Gender constructions helped people perceive their enemies as innately different from themselves.

[512] The Roma birthrate was (in 1992) 2.7 per capita, as opposed to 1.8 for Romanians and 1.7 for Hungarians. Kligman, 1998, p 300, footnote # 42.

Besides the internal and external distinction, another aspect of the differences between Romania and Yugoslavia was the degree of threat. The degree of threat in both cases was portrayed by the nationalist leadership as vital to the survival of the nation. In actuality, the degree of threat in Yugoslavia was greater, as the conflict spiralled into civil war. The threat in Yugoslavia was generally portrayed and subsequently perceived as one that threatened the integrity of the nation from the outside. The threat to the nation was more extreme in this way, and the use of violent gender constructions served to portray and to heighten the threat to every Serb. This distinction shows how the gendering of the national conflict in Yugoslavia entrenched the conflict. The perception of threat from an enemy is very difficult to erase once it has been constructed, and the gendering of the threat serves to entrench that perception further.

There are two processes at work here. As discussed above, the degree of threat to Serbs was portrayed in part through violent gender constructions, in which Albanians and Croatians were dehumanised by being portrayed as rapists and whores. Secondly, the intensity of the conflict was increasing, as more people were killed and more rapes were committed. The increasing degree of threat led to the entrenchment of the gender constructions. This dual process led to a spiral effect, as gender constructions were reinforced and the conflict intensified. Therefore, the threat in Yugoslavia was portrayed through gender constructions, and the degree of that threat was both intensified and entrenched by these gender constructions.

The sections on deviations from a proscribed gender norm provide some of the most overt examples of the constructed nature of gender. One of the purposes of this thesis was to examine the malleability of gender constructions in nationalist movements. There are no absolutes of what gender is or of what it should look like, even within the strictures of a nationalist movement. Indeed, despite the efforts of many nationalist movements to control the physical bodies of its members, there are still deviations from these norms. However, the *perceived* naturalness of particular constructions is utilised within many nationalist movements to establish uniqueness and, therefore, legitimacy of a particular nationalist group. As discussed in chapter three, this is often through natural social structures such as the family. However, as with many other nationalist constructions, the image of gender is one that has been

culled from an often invented and manipulated past, and in reality is subject to change depending upon the need of the nationalist project. Therefore, there were examples of feminist groups in the former Yugoslavia who were condoned by the nationalist leaders for their support, while other feminist groups who did not support the leadership were condemned. Although one of the primary responsibilities of a mother in "nature" is to protect her young, women who strived to save their sons from battle were pilloried in the public arena. The image of a natural mother is useful to the national project in regards to the bearing of children. This then conflicts with the obligation to her national identity, which calls on her to send her sons off to battle.

The discussion of deviations from the national norms is also illustrative of one of the paradoxes of nationalist identity: what is professedly a consistent, natural and immutable identity is actually fluid, and tends to change with the needs of a particular leadership. In the sections on "deviations", we found the demonisation of women and men in particular roles often depends on the usefulness those roles. The presumed rigidity that would come from a narrow definition of gender roles was actually quite flexible if the new definition had utility. Women soldiers in Yugoslavia, for example, were often considered useful by the Serb leadership if they were pro-Serb. If they were not, they were demonised as unnatural and as "monstrous".[513] The same was true of women's groups in Yugoslavia. If the group was co-opted by the Serb nationalist project, it was acceptable an even laudable. If it reached across nationalist lines, it was condemned.

As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, there were certain restrictions on the scope of this work., which included the barriers of language and culture. The restriction of geography meant that this thesis had to draw on secondary case studies in most instances. This did not prove to be a problem, as the literature from the various disciplines utilised here was congruent with the primary information that was available. Where primary information was sourced, it was noted in the text of the thesis and was not evaluated at face value. In other words, I did not take for granted that information from the case study countries was not without an agenda: in most cases, the information obtained was useful because it did have an agenda. This was the case in the poem, "Spiteful Verses", from the Yugoslavian government website.

This piece was sanctioned by the Serb government and could be seen as representing their viewpoint. Thus, the subjectivity was useful in examining the gender representations approved by the Serb nationalist leadership.

I would like to draw attention here to some further areas in which the gendering of nationalism is relevant and deserves further study. One is the issue of the uncertainty of nationalist leadership itself, in that there is a particular overarching legitimacy to which even the seemingly most permanent leaders are held. In Romania, Ceausescu was seen as having betrayed the nationalist project in his ravaging of the country and its people. His ultimate punishment was to be killed by the very people to whom he was meant to be a father. In Yugoslavia at present, Milosevic increasingly uses thug tactics to keep control of the country, such as quashing opposition protests. No longer certain of control over the people, he is turning more to coercion.[514] His recent move to extend his presidential term is more reliant upon his ability to split the opposition vote than on his certainty in gaining support from the majority of Serbs.

One question that arises from these two cases is, who has the right to be the "father" (it is not usually a political mother) of the nation? The difficulty with nationalist credentials is that if someone can be perceived as more "genuine" than the leader, they can then co-opt the nationalist movement. In Romania, the post-socialist contention for leadership has often focussed on which leader or political party can claim the most genuine nationalism, and to be representing the "real" Romanian. The legitimacy of a particular leader is dependent upon nationalist "credentials". In the former Yugoslavia, one of the most respected Serb nationalists has joined the youth opposition group, Otpor.[515] Milosevic's continuing hold on power has relied on nationalist concepts, and on maintaining the right to determine what those nationalist concepts consist of. The threats to his hegemony come in part from the perception that he does not have those nationalist credentials.

It is possible to construe from this that the constructed images of father, mother, son and daughter carry with them a certain degree of responsibility to the national project. To carry the metaphor of the family to its logical conclusion, the

[513] Zajovic, 1997, p 171
[514] Judah, 1997, p 43
[515] Sandford, 2000, "Father of the Nation"

self. This serves to entrench the conflict, as the differences between the two groups become so deeply rooted in past wrongs that a lasting peace becomes very difficult to achieve.

The effect of this gendering of conflict can then be extended to a recognition of the way these social constructions can effect the way countries in Eastern Europe deal with the issues of ethnicity and state borders. A national identity that is reliant upon these negative constructions of the enemy on such an emotive level will have great difficulty in reaching an equitable situation with members of that enemy nation in the same state. Therefore, in a scenario where there are the populations of two national groups living in the borders of one state, it is likely that these groups will have difficulty co-existing peacefully. This was certainly the case in the former Yugoslavia. What is important to understand is the deep impact that the often unrecognised influence of gender has upon these conflicts.

Whether under a hegemonic nationalist leadership or during a struggle between competing nationalisms, gender constructions played an integral part in the claim to and maintenance of nationalist power in the two countries examined in this thesis. The utility of including gender in the study of nationalism is not only evident in the examination of past events in Romania and Yugoslavia, it is necessary in the analysis of the present situation of both countries, as gender constructions will impact on the way those countries deal with issues of nationalism in the future. In Romania, the conception of women and men as breeders of the nation led to devastating psychological effects and the abandonment of thousands of children who could not be cared for. In the former Yugoslavia, the utilisation of rape as a tool of war has served to entrench the perceptions of difference between several national groups. Understanding the ubiquitous nature of these gender constructions in nationalist projects is vital to understanding how these nationalist groups view each other and themselves. Ignoring the vital role that gender plays in nationalism is to misunderstand the power that can be wielded through nationalist discourse.

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